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ABSTRACT 
ERIN BARTELS BULLER: The Unlocked Room Problem: Evidence and Interpretation 
in Twentieth-Century Investigation Narratives 
(Under the direction of Minrose Gwin) 
 
This project examines how a range of 20th-century fictions and memoirs use 
tropes borrowed from detective fiction to understand the past.  It considers the way the 
historiographical endeavor and the idea of evidence and interpretation are presented in 
William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, Go Down Moses, Intruder in the Dust, and the 
stories in Knight’s Gambit; Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men; Louis Owens’s 
The Sharpest Sight and Bone Game; and Lillian Hellman’s memoirs (An Unfinished 
Woman, Pentimento, Scoundrel Time, and Maybe).  The historical novel and sometimes 
even memoir, in the 20th century, often closely resembled the detective novel, and this 
project attempts to account for why.  Long before Hayden White and other late 20th-
century theorists of historical practice demonstrated how much historical writing owes to 
narrative conventions, writers such as Faulkner and Warren had anticipated those 
scholars’ claims.  By foregrounding the interpretation necessary to any historical 
narrative, these works suggest that the way investigators identify evidence and decide 
what it means is controlled by the rhetorical demands of the stories they are planning to 
tell about what has happened and by the prior loyalties and training of the investigators.  
The narratives investigators ultimately tell about what has happened in the past are 
already taking shape as the investigation proceeds, and it is the need to develop a 
persuasive account that determines what investigators are able to see and therefore what 
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counts as evidence.  In its final chapter, this study moves beyond the historical novel to 
explore, in memoir, the tension between the interpretation of documentary evidence and 
the narrative form of what James Olney calls the “voice of memory.”  The project 
concludes by considering the versions of justice that persist once these 20th-century 
novels and memoirs have severed the direct link between the reconstruction of the past 
(specifically the crime) and justice that predominates in genre detective fiction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“There is nothing like first-hand evidence . . . as a matter of fact, my mind is entirely 
made up upon the case, but still we may as well learn all that is to be learned.” 
 
Sherlock Holmes speaking, in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, A Study in Scarlet, 1887 
 
 “He knew what he was going to find before he found it.” 
 
William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses, 1942 
 
As sixteen-year-old Isaac (Ike) McCaslin, in William Faulkner’s novel Go Down, 
Moses, pages through the ledger books in which his father and uncle recorded the 
buyings, sellings, freeings, births, and deaths of the McCaslin slaves, we are told that “he 
knew what he was going to find before he found it” (257).  What he knows he will find, 
however, is not a specific entry or an already-known detail, but a particular type of 
answer to a question: why his uncle Buddy believed that a slave woman named Eunice 
drowned herself on Christmas Day of 1832.  Ike both knows and does not know, the text 
suggests, what he is looking for.  The text describes his reading experience in terms that 
might be familiar to any researcher who has gone to a source knowing what it should 
contain, may contain, yet might not reveal as straightforwardly as the researcher hopes: 
“finding, beginning to find on the next succeeding page what he knew he would find, 
only this was still not it because he already knew this” (257). What Ike knows he will 
find is a reference to the pregnancy of Eunice’s daughter Tomasina, presumably pregnant 
by Ike’s grandfather (and her master) Carothers McCaslin.  The entry that he refers to as 
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“still not it” (because he knows it already) states that Tomasina, called Tomey, died 
giving birth in 1833, along with a reference to “Fathers will” that Ike understands to 
explain the paternity of Tomey’s son Terrel (Turl), to whom the elder McCaslin 
bequeathed a thousand dollars (257, italics original).  But Ike anticipates that there is 
something more, something he does not yet know, something that exceeds the 
explanatory power of the story he has known since childhood.  What he expects to find is 
a turn of events beyond expectation—he does not already know the actual content of 
whatever evidence that he is going to find, only that he will know it when he sees it 
because it will explain; it will be unspeakably horrible to have caused Eunice to kill 
herself.  Ike knows the nature of the fact he will discover without actually knowing what 
it is; he has construed it as crucial evidence prior to knowing its content. 
A corollary to this search scene can be found in Faulkner’s short detective story 
“Hand Upon the Waters,” published in 1939 and reprinted in Knight’s Gambit in 1949.  
Lawyer-detective Gavin Stevens goes to a neighboring county while trying to determine 
who might have murdered a local man, and “although he would not know until he found 
it just what he was looking for, he found it before dark—the agent for the company 
which, eleven years ago, had issued to Lonnie Grinnup [the murdered man] a five-
thousand-dollar policy, with double indemnity for accidental death, on his life, with Tyler 
Ballenbaugh as beneficiary” (72).  Like Ike, Gavin does not quite know what he is 
looking for, but he knows enough to know where to look and the shape, the type, the 
outlines of the evidence he will need to find.  He knows enough to realize when he has 
found what he is looking for.  
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 When Ike McCaslin does recognize the unspeakable fact that fits the gap in the 
narrative that he has held open as a blank space whose outlines and thus whose meaning 
already appears clear to him, he is not at that moment reading the ledger book that is open 
in front of him.  Instead, having lifted off in his thoughts from the text of the ledgers 
themselves, he has been telling himself a story about Tomey and her parents: Tomey, he 
muses, is “the only child of a couple who were not field hands and who held themselves 
something above the other slaves not alone for that reason but because the husband and 
his father and mother too had been inherited by the white man from his father, and the 
white man himself had travelled three hundred miles and better to New Orleans in a day 
when men travelled by horseback or steamboat, and bought the girl’s mother as a wife 
for” (258-59).  The line breaks off as Ike suddenly realizes that part of the story he is 
telling himself does not measure up.  The incongruence is located in the story he is telling 
himself, not in the document he is holding.  As he realizes, however, that Tomey must 
have been the daughter of Carothers McCaslin, as well as the mother of his child, the “old 
frail pages seemed to turn of their own accord even while he [Ike] thought His own 
daughter His own daughter.  No No Not even him back to that one [page] where the white 
man (not even a widower then) who never went anywhere . . . and who did not need 
another slave, had gone all the way to New Orleans and bought one” for $650 (259, 
italics original).  The ledger reasserts itself as a source of evidence for the new story.  Ike 
returns to it, almost frantically, to verify the story he has just produced, to see if the 
evidence does fit this terrible explanation—if the prices, the dates, the journey mentioned 
indeed correspond with the new meaning his revised narrative has assigned them.   
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There is no proof in the ledgers that Carothers McCaslin committed incest other 
than two story elements that reinforce each other and thus become evidence for each 
other: McCaslin traveled to New Orleans to purchase an expensive slave (Eunice) of 
whom he had no need, and years later, the daughter (Tomey), whom the woman bore 
three years after she came from New Orleans and a year after she was married to her 
husband, became pregnant and the baby’s grandmother (Eunice) killed herself.  Indeed, 
there is almost nothing in those pages, as presented, that particularly suggests it—not the 
timing of Eunice’s arrival, marriage, or pregnancy—nothing but these two mutually 
reinforcing story components.  Yet they compel belief because together they make the 
story work.  
The story elements recorded so briefly by Ike’s father and his uncle Buddy are 
secondhand and written down years after they have taken place.  When Ike’s father starts 
the ledger after his own father’s death, it is 1837.  The information about Carothers 
McCaslin’s purchase of Eunice in New Orleans is thus recorded in at least 1837, if not 
later, but goes back to 1807.  How do Ike’s father and uncle know the year, the place, the 
price of her sale?  The story is embedded already in a history of the way things become 
evidence, yet Ike accepts it as evidence because it supports the story he has hit upon.  
Then, in the context of the new explanatory narrative, something else that Ike has known 
all his life suddenly begins to figure as evidence as well: “he knew from his own 
observation and memory that there had already been some white in Tomey’s Terrel’s 
blood before his father gave him the rest of it” (259). His observations have been a 
lifelong fact.  Only now, however, does what he has seen come to have an evidentiary 
value, a meaning in a story.   
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Narrative, Evidence, and Detection in 20th-Century American Literature 
It is the situation of a fact in a narrative, as Ike’s encounter with the ledgers 
suggests, that makes it evidence in a literary or historical sense.1  Narrative is primary; 
evidence becomes evidence because of its relationship to that narrative.  Historian Lionel 
Gossman writes that “evidence only counts as evidence and is only recognized as such in 
relation to a potential narrative, so that the narrative can be said to determine the evidence 
as much as the evidence determines the narrative” (26).   Mark Bevir, writing in 2011, 
pushes this claim further, to encompass even the term “fact,” arguing that “the content of 
facts necessarily reflects the narratives in which they are located,” that “there cannot be 
facts outside narratives” (32).  Julian Lethbridge provides a literary angle on the same 
issue: “How can we know what the evidence is that will lead us to the solution until we 
know what has been done and how, until we are possessed of the solution?”, Lethbridge 
asks in an essay on Edgar Allan Poe’s short story “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” 
(1841), which is usually recognized as the first example of detective fiction (89).2  The 
direction of an investigation, understood as Lethbridge describes it, is thus unexpected—
it moves from the solution (the expected or proposed solution) to the evidence, 
considering whether a given fact or object constitutes evidence on the basis of its 
congruence with the proposed story, with the proposed solution.3  A consideration of the 
                                                           
1
 In other contexts it might make more sense to say that it is a fact’s situation in an argument that makes it 
evidence, but historical narratives, like their literary (fictional and non-fictional) corollaries, argue for 
themselves as the most persuasive version of a story, the most persuasive explanation of events.   
2
 See for instance Howard Haycraft, Murder for Pleasure: The Life and Times of the Detective Story 
(1941), 4, and Julian Symons, Bloody Murder: From the Detective Story to the Crime Novel (1993), 28. 
3
 As Tzvetan Todorov, Peter Brooks, and Franco Moretti stress, detective fiction represents the search for 
the fabula, for the imagined order of events operating behind their presentation in narrative (which the 
Russian Formalists—fabula is also their term—called the sjužet).  See page 15 for further discussion. 
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concept of evidence in these terms, particularly of its relationship to narrative, has 
significant ramifications for the practice of history, specifically the relationship between 
historical research and history writing. 
Since its earliest days, detective fiction has been a genre with great promise for 
exploring epistemological questions.  Lethbridge argues that Poe was addressing a 
philosophical problem endemic to historical practice: how we come to know that which 
we do not know (89-90).  Detective fiction and historical practice share not only 
epistemological concerns but also rhetorical concerns; historical work consists not just in 
knowing but also in explaining and convincing.  Robin Winks argues that the “historian 
must collect, interpret, and then explain his evidence by methods which are not greatly 
different from those techniques employed by the detective, or at least the detective of 
fiction” (xiii).  Like the detective, the historian is responsible not just for attempting to 
determine what has happened in the past, but also for producing a persuasive and 
meaningful account of it.  In detective fiction, the stakes of the persuasiveness of this 
account are more immediate, concrete, and visible than those of historical work: freedom 
or incarceration, life or death. Each piece of evidence in an investigation, criminal or 
historical, has two lives: the first when it is sought and found, and the second when it is 
presented as support for the investigator’s story or argument.  It is the expectation of that 
second instance, as in Ike McCaslin’s story, that enables the first and determines what 
will count as evidence. 
This dissertation examines four groups of texts, from a range of periods and more 
than one genre, that examine, from four different angles, the way that evidence emerges 
in narrative and is in fact determined by the requirements of narrative.  Each group of 
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texts likewise engages with the idea of investigation, of how the past might be 
apprehended, or at least glimpsed, and how it might be represented—and especially 
pertinently for this project, how the apprehension of the past is often fully subsumed into 
its representation.  In many cases the texts studied go so far as to suggest that evidence is 
a rhetorical flourish, a part of the story of investigation that emerges not as a thread 
leading through the investigation of the past and toward the truth, but instead recognized 
and included as evidence first at the moment when it becomes clear that it will make the 
story told about the past more convincing.4  The idea that evidence becomes evidence 
only in relation to a narrative brings into play an obvious circularity, a circularity which 
the texts examined in this dissertation submit to scrutiny and ultimately suggest is the 
case in all dealings with evidence.  These texts explore the consequences for 
historiography of the circular nature of evidence, indeed of its tendency to appear as a 
result of the demands of narrative.  In the pursuit of their exploration of the idea of 
evidence and its implications for historiography, all four sets of texts either make direct 
                                                           
4
 We often think of evidence and clues as related concepts.  However, the two concepts seem to have arisen 
in very different ways.  The Oxford English Dictionary indicates that “clue” once meant a ball of thread or 
yarn (“Clue,” Def. 1a).  One use of this word was in the context of myths such as Theseus in the Cretan 
labyrinth and Chaucer’s reworking of it (the “Ariadne” section of The Legend of Good Women, dating from 
around 1386, which used the word clew(e) or clue (which were just variations in spelling) to describe the 
thread that helped Theseus find his way in the labyrinth) (“Clue,” Def. 2a.).  Later, its literal sense more 
deeply obscured, clue came to mean “that which points the way, indicates a solution, or puts one on the 
track of a discovery” (“Clue,” Def. 2b).  Evidence as a concept, on the other hand, has its origins in rhetoric 
rather than the way-finding of the labyrinth.  Evidentia, the Greek word most similar in sound to the 
English evidence, meant the ability “to make a topic not only evident, but palpable”—in other words, 
seemingly even beyond evident, due to the rhetorician’s skill—to make it come to life (Ginzburg 29).  
Thomas Cole defines it as the “re-creation of a scene with such vividness as to compel belief on the part of 
the hearer” (39, emphasis added).  “Both our notion of evidence and the Latin evidentia,” Carlo Ginzburg 
explains, “emerge in the sphere of rhetoric, especially judicial rhetoric” (29).  As a word in English, 
“evidence” has from its earliest recorded history meant an indication, a mark, an “appearance from which 
inferences may be drawn” (“Evidence,” Def. 3a), or similarly a “ground for belief; testimony or facts 
tending to prove or disprove any conclusion” (“Evidence,” Def. 5a).  Its legal meanings in English grew 
directly out of these commonplace ones.  Whereas a clue leads, evidence supports a conclusion or an 
argument.  Yet in detective fiction, what masquerades as a clue turns out more often than not to be 
determined by the argument it will be used to make, the argument about what happened at the time of the 
crime.   
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use of the structures of detective fiction or frame the approach to the past as an endeavor 
that resembles the solving of crimes in detective fiction.  They furthermore ask what 
happens to the idea of justice when the direct link between reconstruction of the crime 
and justice that predominates in genre fiction is broken.  The texts considered include 
Faulkner’s novels Absalom, Absalom! (1936) and Go Down, Moses (1942) and his 
detective fiction, primarily the novel Intruder in the Dust (1948) and the stories written 
between 1931 and 1940 that were reprinted, together with a novella completed in 1949, 
under the title Knight’s Gambit in 1949; Robert Penn Warren’s novel All the King’s Men 
(1946); Lillian Hellman’s memoirs, published between the late 1960s and mid 1980s; and 
the mystery novels written by Louis Owens in the early 1990s.   
The dissertation argues that many of the 20th-century American writers who 
borrow structures and imagery from detective fiction to use in texts about various kinds 
of investigation (historical, criminal, and even the exploration of the personal past in 
memoir) make use of those borrowings to examine the gap between evidence and 
conclusions in attempts to know the past.  Detective fiction itself, especially the Golden 
Age detective fiction that immediately preceded (and in the work of many detective 
fiction writers continued into) the period studied in this dissertation, and of which several 
of the writers studied here were readers, tends to represent the movement from clue to 
conclusion as a smooth process made possible by the masterful interpretation of the 
available evidence by what Howard Haycraft calls a “transcendent and eccentric” 
detective (12).5  It can even be argued that more recent versions of detective and crime 
                                                           
5
 The Golden Age of detective fiction spans the decades of the 1920s and 30s; Symons argues that it began 
with the publication of Agatha Christie’s first novel, The Mysterious Affair at Styles, in 1920 (102-03).  
Many of the writers of this period, however, continued to write into the 50s, 60s, and even 70s. 
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stories intensify the directness of the link between evidence and conclusions: according to 
Scott Campbell, in the popular television series CSI, “the characters [professional “crime 
scene investigators”] finish each other’s sentences, providing a single interpretive avenue 
available to anyone who has done the training.”  The texts examined in this dissertation, 
on the other hand, react against detective fiction proper and instead represent 
investigation as a site of conflict.  These conflicts generally arise from one of two causes.  
The first is a circularity in the investigative process, whereby either the way a preliminary 
narrative about what has happened is being constructed, or the investigator’s desire for a 
particular outcome, determines what is construed as evidence.  The second is the way the 
situatedness of the investigator figure affects the identification and interpretation of 
evidence.  In many of these texts, the conflict arises from both causes.   
In Faulkner’s work, it is the need to create a persuasive narrative, for instance in 
one of lawyer-detective Gavin Stevens’s end narratives in the Knight’s Gambit stories or 
in the inventive historical reconstructions carried out by Quentin Compson and Shreve 
McCannon in their dormitory in Absalom, Absalom!, that affects what is identified as 
evidence and how that evidence is used in support of a conclusion about what must have 
happened in the past.  The story the investigator wants to tell about the past, in other 
words, determines the evidence, just as much or more than the evidence determines the 
shape of the reconstruction of past events.   
Robert Penn Warren draws together three stories of investigation in All the King’s 
Men: Jack Burden’s study of the life of Cass Mastern, his search for politically-damning 
activity in Judge Irwin’s past in “The Case of the Upright Judge,” and his attempt to 
discover who prompted his friend Adam Stanton to kill his employer, Willie Stark. 
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Warren draws heavily on the imagery and structures of detective fiction, especially 
American hardboiled detective fiction, in the investigation scenes, but he subverts the 
work that hardboiled detective fiction usually does by burdening his detective with 
multiple and contradictory commitments that influence his investigative method and also 
by having Jack (the detective-narrator) tell his story from a position removed more than a 
year from the events and having him reject several possible detective fiction endings. 
Even more clearly than Warren’s book, Louis Owens’s novels The Sharpest Sight 
and Bone Game borrow heavily from detective fiction structures and tropes but resist full 
identification with the genre. Working partially within this genre so deeply indebted to 
rationalism and European ways of knowing, Owens, a Native American writer, 
challenges detective fiction’s traditional frameworks of investigation, evidence-gathering, 
and detective-style deduction by showing interpretation and even the identification of 
evidence taking place in the context of the tension between legal and academic ways of 
knowing and Indigenous epistemologies.  The investigators in Owens’s novels make use 
of dream knowledge and spiritual and supernatural experiences as evidence in the 
reconstruction of both crimes and historical events.   
Like Owens’s novels, Lillian Hellman’s life writing foregrounds a potential 
conflict among multiple types of evidence and multiple ways of knowing.  Hellman’s 
memoirs are punctuated by investigation scenes in which her memoirist persona 
investigates her past life as would a detective or a historian, sifting through documents 
and comparing them to the narrative of the past that she has tentatively created.  Her 
writing is animated by a tension between her fidelity to her memories of her past and 
another, just as strong, commitment to the truth of her previous writings about those same 
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past events—her diaries and journals, her notes, her letters, even her previously-published 
writing.  The tension is made more dramatic by the heightened attention to the status of 
truth claims in memoir in the last several decades and by the repeated public accusations 
in the last few years before Hellman’s death that her memoirs were full of lies.  Her 
inclusion of documents from her past and of her own earlier writing ultimately serves to 
lend greater authority to the voice of memory in her life writing, as the evidence of the 
diaries, letters, and other documents included is interpreted and framed (sometimes even 
re-written) in light of the present concerns of the narrating consciousness of the memoirs.  
In the place of the smooth movement from evidence to conclusion portrayed so 
often in genre detective fiction, and indeed in the writing of history, in which as Susan 
Stanford Friedman notes, “the notion of history writing as the best possible 
reconstruction of the past—in a seamless narrative by an omniscient, invisible narrator . . 
.  continues to underwrite many projects” undertaken by historians despite theorists’ 
insistence in the last forty years on the situatedness of the observer, the texts examined in 
this dissertation offer both a critique of the idea of evidence and a series of examples of 
the kinds of truth claims that literature can offer in its stead (201).  These particularly 
literary takes on evidence consider the possibility of justice (or sometimes instead of 
empathy) when knowledge is contingent and make a bid for the staking of truth claims 
outside narrow and sometimes arbitrary institutional rules (whether legal or historical) 
about what constitutes evidence.   
Detective fiction itself is an ideal place to study story, and certainly an ideal place 
to study the relationship of evidence to narrative; the texts examined here partake of that 
relationship as well, even as they call attention to the way detective fiction operates.  The 
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detective’s end narrative, which can be traced back to Poe and had a strong presence in 
the detective fiction that followed, is key in Faulkner’s fiction in particular but also 
resonates in Hellman’s work, as the memoirist’s voice describes the search through old 
papers, and in Jack Burden’s narration in All the King’s Men, which might be considered 
one long end narrative.  Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” was, as critics have 
noted, remarkably powerful in the influence it had on the subsequent development of the 
genre of detective fiction.6  The convention of ending with the narrativization of the 
initial event, the crime itself, in order to reveal both the criminal and the details of the 
crime, goes back to “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” and informs the subsequent 
development of the detective fiction genre.  At the end of Poe’s story, Dupin (the 
detective figure) tells the story of his investigation, presenting the clues and his 
interpretation of them one by one to the narrator and ultimately reconstructing for him the 
events of the murders.  Poe’s technique is to allow the inset story, narrated in quotation 
marks by Dupin to the narrator of the rest of the story, to argue for itself as the most 
likely explanatory narrative for the facts, as the most likely reconstruction of a series of 
past events that have not been observed by any available witness. The story is a locked 
room problem, in which the action has taken place “behind the shut doors of the 
impenetrable past,” in the words of David Lehman (76).  The detective’s role is to 
recover that past and solve the crime with the help of only the evidence remaining in the 
room.  Dupin tells the story of the investigation first, but even as he relates the story of 
the investigation, it becomes clear that the evidence he seeks in that investigation is 
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 David Lehman, for instance, remarks that “[n]early all the conventions of the classic whodunit—from 
locked rooms to least likely culprits, eccentric sleuths and their admiring companions, dullard cops, and 
wrongly accused bystanders—originate with Poe” (71). 
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already part of a potential explanatory narrative for the crime.  He goes to the scene of the 
crime, in other words, specifically in order to find a means by which an extremely agile, 
non-human creature could have entered the room through the window and then left it 
after murdering the women while still shutting the window behind him.  He brings his 
explanatory narrative with him into the locked room, and everything he sees there, he 
sees in light of it. 
Since Poe, the detective story has largely been about the detective’s story. 
Lehman argues that the two narratives of the detective story, the story of the murder and 
the story of the investigation, “meet at the point where the sleuth reveals his solution to 
the case” (xiii). The revelation of that solution almost always takes the form of an 
account of the investigation and its conclusion as narrated by the detective.7  Because of 
their end narratives, detective stories are story-arguments; end narratives argue for their 
own veracity.  In the end narrative, as in historical writing, each piece of found evidence 
functions as rhetorical evidence, so that the storytelling phase of investigation becomes a 
persuasive act.  The impact of this storytelling phase filters backward in time, as well, 
meaning that the identification and interpretation of evidence throughout the investigation 
narrative is argumentative in form.  As an aid in discovery, evidence cannot get free of its 
primary, future position—to persuade.  
Much has been made, in narratology and detective fiction studies alike, of the 
detective story’s “double plot.”  Greg Forter summarizes John Cawelti’s description of 
the double plot by explaining that the crime “takes place once in the actual happening, 
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 This trend persists from Poe through the Golden Age.  In most hardboiled detective fiction, the detective 
narrates throughout but still delivers an end narrative.  More recent detective fiction uses a mixture of 
strategies but seldom eliminates some sort of revelation of the details of the crime by the detective. 
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then a second time in its gradual reconstruction and retelling by the detective,” allowing 
the reconstruction “to be judged on the basis of its fidelity to an initial, unrepresented 
event” (“Freud, Faulkner” 273).  One of the two plots of the detective story is mapped 
onto the other, so that as plot two (the investigation) reveals plot one (the crime), plot one 
structures plot two.  The narration of the crime seems to structure the events of the 
investigation because it is a retracing.  In the end narratives with which fictional 
detectives draw their cases to a close, the two levels of the plot, the story of the crime and 
the story of its investigation, meet.  The revelation of what has been found and what it 
means—the incorporation of the found evidence into the narrative and its deployment as 
rhetorical evidence—also reveals the criminal. 
Lehman makes an attempt to extend the significance of the detective story’s 
double plot by claiming that “the detective story is unique among literary forms in that 
the narrative line flows backward, from effect to cause, causing the reader to become a 
participant or co-conspirator, since one is continually asked to guess at the meaning of 
events and to extrapolate an entire scenario from a handful of clues” (xviii).  Jonathan 
Culler, however, extends this reversal of direction to all narratives: “One could argue that 
every narrative operates according to this double logic, presenting its plot as a sequence 
of events which is prior to and independent of the given perspective on these events, and, 
at the same time, suggesting by its implicit claims to significance that these events are 
justified by their appropriateness to a thematic structure” (198).  In other words, says 
Peter Brooks (paraphrasing Culler), narrative “proceeds through a ‘double logic,’ in that 
at certain narrative moments story events seem to be produced by the requirements of the 
narrative discourse, its need of meaning, rather than vice versa” (Reading 28).  Detective 
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fiction makes this unexpected reversal of direction, which Culler and Brooks argue is a 
feature of all narrative, very apparent. Tzvetan Todorov, according to Brooks, by 
identifying “the two orders of story, inquest and crime, as sjužet and fabula,”—a 
distinction developed by the Russian Formalists in which fabula is “defined as the order 
of events referred to by the narrative” and sjužet is “the order of events presented in the 
narrative discourse”—makes “the detective story the narrative of narratives” (Brooks, 
Reading 24-25, 12).  Working through a Sherlock Holmes story as an example, Brooks 
draws on Todorov’s work to argue that a “condition of all classic detective fiction” is 
“that the detective repeat, go over again, the ground that has been covered by his 
predecessor, the criminal” (Reading 24).  The detective produces the fabula—the 
complete array of imagined events on which the narrative presented (the sjužet) is 
based—from the sjužet, essentially reading and interpreting the narrative constructed by 
the criminal and then presenting literature’s closest approximation of the fabula itself in 
the end narrative at the close of the story, in which he reveals his solution to the case.8  
The writers studied in this dissertation who wrote before these critics (Faulkner, Warren, 
and Hellman) anticipate, to varying degrees, their claims about the way detective fiction 
structures illuminate the nature of all narrative.  Owens, writing afterward, takes on some 
of their ideas as he challenges the relationship of conclusion to justice that operates in 
genre fiction.  These writers sever detective fiction’s structures from their ends in genre 
fiction—closure, complete knowledge, and uncomplicated notions of justice—and yet by 
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 “In the terms of the Russian formalists,” Moretti says, “the criminal produces the sjužet, the detective the 
fabula . . . the former embodies the literary pole, the latter the scientific” (146).  Moretti goes on to argue 
that the “fabula narrated by the detective in his reconstruction of the facts brings us back to the beginning; 
that is, it abolishes narration . . . declares narration a mere deviation, a masking of that univocal meaning 
which is its raison d’être” (148). 
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inhabiting the forms of detective fiction, they are nevertheless able to participate in the 
investigations of the nature of narrative that these forms enable. 
 
Narration, Authority, and the Writing of History 
The texts discussed in this dissertation use the structures of detective fiction not 
only to think about narrative in general terms but to think through a central problem in 
historiography in the past forty years: the effect that the need to produce a persuasive 
narrative has on judgments about what constitutes evidence and on the interpretation of 
what is judged to be evidence.  As previously discussed, the historian, like the detective, 
has a double responsibility—to investigate and to narrate his findings.   Charles Rzepka 
links the figures of detective and historian (and the historian’s counterparts in the other 
historical sciences) historically, arguing that “the story of the development of the 
detective genre largely coincides with the history of narrative practice in these 
reconstructive sciences [paleontology, geology, and antiquarianism], and with its popular 
dissemination” (33).  Concurrent with the emergence and subsequent surge in popularity 
of detective fiction between 1841 and the early 20th century,9 the theory of history writing 
in the European and American tradition shifted from the positivist “wie es eigentlich 
gewesen” of Leopold von Ranke and his predecessors, who advocated the representation 
of the past “as it actually was,” as it actually happened, toward an increasingly prominent 
recognition of the role of narrative structures in shaping history writing (57).  In the 
1940s, R.G. Collingwood identified a shift in the popular understanding of historical 
work that he read as linked to changes in popular detective fiction.  In the late 19th and 
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 Symons (citing Haycraft) says that “no more than a dozen” crime stories were reviewed in the American 
Book Review Digest in 1914, “a figure which had grown to 97 in 1925 and to 217 in 1939” (123). 
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early 20th-century world of Sherlock Holmes, whom Collingwood accuses of running 
about like a human bloodhound rather than first formulating a theory, scientific history 
(the method of historical research that Collingwood promoted and that according to him 
“puts the question” to the past rather than relying on ready-made statements from primary 
sources) was not popularly accepted (218).  On the other hand, by Agatha Christie’s 
“Monseiur Poirot’s time,10 to judge by his sales, the general [public] cannot have too 
much of [the idea of formulating a question or theory first and then looking for evidence 
of it].   The revolution which dethroned the principles of scissors-and-paste history, and 
replaced them by those of scientific history, had become common property” (282).   
 This historian-as-detective model described by Collingwood is surprisingly 
narrative in nature.  Collingwood advocates bringing a question to what one finds in the 
archives, indeed putting sources “to the torture, twisting a passage ostensibly about 
something quite different into an answer to the question [one] has decided to ask” (270).  
The potential narratives proposed in answer to these questions brought to the material 
found in archives are the narratives according to which evidence is sorted and identified, 
and in light of which it is interpreted.  “Every time a historian asks a question,” 
Collingwood contends, “he asks it because he thinks he can answer it: that is to say, he 
has already in his mind a preliminary and tentative idea of the evidence he will be able to 
use” (281).  Collingwood’s ideas, though they are of course not accepted in their entirety 
by more recent scholars, have maintained some currency and have gone on to influence 
other scholars.  In 1991, the editors of Critical Inquiry (James Chandler, Arnold 
Davidson, and Harry Harootunian) named Collingwood as the best-known exception to 
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 Hercule Poirot appeared first in The Mysterious Affair at Styles (1920) and last in Curtain (1975).  
Collingwood is clearly not speaking of these later Poirot appearances. 
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the “rule of neglect” of the topic of evidence in the humanities, calling his case for the 
notion of the “historian’s constitutive dialogue with the human past” “compelling” 
(738).11  Writing a half-century later, they contended that though Collingwood’s analysis 
“did not register how complicated the questions of evidence prove to be,” it “helped 
scholars to see that evidence always responds to questions” (739). 
Hayden White, who since the 1970s has been engaged in examining the literary 
structures of historical writing and thinking, argues in a much more direct way that 
historians use narrative conventions to organize their accounts of the past.  The language 
that historians use (like any language) is not transparent; it adds meaning.  White argues 
that making a narrative out of research findings “entails an aesthetic regulation,” a 
“disciplined historical style” (Content 68).  He suggests that the “stylistic exclusions” 
necessary to aspire to the style canonized by academic historians are more powerful in 
setting limits on what counts as appropriate evidence in historical writing than are the 
actual “‘rules of evidence’ that a researcher is supposed to adhere to in any examination 
of the historical record” (Content 66).  White’s argument, in other words, is that what 
counts as evidence is largely determined by narrative requirements and expectations for 
structure that historians anticipate will arise during the writing stage.  Narrative and 
argument are so interdependent as to be inextricable in historical writing.  In the story 
told, each piece of found evidence functions as rhetorical evidence, making the 
storytelling phase of historical investigation a persuasive act. 
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 The limitations to his theory a half-century later, in the editors’ opinion, were two: first, his theory of 
historical reenactment, derived from the German hermeneutic tradition, had come under attack “from 
positions as diverse as those of the logical positivists and the post-structuralists”; and second, his theories 
“did not respect distinctions among disciplines and thus could not attend to differences among the ways in 
which evidence figures in various humanistic practices of inquiry and argument” (739).   
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Plots, according to White, are not to be found in events themselves; they are 
instead put there by historians, who are involved in “essentially a literary, that is to say 
fiction-making, operation” (Tropics 85).  White observes that historical narrative is by its 
nature interpretive, is by its nature linked to a process of meaning-making and to notions 
of justice, without which past happenings could not be told within a structure of 
beginning, middle, and end.  For a historical account to have a beginning, a middle, and 
most importantly an end, since real events clearly never do, what is required is a “moral 
principle” in light of which a historian might judge the resolution of the story as either 
just or unjust (White, Content 19).  “The demand for closure in the historical story,” 
White suggests, is “a demand . . . for moral meaning, a demand that sequences of real 
events be assessed as to their significance as elements of a moral drama” (Content 21).  
The desire for an ending is a desire for an apparatus to be built into the story to enable 
justice to be distinguished from injustice, and then justice either done or refused.  This 
link between the end of the story and justice in historical writing evokes, too, the similar 
equation of the two in detective fiction. 
 While historical research is certainly often undertaken with the primary goal of 
representing the experience of people who lived in the past, it also always bears the 
possibility that it will have an impact on the present and the future.  Certain types of 
investigations, especially in governmental or legal contexts, are undertaken explicitly in 
order to make a decision about how to proceed in the future.  Especially in this second 
version of history work, reconstruction takes on a particular weight; actions taken in 
response to a given historical narrative, be they legal or political, are presumably as just 
as possible only when the reconstruction is as accurate as possible.  The idea that 
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evidence, found only because it is sought, not coming into being until a narrative calls for 
it, is called upon to provide authority in decision-making about the future, means that in 
every case there is the risk of an inappropriately-assumed authority on the part of the 
investigator.   
To return to Go Down, Moses, the authority underlying Ike’s judgment about the 
story he uncovers is the relationship he claims not only to the white McCaslins but to the 
black ones—he believes that the ledgers contain a record “not alone of his own flesh and 
blood but of all his people, not only the whites but the black one[s] too, who were as 
much a part of his ancestry as his white progenitors, and of the land which they had all 
held and used in common and fed from and on” (256).  Ike has known Tomey’s Turl all 
his life and presumes to be able to judge that his skin color is more than half white, and 
thus to be able to reconstruct his ancestry.  From there he moves to try to imagine 
Eunice’s motivations and emotions as she walks into the creek. The people whose stories 
are buried in the traces left in the McCaslin ledger books take “substance and even a sort 
of shadowy life with their passions and complexities too as page followed page and year 
year,” but only through the structuring logic of Ike’s expectations, and with the addition 
of the stories he remembers (254).12  Ike desires to redress the wrongs instigated by his 
grandfather, but as Thadious Davis argues, his actions nevertheless reinforce his 
grandfather’s will.13  What Ike is doing may be a “challenge to his grandfather’s cultural 
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 Minrose Gwin argues that the ledger books “are too small a space to contain, in all their cultural and 
historical implications, the outrageousness of old Carothers McCaslin’s crimes and the tragic stories of 
Eunice and Tomasina, whose lives are squeezed into cryptic phrases in the ledger book” (77). 
13
 Davis’s argument considers the slippage between will as legal document and will as bidding: “The 
strength of the will as testament links will in Go Down, Moses to narration as human desire” (150). The 
words “father’s will” in Go Down, Moses, she says, carry “the weight of obligation, interpretation, and 
law” (Davis 149). 
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authority and his social identity,” Davis says; he “may well discursively expose 
Carothers’s wrongdoing and dissect his power; however, Ike also capitulates to the ‘will’ 
of old Carothers when he attempts to disperse to Tomey’s Turl’s children their monetary 
legacies” (159).14  Ike cannot interpret the actions of his black relatives without assuming 
an inappropriate authority that resembles his grandfather’s.  Wherever there are questions 
of evidence, there are questions of authority.  “When advertisers flourish a clean glove as 
proof of the miracles their detergent can work,” Heather Dubrow argues in the 
introduction to a 1996 PMLA issue that focused on the status of evidence in literary 
studies, “they assert the Adamic power to name, linking signifier and signified.  
Alternative meanings and interpretations are banished.  Turning an object into evidence is 
like gift-wrapping it: the agent performing the action defines and delimits the significance 
of the object” (16).   
One of the questions addressed in this project is how texts that interrogate the act 
of investigation in a particularly literary manner help us to think about the role of 
authority in the process of designating what counts as evidence for whatever it is that 
“has happened.”  Texts that are self-conscious about their strategies of narration and 
about the category of character, in particular fiction and memoir, allow a particular 
insight into the relationship between authority and persuasion.  If we use Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith’s much-cited definition of narrative as “verbal acts consisting of 
someone telling someone else that something happened,” then literary texts tend to open 
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 Gwin argues, in a similar vein, that in the Fonsiba story, also in “The Bear,” upon hearing Fonsiba say 
“I’m free,” Ike “rapidly retreats from Fonsiba’s material space which he has trespassed upon [and] re-enters 
the space of the ledger, the world of commerce in which debts of all kinds can be paid in money, the space 
owned by white men” (88).  “That space,” Gwin contends, “is what Ike cannot retreat from, though he tries, 
for he himself has become its ideological producer and production” (88, emphasis original). 
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up the question of who the “someone” and the “someone else” are and of how the 
“someone” achieves his or her authority with respect to the “someone else,” in a way that 
narrative history tends not to (228, emphasis original).  These texts make the figure who 
carries out a historical investigation into a character and the investigation itself into part 
of the plot, in contrast to historical writing, in which the work of gathering and 
interpreting evidence and the very position of the writer traditionally strive to make 
themselves disappear into the recounting of events.   
There have of course been movements in historiography, particularly in feminist 
historiography, that have attempted to recover the historian’s presence as author of the 
historical account.  As provocative as these attempts are, however, particularly literary 
means of exploring the investigator’s situatedness offer a different perspective.  History 
writing itself, as well as theory on historical practice, has in the past few decades opened 
up the question of how the historian is situated and of subjectivist epistemologies in 
general, in provocative and useful ways.15   Joan Scott, for instance, calls for “examining 
the relationships between discourse, cognition, and reality, the relevance of the position 
or situatedness of subjects to the knowledge they produce, and the effects of difference 
on knowledge”; indeed she criticizes historians for not asking “whether it matters for the 
history they write that historians are men, women, white, black, straight, or gay” and for 
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 This project has succeeded in many ways but has also encountered challenges at the level of technique: 
how does one actually write a history that takes the historian into account?  Susan Stanford Friedman 
summarizes the situation (as of 1995) in this way (in a fuller version of an argument I have previously 
quoted): “The positivist belief in history writing as the production of objective truth may no longer be very 
prevalent in its purest form, although it once served as the philosophical bas[i]s for the formation of history 
as a discipline in the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries.  However, the notion of history 
writing as the best possible reconstruction of the past –in a seamless narrative by an omniscient, invisible 
narrator—nonetheless continues to underwrite many projects, including feminist ones” (201). 
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measuring authority, in the words of Michel de Certeau, “‘by the elimination of 
everything concerning the speaker’” (Scott 373).   
Detective activity in fiction and memoir provides a useful backdrop against which 
to read texts that represent historical investigation as a complicated and messy process.  
Detective characters have been fleshed out and quirky from the beginning (for example 
Eugène François Vidocq’s persona in his Memoires (1828),16 Poe’s Dupin, Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes).  They both embody the coldest and most rational of logics 
and serve as some of the most memorable and warmly eccentric characters in popular 
literature.  (Sherlock Holmes, especially, is arguably more memorable than the mysteries 
he solves.)  Haycraft argues that Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” created the 
structure and “minutiæ, time-hallowed today,” of detective fiction “virtually with a single 
stroke of the pen,” including the “transcendent and eccentric detective,” the combination 
of aloofness, amateur status, and precise method on the part of the investigator that has 
largely persisted in detective fiction (12).  Despite the detective’s quirks, factors external 
to the investigation such as his relationships, his family, or other demands on his time 
have no bearing on his interpretation of evidence, in genre fiction. 
The literature of investigation of the last eighty years draws on the eccentric 
investigator convention of detective fiction but, rather than preserving the tension 
between that eccentricity and the supposedly smooth logic of detective-style deduction,17 
opens up the question of the situated historian.  Gavin Stevens and Chick Mallison are 
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 One of Poe’s alleged influences.  See Haycraft 24. 
17
 My discussion of “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” in chapter 2 suggests that in some detective fiction, 
at least Poe’s, the movement from clue to conclusion is not as unimpeded as the story seems at first glance 
to present it. 
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decidedly from Yoknapatawpha County and see the world and the problems they are 
investigating in its terms.  Jack Burden attempts to uncover evidence against one good 
friend in conversations with other good friends because he is employed by a political 
rival of the friend and father figure.  Cole McCurtain and Alex Yazzie believe in ghosts 
and dreams and try to reconcile the knowledge they receive from those sources with their 
academic training.  Hellman questions the stability of memories as their emotional 
valences change: “What didn’t I see during the time of work that I now see more clearly? 
. . . Or what did I see in the past that I could not now duplicate?  Perhaps because the 
emotions that made it possible are over and are not recoverable . . . or perhaps because 
the years blank out even passions” (Three 4).  Novels and memoir are ideal sites for 
working out the shifts in the ways evidence is identified, sorted, discarded, and 
interpreted when the ways of knowing proper to expert methodologies run up against the 
quite different but quite real circumstance of knowing one’s way around a place or a 
person.  These literary texts also ask us to notice—in a way that most historical narrative 
does not—the way narrators direct attention toward and away from scenes and traces that 
might function as evidence.  They ask us to notice what is determined to count as 
evidence and what is not and why.  Memoir, the genre with which I conclude this project 
by considering Lillian Hellman’s life writing, is a particularly productive site for 
exploring issues of authority because it both calls attention to its narration and the 
authority of its narrator and makes truth claims that fiction does not.  In my examination 
of memoir in my last chapter, I shift to a broader discussion of authority and evidence in 
an attempt to extend the implications of these arguments. 
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Chapter Summaries 
 My first chapter, “The Detective’s Story: Narration, Persuasion, and Justice in 
William Faulkner’s Fiction,” discusses Faulkner’s engagement with the centrality of 
narrative conventions in the representation of the past in both major novels like Absalom, 
Absalom! and Go Down, Moses and his detective fiction.  I contend that Faulkner’s 
fiction shows not only that law is narrative and rhetorical in nature, as Jay Watson has 
previously argued, but that investigation itself—the search for and interpretation of 
evidence—is narrative and rhetorical, as well.  The readings in the chapter demonstrate 
that Faulkner’s work anticipates the claims that scholars such as White later made about 
style and narrative conventions determining the shape of historical writing.  Additionally, 
they suggest that Faulkner’s understanding of the nature of historical research and writing 
is even more radical than White’s: where White sees imagination at work “at the last 
stage of [the historian’s] labors, when it becomes necessary to compose a discourse or 
narrative in which to represent his findings, that is, his notion of ‘what really happened’ 
in the past,” Faulkner, in Intruder in the Dust and his short detective fiction, represents 
the investigation of crimes or other past happenings as inflected, from the moment the 
investigation begins, by the shaping force of the end narrative that the detective figure 
knows he will eventually have to tell about what has happened (Content 67-68).  The 
presence of this end narrative is so strong during the course of the investigation that it 
causes the detective to identify some facts and objects, but not others, as evidence for the 
emerging story, even as those facts and objects are first encountered.  Narrative 
formations drive and structure the investigation.   
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Gavin Stevens, Chick Mallison, and other investigator figures in Faulkner decide 
their next step on the basis of stories they have in mind—for instance the conclusion that 
Jake Montgomery must have been the buyer of the stolen timber in Intruder in the Dust, 
and must have known that it was stolen, in order for his killing to make sense.  It is on the 
basis of this story that Stevens and the sheriff decide to call the timber’s “ultimate 
consignee” to verify Montgomery’s role (223).  They find the evidence they go looking 
for.  These story-form investigations gesture toward the literary and rhetorical nature of 
investigation, not only in detection, but in all fields that begin with the identification and 
interpretation of evidence: history, the physical sciences, medicine, archaeology, and 
many others.  In Faulkner’s detective fiction, evidence is produced by the conclusion—in 
other words, the just ending anticipated by the detective figure enables the identification 
of a set of facts and objects as evidence.  The chapter does not suggest that this 
relationship of evidence to conclusion is unique to Faulkner’s work; indeed, it argues that 
the genre itself subordinates the idea of evidence to the tidiness of the just conclusion and 
does so not only in the Golden Age detective fiction Faulkner was known to have read 
and enjoyed, but going all the way back to Poe, in whose detective stories, as Patricia 
Creswell argues, detection “is more a mastery of rhetoric than of reasoning” (49).  
Faulkner’s detective fiction calls attention to the relationship of evidence to conclusion in 
all detective fiction, and indeed in historical writing as well.  More than the other writers 
studied here, however, Faulkner attempts to preserve the use value of the concepts of 
truth and justice, even when evidence’s inescapably rhetorical nature is recognized. 
The chapter goes on to argue that there is a strong link between Faulkner’s 
engagement with narrative and evidence in the representation of the past in his detective 
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fiction and the same concerns in Absalom, Absalom! and Go Down, Moses; it thus re-
evaluates the place of his detective fiction, which has often been considered a distinct 
project from his major novels and to have been written mostly for money, in his body of 
work. I argue that the focus on evidence in Faulkner’s detective fiction, especially in 
Intruder in the Dust, which many critics have argued is closely linked to Go Down, 
Moses, Faulkner’s previous novel, enables a reading of certainly Go Down, Moses, but 
also Absalom, Absalom!, as concerned with the nature of evidence and interpretation.  
In my second chapter, “Hardboiled Sleuthing and Historiography in Robert Penn 
Warren’s All the King’s Men,” I use the hardboiled detective fiction content from All the 
King’s Men, which has been documented in great detail by Henry Cuningham, as a lens 
for examining the novel’s historiographical vision.  A paid private investigator for the 
“Boss,” (Willie Stark, called Willie Talos in the 2001 “restored” version of All the King’s 
Men compiled by Noel Polk18), Jack searches for politically damning evidence against his 
employer’s rivals, keeping “out of sight” so that his work cannot be traced back to the 
Boss (20).  This work, as well as his searches for people the Boss needs to find, closely 
resembles the work of a private investigator in hardboiled detective fiction, as does the 
tough language Jack uses both in dialogue and in his role as narrator.  I argue that the 
novel both revises the conventions of the detective story and fictionalizes the 
historiographical endeavor, such that the commitments of the investigator determine the 
shape of the investigation and what he is able to perceive as evidence in his three major 
investigations into the past—his dissertation research using the letters and journals of a 
19th-century ancestor, what he calls “The Case of the Upright Judge” (the search for 
                                                           
18
 Except where otherwise noted, all citations from the novel are to the 1996 Second Harvest Edition of All 
the King’s Men, which follows the originally-published 1946 text. 
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evidence of scandal in the past of the Boss’s political rival and Jack’s childhood friend 
and father figure Judge Irwin), and his attempt to determine who is ultimately responsible 
for the Boss’s assassination.  All the King’s Men considers the investigator’s own history, 
particularly what his commitments allow him to perceive as evidence, in precisely the 
ways that academic writing does not.  My analysis considers two angles of the 
relationship between Jack’s research methods and the narratives he produces from that 
research in the novel: first, Jack as a detective who is (more decidedly than in any form of 
genre detective fiction, whether Golden Age or hardboiled) torn between several 
commitments, and second, Jack as a detective who also narrates his own investigation. 
Part of the work of chapter 2 is to trace what Jack calls his “technique” as a 
historian-detective (193).  I look at the way his method in “The Case of the Upright 
Judge” divides into two parts, the first inflected by his personal relationships and the 
second attempting to set them aside as he leaves his home state and searches in 
professionalized zones like newspaper archives and stock record rooms, carrying out his 
detection in accord with what he conceives of as a set of rules for historical practice.  The 
personal does not stay sidelined for long, however, and returns to condition what he does 
with the evidence.  Throughout the search, his loyalties determine what he can ask, how 
he can ask it, and what he can hear in response.  The private investigator of hardboiled 
detective fiction is, like Jack, usually committed to the person who has hired him, and his 
investigation proceeds in the direction it does because of that commitment; All the King’s 
Men complicates the idea of commitment further than most hardboiled detective novels, 
however, because the political commitment he is paid for is in constant contention with 
Jack’s other loyalties.  
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The chapter also addresses the fact that Jack acts as both investigator and narrator.  
Jack’s position as a narrator removed in time by more than a year from the cases he is 
chronicling disrupts the normal operation of hardboiled detective fiction and by doing so 
engages with a second historiographical problem: the way the end point chosen by the 
teller helps to determine what is told.  Jack flirts briefly with detective fiction endings 
several times in the second half of the novel—when he discovers the clinching piece of 
evidence against Judge Irwin, when he experiences a “clean and pure” feeling upon 
deciding that it is Tiny Duffy who is ultimately responsible for Willie Stark’s 
assassination, and when he thinks to himself, “It was as though I were caught in a more 
monstrous conspiracy whose meaning I could not fathom” (417).  This last is an ending 
particular to hardboiled detective fiction, but although Jack has been using the idiom and 
moves of that tradition throughout his story, he rejects this type of ending, too.  Guilt for 
him is ultimately neither particular nor universal; he decides not to take revenge on Duffy 
or otherwise pursue the question of who is guilty, perhaps because too thorough an 
investigation would reveal Jack, not Duffy, as the villain.  He turns against the idea that 
knowledge can be certain—declining to even try to verify, for instance, his mother’s 
claim that Judge Irwin is his father, as James Perkins has pointed out (“Human 
Genetics”).  Because he presents his search for evidence against the Judge as from the 
beginning directed by reasons more complicated than an idea of justice, Jack’s narrative 
does not behave like genre fiction; when the evidence has been found and interpreted, it 
does not mean that the story is over.  Jack rejects the premise that decisions about how to 
proceed in the present and future should be based in knowledge of what has happened in 
the past.  By imposing another ending on the story, one in which he lives in Judge Irwin’s 
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house, cares for the Scholarly Attorney, and marries Anne, he chooses to proceed in the 
future based on his feelings and his philosophies rather than his knowledge about what 
has happened in the past.  He chooses to no longer be a detective. 
My third chapter, “Ghosts in the Locked Room: Spiritual Forms of Evidence and 
the Emergence of the Undisciplined Academic in Louis Owens’s Mystery Novels,” shifts 
into the later part of the 20th century, when the arguments made by figures like White had 
become commonplace and Owens and other writers were consciously using the strategies 
of postmodernism to think through the problems of narrative history.  I argue that Owens, 
himself an academic and a literary theorist and critic, uses the detective fiction genre to 
address the difficulty of reconciling the forms of evidence accepted in the academy and 
knowledge acquired from dreams, spiritual experiences, and encounters with beings such 
as ghosts.  The direct intrusion of the past into the present, in the form of a ghost or a 
revelation, disrupts the idea of reconstruction of the past on the basis of remaining traces 
only that has dominated detective fiction going back to Poe.  Dupin rejects supernatural 
causes outright in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” when he tells his friend the narrator 
that “it is not too much to say that neither of us believe in praeternatural events . . . 
Madame and Mademoiselle L’Espanaye [the victims] were not destroyed by spirits.  The 
doers of the deed were material, and escaped materially.  Then how?” (139).  Detective 
fiction relies on the past (or the crime scene) being a closed system, accessible only 
through traces left behind.  Owens harnesses the power of the disruption introduced by 
the presence of ghosts (and likewise knowledge that comes directly from dreams or from 
revelation in religious ceremonies) and uses it to challenge detective fiction’s usual 
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models for investigation and evidence-gathering, de-emphasizing solving in favor of a 
more expansive notion of learning and justice in favor of empathy.  
The investigators in these novels also reject the procedures of legal evidence-
gathering for other reasons.  In The Sharpest Sight (1992), the investigators refuse to 
consider much of the available physical evidence, partly because examining the murdered 
man’s body would probably lead them to the nineteen-year-old woman who most likely 
committed the murder, but who they by the end of the investigation consider “just part 
of” the web of injustices that has been committed (223).  The murderer, whose sister had 
previously been killed by the man she later murdered (but during a hallucination after he 
returned from Vietnam), begins to desire an end to the violence as well.  Because the 
investigators destroy the physical evidence, she is able to go on with her life and her 
healing. The investigators’ choices undercut the idea of an individual perpetrator and of 
the tidy notions of justice that often appear at the end of detective novels.  Whereas a 
double apprehension—a final understanding of the crime and the physical entrapment of 
the criminal—is the expected resolution in detective fiction, in both The Sharpest Sight 
and Bone Game (1994), the cause of the crimes is never entirely apprehended—neither 
entirely understood nor entirely caught and stopped. 
Bone Game, which takes place in a university setting and whose two main 
characters are professors and Native Americans, also attempts to negotiate between the 
systems of inquiry prized in academic disciplines and ways of evaluating and interpreting 
knowledge that operate outside those academic systems, particularly within Indigenous 
communities.  The physical and archival evidence for the lives and events that the 
investigators in both Bone Game and The Sharpest Sight are trying to understand is too 
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tenuous to support conclusions about those lives and those events on its own; the novels 
suggest that dreams and ghosts are necessarily the primary sources of evidence about 
them and offer deeper knowledge about what has happened.  The professor characters in 
Bone Game rely on evidence from academic sources, as well, and integrate that evidence 
with what they learn through dreams, spiritual experiences, and encounters with ghosts in 
order to understand the lives of the native Californians from almost two centuries prior 
who are demanding their attention.  They succeed at reconciling these two forms of 
evidence within their circle of close friends and family, and also in the fiction that Cole 
plans to return to writing.  The novel does not argue for forcing the university to 
acknowledge Indigenous ways of knowing, however; instead it indicates that Cole and 
Alex’s need to negotiate (rather than be at home in) the primarily Western frameworks of 
the academy puts them at an advantage as scholars.  The novel suggests that while the 
university is a productive position from which to write and speak, its insularity is 
potentially dangerous.  (The two murderers in the novel turn out to be Cole’s most 
serious students.)  As undisciplined academics, taking Indigenous ways of knowing 
seriously, spending much of their time off campus with family members, and forming 
cross-disciplinary friendships and work partnerships, Cole and Alex are able to make use 
of academic discourse and academic forms of evidence without having them condition 
their ways of thinking, a problem Owens takes up in his critical writing, as well.  Bone 
Game attempts to enlarge notions of evidence beyond what is usually accepted in the 
university and the law in order to try to take seriously all the ways that the world and the 
past can be known. 
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The final chapter, “Vouching for Evidence: The New Life of Old Writing in 
Lillian Hellman’s Memoirs,” shifts away from a direct consideration of detective fiction 
elements and instead attempts to ask much broader questions about evidence and 
authority.  Although the detective metaphor is certainly present in the investigation 
scenes in Hellman’s memoirs—one could argue that after years of living alongside 
detective novelist Dashiell Hammett, Hellman would quite easily have made recourse to 
that imagery—her engagement with the idea of evidence resides primarily in the friction 
created when her memory of the past encounters her previous writings about it or other 
documentary evidence.  The arguments made in chapter 4 rely heavily on my work with 
Hellman’s personal papers and the drafts of her memoirs located in the Harry Ransom 
Humanities Research Center at the University of Texas.   
In the 1980s, after the publication of her first three memoirs, Hellman began to be 
widely accused not only of inventing incidents in her life writing, but also of 
appropriating other people’s stories, particularly that of American psychoanalyst Muriel 
Gardiner, who had worked in the anti-fascist underground in Vienna during the 1930s, 
much like the title character of Hellman’s portrait “Julia” (part of her 1973 Pentimento: A 
Book of Portraits).  But Hellman’s memoirs themselves (like her plays) focus insistently 
on truth and lying, and also on the related concepts of memory, evidence, and access to 
the past.  Hellman’s inclusion of both retrospective narrative, based on her memories, and 
documentary evidence (such as old diaries and letters) in her memoirs prompts her 
readers to reconsider the relationship between these two major forms of evidence for the 
past.  Hellman’s references to sources are embedded within her testimony as to their 
origin, accuracy, and importance, which is true of the use of sources as evidence not only 
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in memoir, but in history-writing, biography, or any other form of writing about the past.  
In her writing, the use of sources to document experience becomes, however, a way of 
exploring present consciousness.  She asks repeatedly what the documents she is using 
mean now.   
The “voice of memory,” which in traditional understandings of autobiography, in 
the words of James Olney, is seen as “the guarantor of identity and continuity of being 
across time, the only liaison—but an unbroken and fully capable liaison all the same—
between past experience and present consciousness,” comes into conflict in Hellman’s 
life writing with earlier writing she has done about her past—her letters, diaries, and 
previously-published magazine pieces (861).  Memory, in story form, supplies the 
organizing logic for both her half-remembered, glimpsed memories and the old papers 
she digs out of her files.  She examines her previous writings and additionally contacts 
old friends and business associates, as well as paid researchers, in order to track down 
names, dates, and other details, but ultimately none of this documentation or research is 
the exclusive determinant of her conclusions about her past; she even re-writes old diary 
entries while presenting them as excerpted from her original diaries.  She reads these 
documents into evidence precisely in order to show how embedded they are in the 
rhetorical structure of her memoirs, her current writing.  The voice of memory claims the 
right to write over the top of what the diarist has previously written.  The evidence she 
uncovers has a second life as rhetorical evidence—selected, interpreted, and positioned in 
order to support what memoir suggests is the more real truth of memory.  While the 
primary implications of this chapter are for memoir, Hellman’s moves point to the 
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rhetoricity of evidence and the ultimate authority of the teller in any form of writing 
about the past, including history writing. 
I begin this study with an examination of the circularity of evidence—of its 
tendency to be determined by as well as determine narratives about what has taken 
place—in Faulkner’s detective fiction, which, while somewhat unusual, is nevertheless 
detective fiction. I go on to discuss the relationship of the idea of evidence in Faulkner’s 
detective fiction to the same concern in some of his major novels.  From there, I broaden 
my scope to look at the way narrative needs and investigators’ attachments define the 
evidence in another major American novel, All the King’s Men, which is not itself 
detective fiction but does borrow heavily from the language, imagery, and plot elements 
of hardboiled detective fiction.  I then zoom in a bit to focus on what seems at first to be a 
specific problem in Louis Owens’s fiction—the interplay between institutional and 
Indigenous epistemologies—but proves to have wider consequences.  I conclude by 
bringing questions of authority to the forefront in my discussion of Hellman’s memoirs 
and considering what it means to see documentary evidence made quite clearly into a 
rhetorical device, what it means for the selection and interpretation of evidence to be 
directly dependent on the will of the narrator.  In all of these chapters, I consider what 
happens to notions of truth and justice when what constitutes evidence is so closely 
linked to the authority of the accounts proposed, revised, and finally promulgated by the 
investigator.  I attempt throughout to illuminate the implications of these texts’ unlocking 
of the locked room of detective-style investigation and likewise their opening up of the 
role of the historian into a field of prior loyalties and expectations. 
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The investigator encounters the mystery of what happened “behind the shut doors 
of the impenetrable past” accompanied by much more than what is lying in front of him, 
by what one might call the scene of the crime, whether it is a locked room strewn with 
bodies or the unreachable childhood of Lillian Hellman’s persona in her memoirs 
(Lehman 76).  Whether what the detective brings to the scene are prior commitments, 
prior assumptions about what the end narrative will look like, prior beliefs, or prior 
professional training—and these categories certainly overlap—the evidence is never all in 
the room.  The detective makes certain categories of what is there in his or her present 
moment into evidence for what happened in the past, enabled to identify and interpret it 
because of his relationships, his professional formation—the learning of a professional 
language, a professional method, a professional way of viewing the world—and what he 
already knows, believes, and feels.  Questions of epistemology, contained in “The 
Murders in the Rue Morgue” in the single problem of making the intuitive leap from clue 
to explanation, open up in these texts to questions of alternate epistemologies: local ways 
of knowing, disciplinary ways of knowing, Indigenous ways of knowing.  To the extent 
that historical investigation is imagined as taking place in a locked room, uninhibited by 
professionalization, personal ties, beliefs, or feelings, these four writers unlock that 
locked room to complicate the representation of investigation, showing how expected 
conclusions and attachments may, often, determine what the investigator sees.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
THE DETECTIVE’S STORY: NARRATION, PERSUASION, AND JUSTICE IN 
WILLIAM FAULKNER’S FICTION 
 
Peter Brooks has observed that the law “adjudicates narratives of reality, and 
sends people to prison, even to execution, because of the well-formedness and force of 
the winning story” (“Narrativity” 2).  Conviction “in the legal sense,” he says, “results 
from the conviction created in those who judge the story” (Brooks, “Narrativity” 2).  It is 
not the accumulation of evidence but the situation of that evidence as part of a story that 
determines judicial outcomes.  Brooks’s statement, of course, is a condensation of the 
branch of law and literature scholarship that has convincingly argued the intersections of 
law, narrative, and rhetoric.  William Faulkner’s crime and detective fiction, most of 
which, as Michael Grimwood puts it, he “wrote for cash during respites in the 
composition of The Hamlet and Go Down, Moses,” anticipates and elaborates on 
precisely Brooks’s point, and likewise the work of Hayden White in historiography 
(Grimwood 187).  Faulkner was not a historian and was almost certainly not interested in 
the finer points of historiographical theory as pursued by academic historians, but he was 
certainly interested in the centrality of narrative conventions in the representation of the 
past.  While one might argue that since he was engaged in writing fiction, after all, his 
anticipation of the claims of scholars like White and Brooks, in their construal of 
historical and legal discourse, respectively, as modes of communication that are 
essentially literary and rhetorical in nature, relying on literary tropes and familiar 
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narrative and argumentative structures, was to be expected, it is nevertheless clear that his 
treatment of justice and historical narrative has implications beyond the realm of fiction.   
It is more than a piece of trivia that Faulkner wrote detective fiction.  By its very 
nature as a genre, detective fiction poses problems that are completely continuous with 
some of the most dominant problems of Faulkner’s entire body of work: what can be 
known about the past, how it can be not only known but represented, and the relationship 
of the knowledge and representation of the past to justice in the present.  I argue that 
Faulkner’s fiction shows that it is not only law that is “inescapably narrative” and 
rhetorical, “at the most fundamental level a matter of rhetorical persuasiveness and 
narrative reconstruction” as Jay Watson has argued so well, but that investigation itself—
the very search for and interpretation of evidence—is narrative and rhetorical as well (5).   
The shape of the story the investigators in this fiction have to tell to apprehend or 
convict the person they think is guilty (or to publicly exonerate the wrongly suspected) 
determines not only how they interpret and narrativize the evidence they find in order to a 
produce a convincing, indeed a convicting, account of how and why the crime occurred, 
but in fact determines where they look for evidence and what they judge to be evidence.  
Faulkner’s detective fiction emphasizes that evidence is, indeed, always a verbal 
construct, always a piece in a rhetorical structure.  As the detective’s story advances, one 
figure out of many circulating in the text emerges in the narrative slot of the murderer.  It 
is in fact often the narrative structure of the investigation itself, the sense that it will have 
an end that will coincide with the initial story of the crime, that convinces the murderer to 
act and reveal himself.  This trope is by no means unique to Faulkner’s detective fiction.  
Indeed, I argue that Faulkner’s detective fiction draws attention to the way the genre 
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itself—particularly the Golden Age fiction of which he was a known reader—privileges 
justice above evidence, requiring structurally that evidence be that which supports the 
“convicting” story.  Among other indications that Faulkner read and enjoyed detective 
fiction is his 1943 recommendation to his stepdaughter and her husband of Dorothy 
Sayers’ The Nine Tailors, in Faulkner’s opinion “right up there with [Agatha Christie’s] 
ABC [Murders] and [Rex Stout’s] FER DE LANCE” (Faulkner, Selected Letters 170).  
Books by these three detective fiction writers and many others were present in Faulkner’s 
library at its cataloging, as well (Blotner, William Faulkner’s Library 53, 63, 71).  I also 
contend that there is a strong link between the attention to evidence, reconstruction of 
past events, and persuasion in the detective fiction and those same preoccupations in the 
historical fiction, thereby re-evaluating the place of Faulkner’s detective fiction in his 
body of work. 
Often considered to be a project distinct from what critics consider his more 
serious fiction and undertaken almost exclusively for financial reasons,19  Faulkner’s 
crime and detective fiction ranges from Sanctuary (1931) to the story “Hog Pawn,” 
written in the early 1950s20 and later revised and incorporated into The Mansion (1959).  
Most of these works feature Gavin Stevens, the loquacious Jefferson lawyer, and his 
Watson-like nephew Chick Mallison, who effectively supersedes his uncle as a detective 
by the time of Intruder in the Dust (1948) and the novella “Knight’s Gambit,” the only 
extensively reworked text in the 1949 collection by the same name.  Ticien Marie 
                                                           
19
 Faulkner said in his introduction to the Modern Library Edition that Sanctuary was “a cheap idea” and 
“deliberately conceived to make money” (Faulkner, Essays 176), although Thomas McHaney argues that 
these claims were parodies of parts of Hemingway’s The Torrents of Spring and “must be taken as tongue-
in-cheek” (334).  Faulkner suggested in his letters that the Gavin Stevens stories were to be moneymakers 
as well.  See Van Dover and Jebb (104-05) and Cowley.   
20
 See Jebb and Van Dover 106. 
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Sassoubre has pointed out that conviction and justice are almost always extralegal in 
Faulkner’s fiction, offering historical evidence to demonstrate persuasively that in both 
Go Down, Moses and Intruder in the Dust, “the preservation of something Southerners 
recognize as justice involves resisting federally imposed law by employing extralegal 
norms and practices in the place of official adjudication” (185).  Just as significantly, 
however, Intruder and Faulkner’s short detective fiction end without legal adjudication 
because they are suggesting that fundamentally it is what Peter Hühn calls “the power 
and efficacy of the verbal construct of a story” that convicts.  In place of legal conviction, 
they substitute the just outcome that is supposed to result from the certainty—the 
conviction—in the minds of Stevens’ listeners (456). 
In much of the short Gavin Stevens detective fiction, Stevens’ approach to his 
investigation, and indeed what he recognizes to be evidence, is pre-structured by the kind 
of end narrative he will have to produce in order to apprehend or punish the criminal.  In 
Intruder in the Dust, an awareness of the public power and indeed the life or death 
consequences of the interpretation of any clue in the Gowrie murder case permeates the 
atmosphere of the two investigation scenes at Caledonia Chapel cemetery.  The pressure 
to find evidence against someone else immediately is intense: Lucas may otherwise be 
lynched.  In the search scene that takes place in the morning, the investigating party 
begins reconstructing the murderer’s movements the night before in order to know where 
they will find the two bodies even before they arrive—the first body concealed in a 
quicksand pit, the best hiding place for miles, and the second body, unexpectedly 
disinterred by Chick and Aleck Sander, shoved into the most easily-accessed hiding place 
  
41 
 
with the loosest dirt.  Evidence, in the search scenes in Faulkner’s detective fiction, is 
anticipated even when its specific content is not yet known.   
Intruder in the Dust and the Gavin Stevens short fiction suggest that the 
investigator himself is the primary rhetorician, as opposed to a lawyer who later prepares 
a case from the investigator’s findings.  In these narratives, the investigator assesses the 
believability of any given fact or object as part of an explanatory narrative and therefore 
determines whether it is evidence.  Indeed, a fact becomes evidence only if there is a 
hypothetical explanation for which it can serve as evidence.  Additionally, in these 
stories, narrativizing is shown to actually produce justice.  In Faulkner’s first detective 
story, “Smoke” (1932), for example, the foreman of the grand jury interrupts lawyer-
detective Gavin Stevens’ extensive tale about a family involved in a murder to say, “You 
should have done all this investigating before you called us together . . . Even if this be 
evidence, what good will it do without the body of the murderer be apprehended?  
Conjecture is all well enough . . .” (26).  The line plays an ironic function in the story: 
Gavin’s investigation by means of storytelling does both produce the body of the 
murderer and enable his apprehension.  It further sets in motion a theme for Faulkner’s 
subsequent detective fiction: story does something.  It not only convicts; it produces the 
criminal.  Being himself convinced by the structure of the investigation that he has been 
discovered, the criminal in Faulkner’s detective fiction often gives himself away, most 
clearly in “Smoke” and Intruder in the Dust.  One of the most common generic markers 
of detective fiction, as noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, is the detective’s end 
narrative, which goes back to the first detective story, “The Murders in the Rue Morgue.”  
That story concludes with a long end narrative in which Dupin explains his thinking and 
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his investigation of the locked room where the killings occurred and ends with a 
reconstruction that solves the mystery.  Particularly in Intruder in the Dust and his short 
story “Smoke,” Faulkner follows this tradition.   
As I argued earlier, the detective story is about the detective’s story, and this, in 
particular, is the convention of detective fiction that makes it a productive site for 
thinking about history work.  Like the detective, the historian tells the story as well as 
investigates.  The nature of evidence and investigation is of course a problem that 
becomes weightier when it extends beyond the realm of genre fiction and into theories 
about historical narrative and the ability of that narrative (whether purporting to be 
fictional or to have actual historical referents) to produce justice.  An understanding of 
the relationship in Faulkner’s detective fiction of evidence to persuasion through 
storytelling and ultimately to justice deepens our readings of many of his more ambitious 
novels—Absalom, Absalom! and Go Down, Moses, in particular—and at the same time it 
demonstrates Faulkner’s anticipation of the claims of scholars like Brooks and 
additionally of theorists of history writing, who have made the same point about the 
relationship between evidence and narrative requirements in historical writing.  As 
outlined in the Introduction, White argues that the narrative conventions historians use to 
organize their accounts of the past, as well as the language they rely on, help to determine 
what counts as historical evidence.  The “‘rules of evidence’ that a researcher is supposed 
to adhere to in any examination of the historical record” are not actually as powerful in 
making these determinations as are stylistic concerns (White, Content 66).  A story 
offered as evidence in a courtroom arranges and explicates an archive of raw material in 
order to argue that it is the most plausible story; historical narrative does much the same 
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thing.  Raw materials become evidence when accompanied by a persuasive interpretation 
of their meaning and, simultaneously, a story framework that accounts for them.  As 
White observes, historical narrative is by its nature interpretive, is by its nature linked to 
a process of meaning-making and to notions of justice, without which, as I outlined in the 
Introduction, past happenings could not be told within a structure of beginning, middle, 
and end.  White calls the demand for closure “a demand . . . for moral meaning” (Content 
21). 
The process of historical inquiry and representation is a fundamental concern of 
major Faulkner novels such as Absalom, Absalom! and Go Down, Moses.  Although the 
detective fiction is concerned with the histories of crimes that have just occurred rather 
than a more distant past, it supplements and extends Faulkner’s engagement with the 
process of historical inquiry and representation in his larger body of work.  Like 
Absalom, Absalom! the detective story consists of history and historical inquiry woven 
together, of the murder plot and the investigation plot, both explicated in the detective’s 
final narrative, which puts the crime into story form in the same breath as it sets the 
criminal up to be convicted.  Like Absalom and Go Down, Moses (and indeed almost all 
of Faulkner’s work), Faulkner’s detective fiction is in part a metacritical project: his 
detective stories are about story.  Further, in Go Down, Moses and Intruder, especially, 
knowledge is almost without exception tantamount to knowledge of injustice motivated 
by racial difference.  Faulkner’s engagement with evidence and knowledge is crucial to 
the larger project of what Linda Wagner-Martin calls his “new start,” in which he “begins 
to express what it feels like to be the heir of white patriarchal power in a slave state” (7) 
by moving from the “impossibility of ‘knowing’” in Absalom, Absalom! to (in Go Down, 
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Moses) “forc[ing] the reader to know”—imposing an “awareness” that “penetrates” (6). 
Jay Watson argues that “Intruder could not iterate more clearly that, in a social climate 
dominated and indeed terrorized by white hegemony, the call to detection assumes a 
distinct moral valence,” the “epistemological quest” mirroring the “ethical one” (141). 
It has long been recognized that Absalom, Absalom! is a kind of detective novel.  
C. Hugh Holman argues that the novel is “a study in kinds of knowledge, in ways of 
knowing” but that despite its concern with historical issues, it “cannot be considered a 
historical novel in the classic sense of Scott’s works,” and instead “is closer to the 
standard detective story” (168-69).  Greg Forter elaborates, pointing out that “the 
proliferating narrators and, especially, the figures of Quentin and Shreve function in part 
as historical sleuths who comb through the meager documentary evidence while 
projecting themselves into the problem of why Henry Sutpen shot Charles Bon . . . and 
how this murder follows from the South’s historical crimes” (“Faulkner, Trauma” 373-
74).21 John Cawelti moves beyond just that one book, claiming that “the concept of the 
detective story with its curiously duplicitous and double structure” not only provides a 
framework for Absalom, Absalom! and of course Intruder in the Dust, but “informs many 
of [Faulkner’s] major novels” (265).  Absalom, then, and perhaps other major Faulkner 
novels as well, draws upon the conventions of detective fiction.  My question is what 
Faulkner’s own detective fiction helps us to understand about his body of work as a 
whole.  Mick Gidley has argued that “the overt detective tales amongst Faulkner’s 
work—such as the stories in Knight’s Gambit (1949)—may illuminate the structure and 
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 John Irwin makes much the same point: “Absalom, Absalom!, with its two young narrators puzzling over 
the facts of a very old murder trying to understand the motive, represents in some sense the culmination of 
the gothic detective form” (95).   
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meaning of some of his major novels,” particularly with respect to Faulkner’s tendency to 
“deliberately withhold meaning” in his major novels, much as a detective author 
withholds the meaning of clues until the story’s denouement (102, emphasis original).  
Forter says that while in Intruder in the Dust and the short Gavin Stevens fiction, 
Faulkner “subordinates his characteristic thematic and formal concerns to the conventions 
of the detective story,” in Light in August and Absalom, Absalom!, much of what is 
compelling “resides precisely within [the] tension . . . between the moral and 
epistemological clarity promised by the generic ‘kernel’ of detective fiction and the 
relentless subversion of that promise in the kernel’s narrative elaboration” (“Faulkner, 
Trauma” 374, emphasis original).  
Watson’s book Forensic Fictions: The Lawyer Figure in Faulkner, the most 
sustained treatment of law in Faulkner’s writing, brings law and literature scholarship to 
Faulkner’s work and discusses the role of storytelling in legal practice and the way 
lawyers in Faulkner proceed by listening and telling.  Alongside Watson’s extensive 
discussion of the lawyer-as-citizen trope in Faulkner’s work, he addresses the 
connections between legal practice and narrative in Faulkner’s fiction.  Watson calls 
attention to the prominence of storytelling in the professional practice of Faulkner’s 
lawyers, especially Gavin Stevens.  As have many scholars of law and literature, Watson 
argues that litigation is “inescapably narrative” and points out the connection between 
narrative and persuasion by arguing that “[p]rosecutors and defense attorneys typically 
put the same narrative raw material to very different uses in the construction of their 
cases, and they frequently endorse very different interpretations of a story offered as 
evidence” (17).  The story components that Watson calls “narrative raw material” are not 
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persuasive—and cannot even be assigned a meaning—until they have their place in a 
narrative.   The interpretation of evidence is determined in part by its future redeployment 
as evidence in an argument, or a story that is arguing for its own veracity.  My argument 
that the attention to evidence, the reconstruction of past events, and persuasion in the 
detective fiction is a continuation of those same preoccupations in the historical fiction 
extends Watson’s work and emphasizes that Faulkner’s detective fiction is deeply 
connected to his historical fiction in its treatment of evidence as a piece in the rhetorical 
structure of the story or investigation.  This chapter demonstrates that in both Faulkner’s 
detective fiction and several examples of his major fiction, the moment of the movement 
from clue to explanation, indeed from fact to narrative, is the point at which investigation 
threatens to fail but instead takes off.  A tendency toward persuasiveness in the 
investigation itself determines the course of the investigation and the identification and 
interpretation of evidence.   
This emphasis in Faulkner pushes the work of Hayden White a step further: now 
the researcher is a rhetorician, not merely the writer who sits down to write about what 
he has found.  White has called attention to the work of imagination in the historian’s 
endeavor, locating the work of imagination “at the last stage of [the historian’s] labors, 
when it becomes necessary to compose a discourse or narrative in which to represent his 
findings, that is, his notion of ‘what really happened’ in the past” (Content 67-68).  
Faulkner’s detective fiction dramatizes this process to an extent, and yet it removes a 
level of innocence that even White lets remain by calling into question the neatness of the 
stages that White describes.  White focuses on a final stage of historical work in which 
events resolve into narrative form, whereas in Faulkner’s detective fiction, narrative 
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formations begin stirring at the first moment of the investigation itself; they are in fact 
what drives and structures the investigation.  In Faulkner’s short story “Monk,” for 
instance, Gavin Stevens, lacking any clue, any thread to lead him to a conclusion about 
why the title character killed a man he adored, generates instead an explanatory narrative 
with only the name of the villain missing.  The inexplicable speech given by Monk as he 
is about to be hanged surely came originally from the mouth of the person who convinced 
him to kill his friend, Gavin determines.  Any man who speaks that way will be the man 
who is really responsible for the murder. 
Faulkner’s detectives investigate in story form.  This premise is important because 
investigation is a pervasive concept, and one generally assumed to precede interpretation.  
Stevens, Chick, and his other investigators make decisions about how to proceed in their 
investigations on the basis of stories that they are in the process of imagining.  Stevens 
and Hope Hampton conclude, for instance, that in order for Jake Montgomery’s death in 
Intruder to fit in with the narrative of the crime, he must have been the person buying the 
stolen timber from Crawford Gowrie and must have known that it was stolen.  Stevens 
and Hampton therefore call the timber’s “ultimate consignee” to verify Montgomery’s 
role (223).  Such story-form investigations underscore the literary and rhetorical nature of 
investigation, not only in detection, not only in law, not only in history, but in medicine, 
archaeology, the physical sciences, and all fields of work that begin with the 
identification and interpretation of evidence.  
Carlo Ginzburg points out a continuity between the present notion of evidence 
and the classical concept of evidentia, which refers to the ability “to make a topic not 
only evident, but palpable”—in other words, seemingly even beyond evident, due to the 
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rhetorician’s skill (29).  “Both our notion of evidence and the Latin evidentia,” Ginzburg 
says, “emerge in the sphere of rhetoric, especially judicial rhetoric” (29).  The resulting 
continuity of these two ideas in the legal profession has significant ramifications for the 
practice of doing history work, as well.  Historians are likewise not only investigators but 
also narrators of the events they study.  Evidence appears twice in an investigation—once 
when it is identified and again when the investigator presents it as support for the story he 
is telling.   
We can turn to another Faulkner novel, in fact, for a demonstration of the 
importance of the situation in narrative of any physical artifact.  Sanctuary’s infamous 
corncob, a notable failure of physical evidence to produce justice on its own, is offered as 
evidence by the district attorney.  It emerges for the first time in the courtroom scene near 
the end of the novel, appearing “to have been dipped in dark brownish paint,” and it is an 
object the reading audience has been looking for: the means by which an impotent man 
could have raped Temple and made her bleed so insistently (Faulkner, Sanctuary 376).  It 
functions in Faulkner’s narrative as evidence of what exactly Popeye has done to Temple.  
To the court audience (and the jury), on the other hand, “‘its bearing on the case’” has 
according to the district attorney been “‘made clear [in] the testimony of the defendant’s 
wife’” in conjunction with the testimony of the chemist and the gynecologist, whom the 
district attorney calls “‘an authority on the most sacred affairs of that most sacred thing in 
life: womanhood’” (Faulkner, Sanctuary 376).  In the trial the corncob functions as 
evidence, in other words, that Lee Goodwin, rather than Popeye, has not only raped 
Temple but has done it in a manner that the court audience and jury might find especially 
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unnatural and difficult to understand.22  The district attorney, in his speech, demonstrates 
how an object becomes evidence—certainly on the basis of testimony, both witness and 
expert, that helps situate it in a narrative, but more pertinently the fact that it is an object 
that the audience has been waiting to find.  Expert testimony serves merely to confirm 
that the object could indeed be the evidence expected.  Again, by no means is this 
expectation/confirmation relationship unique to Faulkner’s detective fiction.  Instead, his 
intense focus on it and magnification of it serves to emphasize how nearly universal this 
relationship is in investigation narratives. 
Evidence is so closely coupled with explanation because a story is a story, rather 
than another kind of discourse, indeed because, as White argues, its logic already 
contains and is structured by a particular kind of justice (Content 21).  Evidence does not 
produce the conclusion in much of Faulkner’s detective fiction.  It is produced by it—in 
other words, the anticipated just ending makes possible the identification of a set of facts 
and objects as evidence.  This reversal is problematic with respect to justice in the 
detective fiction because it means Gavin Stevens calls the shots, even in his moments of 
bigotry and self-congratulation.  He can turn from his Sambo diatribe in the car on the 
way to Caledonia Chapel to go find the body where he knows it will be and then send it 
home with Mr. Gowrie to keep Crawford from being exposed as his brother’s murderer.  
The circular relationship of story and evidence demands a responsible teller.  Chick, who 
never stops evaluating the moral consequences of any of his choices, therefore effectively 
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 If Temple is a woman everyone seems to want to possess sexually, then Goodwin has turned down or 
misused his opportunity, in the eyes of the court audience and jury.  As a man in the mob crudely 
complains, “‘Jeez.  I wouldn’t have used no cob’” (383). 
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takes over as detective in the last two pieces of detective fiction Faulkner wrote (Intruder 
in the Dust and the novella “Knight’s Gambit”), as Gavin’s credibility declines. 
As a step along the way to showing that the detective is the primary rhetorician in 
Faulkner’s detective fiction, I also consider the situatedness of Faulkner’s investigators: 
Stevens most often solves mysteries on the basis of intimate knowledge of the habits of 
the victims and criminals, and Chick Mallison, the original investigator in Intruder, 
begins his search at the direct request of the suspect, Lucas Beauchamp, whom he owes 
for saving his life.  Both Stevens and Chick are investigators on the inside of the white 
community, determining what constitutes evidence on the basis of assumptions about 
what their neighbors will do and generating possible accounts of the crime that originate 
in known local histories.  Faulkner, as Grimwood has noted, has no use for the unattached 
detective so popular in the decades leading up to his entry into the genre: Gavin solves 
crimes “precisely through his intimate familiarity with his neighbors and his county” 
(202).  Like Absalom, Absalom!, Faulkner’s detective fiction represents the endeavor of 
reconstructing events as something that happens in the context of a relationship to a place 
and a community.  Faulkner’s investigators, speculators, and storytellers, be they 
detectives, lawyers, or college boys in frigid dormitories, are situated observers; their 
positions and affiliations determine the way they move between evidence and 
explanations, and indeed what counts as evidence in the first place.  Their local ties show 
yet again that what constitutes evidence depends on who the detective is.  Fundamental to 
their situatedness is race.  Lucas approaches Gavin and then Chick seeking an authority 
for his investigation that in the community represented in Intruder is underwritten by 
their whiteness.  Just as Chick interprets Lucas’s actions at the beginning of Intruder on 
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the basis of his racial biases, he and Gavin will evaluate the relationship among Lucas, 
Crawford, and Vinson on the basis of these same biases and will allow their 
interpretations and conclusions to be decided by them, except where those conclusions 
are refused by Lucas.  Like all investigators, Stevens, Chick, Sheriff Hope Hampton, and 
other Faulkner detectives are working inside a circle of interpretation, identifying clues as 
clues because of the relationship of those clues to the stories they already know, or the 
gossip that starts their investigations, or their knowledge of the habits and histories of 
their neighbors—and then taking those clues and interpreting them to produce additions 
or contradictions to the existing narratives.   
 
Faulkner’s Crime and Detective Fiction 
While detective fiction may seem like a cheap imitation of history work rather 
than a form in which Faulkner could have developed his thoughts about access to and 
narration of the past, it is an ideal form for studying story. “At a basic level,” Scott 
McCracken writes in an examination of the detective story form, “the process of 
discovery might be said to be a universal function of narrative: all narratives proceed by 
way of revelation and explanation” (51).  As explained in the Introduction, the detective 
story can be thought of as the “narrative of narratives” because it shows the interaction 
between the fabula and the sjužet, the two levels of story that the Russian Formalists 
argued structure all narratives—the order of imagined events referred to, and their order 
as represented in narrative discourse (Brooks 25).   Franco Moretti imagines this split as 
the detective producing the sjužet and the criminal the fabula, which must be unraveled 
(and thus established) by means of the sjužet, the presentation of the events in narrative 
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discourse (146).  Again, as discussed in the Introduction, this relationship has been 
referred to as the “double plot” of the detective story23: at the same time as plot two (the 
investigation) reveals plot one (the crime), plot one provides the structure for plot two.  
The story of the crime and the story of the investigation meet in the end narrative.  The 
revelation in the end narrative of the evidence that has been discovered and its 
interpretation, which we can also think of as the re-deployment of the found evidence as 
rhetorical evidence, is what produces the solution and reveals whodunit.   
Faulkner’s engagement with law and detection extended from almost the 
beginning of his career to almost the end and was surprisingly persistent: Watson notes 
instances of lawyers and lawyering in at least seventeen of the novels, stories, and 
screenplays Faulkner authored (4).  Not all of this legal activity is explicitly 
investigation-oriented, but a good deal of it is.  In addition to the sheer quantity of 
detective material in his work, there is also evidence that Faulkner enjoyed the genre as a 
reader.  Joseph Blotner explains that Faulkner was, “like his mother, a frequent reader of 
detective fiction” and that the “germ of Intruder in the Dust [sic] first appeared, he once 
said, as an idea of the detective story kind” (William Faulkner’s Library 9).  In 
Faulkner’s library, Blotner says, “[t]he classic cases and sleuths are there in hardcover 
and paperback” (9).  John Jebb and J.K. Van Dover add that there are about thirty 
detective novels in Blotner’s catalog of Faulkner’s library (101-02).  Perhaps even more 
prominent than detection and lawyering in Faulkner’s writing is simply crime itself.  
Gidley generates a long and not even exhaustive list of Faulkner works with “crime, 
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 David Lehman, for instance, argues that the “plot is bi-level, as it must be: The story of the murders is 
framed within the story of the detective’s investigation.  The two narratives meet at the point where the 
sleuth reveals his solution to the case” (xiii).     
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frequently violent crime, at their core”: Sanctuary, Light in August, Absalom, Absalom!, 
The Wild Palms, The Hamlet, The Mansion, Requiem for a Nun; “a similar mosaic of 
crime could be put together from the central events of many of Faulkner’s most 
memorable short stories,” Gidley adds (100). 
Most of Faulkner’s detective fiction was written in his middle and later career, but 
his interest in not only crime but also evidence was already apparent in Sanctuary, the 
novel of sensation, the bestselling crime story thick with violence, underworld activity, 
sex, and liquor, that Faulkner began writing in January 1929.  He would finish it within a 
few months and publish it in 1931 (Kerr 52).  Although André Malraux, in his preface to 
the novel, famously called it “‘the intrusion of Greek tragedy into the detective story,’” it 
includes almost no detection (qtd. in Cowley).  However, as previously noted, 
Sanctuary’s action culminates in a courtroom scene in which the problem of what can be 
known becomes central as the notorious corncob appears, its evidential value and ability 
to substantiate a just conclusion to the case perverted by Temple’s false testimony.  
Faulkner appears to have been already interested in the relationship between narrative 
accounts of past events and the traces, testimonies, and interpretations on which they are 
based.   
Soon after he completed Sanctuary, Faulkner began writing what was much more 
straightforwardly a detective story, intending to publish it in one of the periodicals that 
printed so much popular detective fiction of the 1930s.  “Smoke” begins with a corpse 
and ends with an explanatory narrative offered by Gavin Stevens—a lawyer by 
profession—to the grand jury sitting to determine whether there is sufficient evidence for 
a trial.  These features seem to situate it squarely in the detective genre, which is so often 
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distinguished by what Lehman calls the “corpse on page one” (1). Faulkner submitted 
“Smoke” to the Saturday Evening Post in the early part of 1930, and it was rejected 
(Cawelti 266).  He eventually published it in Harper’s Monthly in 1932.   
After “Smoke” Faulkner did not publish another detective story until 1937, when 
a piece titled “Monk” appeared in Scribner’s.24  Following “Monk,” however, he wrote 
three stories around 1940 (one of which was not published until 1946) and then a full-
length detective novel, Intruder in the Dust, written and published in 1948.  In 1949, 
perhaps in response to Intruder’s popularity, Faulkner gathered the Gavin Stevens 
detective stories into a single volume called Knight’s Gambit.  He made substantial 
changes only to the title story and did not revise the others in order to achieve a unity 
among them, as he had done to the previously-published stories that reappeared in Go 
Down, Moses and The Unvanquished.  Many critics have intuited a lack of emotional or 
intellectual commitment to the detective fiction because Faulkner was so willing to 
republish the stories quickly on the heels of a financial success.25  However, despite his 
hurry with them, and though he dismissed his detective fiction in his letters, often 
remarking to agents and publishers that he needed to write “trash” in order to sell26 or that 
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 “Monk” was sold in January 1937 and was likely written not long before.  See Blotner, William Faulkner 
952. 
25
 Grimwood argues, on the other hand, that the sale of the motion picture rights for Intruder in the Dust 
had lessened the financial pressures on him and that instead he chose to leave the first five stories in their 
original magazine form as “a way of publicly acknowledging his illegitimate issue” (195).  Through the 
final, thoroughly revised story, however, the volume also “comments on them, rejects them, and moves 
beyond” the five original stories (Grimwood 195). 
26
 Faulkner made the “trash” comment about the novel that would become Intruder in the Dust (Faulkner, 
Selected Letters 119, 122; reprinted in Van Dover and Jebb 104).   
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he did not even recognize some of the stories when he read them later,27 he persisted in 
writing detective fiction even after the Saturday Evening Post rejected “Smoke” three 
times.  In the spring of 1948 he repeatedly extended his time frame for writing Intruder, 
calling it a “little more of a book than I thought at first,” (Faulkner, Selected Letters 262) 
and then went almost immediately into revising “Knight’s Gambit” and collecting the 
Gavin Stevens stories into a volume, commenting to Random House chief editor Saxe 
Commins, “This is the story I seem to be hottest to write now” (Faulkner, Selected 
Letters 280).  He pressed his publishers regarding that volume, and not the other way 
around.  Cawelti points out that, although Faulkner stopped writing mysteries after the 
financial success of Intruder in the Dust made selling books less urgent, he “continued to 
use the character of Gavin Stevens and the characteristic patterns of mystery, clues, and 
solutions throughout the Snopes Trilogy” (267).  Those patterns were more than just a 
moneymaker to him. 
 
Evidence and Interpretation in the Knight’s Gambit Stories 
When Faulkner decided to gather certain pieces of his short fiction into the 
volume Knight’s Gambit as he was working on the organization of Collected Stories in 
1948, he called it “a ‘Gavin Stevens’ volume, more or less detective stories” (Selected 
Letters 280).  There are six stories in the finished volume, five of which were written 
before 1940 and published before 1946.  These five are “Smoke” (1932), “Monk” (1937), 
“Hand Upon the Waters” (1939), “Tomorrow” (1940), and “An Error in Chemistry” 
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 He claimed not to recognize “An Error in Chemistry” (1946) when he read it in Ellery Queen’s Mystery 
Magazine (he had first sent it off several years before) and to have later forgotten the title and content of 
“Monk” (1937) (Van Dover and Jebb 105).  [Original source: Faulkner, Selected Letters 206, 283, 287, and 
143] 
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(written in 1940 but not published until 1946).  The sixth was the novella “Knight’s 
Gambit,” an unpublished earlier story which he substantially reworked and lengthened to 
over a hundred pages between November 1948 and May 1949, after Intruder in the Dust 
was finished.  The last piece is thus more easily discussed in connection to Intruder and 
not to the other stories in the volume. Most of the stories involve the direct righting of a 
wrong, which is usually a greedy and sometimes murderous position assumed by an 
outsider to the community.28  Each involves a mystery, four about the circumstances of a 
murder and one about why a juror refuses to side with his peers in a murder trial.  These 
mysteries are largely solved with little direct investigation; Gavin instead spends his time 
talking with other members of the community, happening upon potential evidence in 
conversation. 
In these five stories Faulkner began to work out the conception of the relationship 
of evidence to justice that would later flower in Intruder.  Faulkner’s straight detective 
fiction is somewhat formulaic and has a simplistic vision of right and wrong; it was 
written, after all, for a magazine audience.  Nevertheless, it draws attention to the fact 
that in stories about crime and detection, justice is accomplished in and through narrative, 
and what is considered to be evidence is identified based on its contribution to the 
anticipated end narrative.  The notion of justice that dominates the stories is Gavin’s own: 
justice is a different thing from truth, and is preferable to it.  “I am more interested in 
justice and human beings [than in truth],” Gavin tells the sheriff in “An Error in 
Chemistry” (111).  There is such a thing, Gavin says, as “truth that [is] anything under 
the sun but just” (111).   
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 See Klinkowitz 81-82. 
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Chick Mallison narrates all of the Knight’s Gambit stories but “Smoke,” which is 
related by a choric voice of the community.29  Gavin, however, is the clear detective-
protagonist. Chick serves only in a Watson role, except perhaps in “Tomorrow,” where 
we see some of his moral education, although in a much more limited fashion than in 
Intruder.  Gavin in “Tomorrow” is also clearly the teacher, whereas in Intruder he 
teaches instead by alternating positive and negative examples.  Watson has argued 
compellingly, for instance, that in Intruder most of Gavin’s remarks to Chick over his 
lifetime have become “part and parcel of his own thought and experience,” “forming a 
background against which the boy struggles to make sense of his world and to act 
responsibly in it,” (120) whereas the “problematic trio of set speeches” in Intruder that 
“has garnered Stevens such infamy among critics over the years” (114)—one is the 
“Sambo” speech—are “suspended—indeed, stranded—in the text” (118).  They are 
highlighted orthographically rather than embedded in Chick’s consciousness because of 
Chick’s reservations about them, which “literally prefigure our own” (Watson 118).  The 
Gavin of the short fiction, on the other hand, is a much more straightforward character. 
Citing complaints from readers that Gavin Stevens in Faulkner’s short detective 
fiction does not do any legwork and instead discovers the keys to the mysteries facing 
him by stumbling upon them, Watson stresses that Stevens instead engages in “colloquial 
detection,” meaning “the sophisticated ability on Gavin’s part to make sometimes 
fragmentary and often unmemorable moments of casual discourse signify as clues” (144).  
Colloquial detection, according to Watson, “emerges both as a mode and as a product of 
conscientious involvement in community life,” and Gavin’s talking, listening, and 
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 In “Knight’s Gambit,” as in Intruder, Chick is the central consciousness but not the narrator. 
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storytelling within Jefferson and its outlying areas make him not only a good lawyer but 
also a good detective (145).  While this is true, I would add that it is a mind engaged in 
continually producing narratives to account for the facts and objects he encounters that 
makes Gavin a good detective.  He often makes his discoveries by means of a circular 
process in which his narrativizing enables him to construe previously-made comments as 
evidence, and that evidence helps him amend his explanatory narratives.  It is the back 
and forth involved in this process, not just the immersion in the community that Watson 
stresses, that allows him to be in the right place to have the next piece of evidence “drop . 
. . into his lap” (Watson 141).  In one of the many teaching moments he directs toward 
his narrator nephew, Gavin stresses that the odd circumstances of the “moron” Monk 
Odlethrop’s murder of a man he had adored, and the strange words he speaks from the 
scaffold in the moments before he is hanged, “add . . . up, all right . . . We just haven’t 
got the right ciphers yet” (39).  While the discovery of the cipher in that story, which I 
will discuss below, occurs some time later and by chance, it indicates that Gavin’s 
practice as a detective is linguistic, code-driven. What Faulkner primarily develops here 
that will become central in Intruder is a plotline in which the shape of the narrative told 
about the crime, and its expected ending, more often than not corners the criminal and 
prompts him to reveal himself—as opposed to that work being done by physical 
evidence. The status of what physical evidence there is is strongly subordinated to the 
narrative form that expresses it and makes it signify as evidence.   
In “Smoke,” a farmer, Anselm Holland, has been found apparently dragged to 
death by his horse, but when the local judge delays the validation of his will for an 
extended period, a second corpse appears: the judge is found in his office dead of a bullet 
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wound, bewildering to the community because they know that no one can ever slip past 
the janitor, who was sitting outside the judge’s door. 30   Gavin Stevens gathers the grand 
jury and the interested parties at the scene of the crime in order to tell an extensive 
explanatory narrative reminiscent of those of Poe’s Dupin or Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes 
except that it is saturated with the personal and family histories of the victims and 
suspects.  By persuading the previously unsuspected murderer, who is of course present 
in the room, that the most damning evidence against him is the tobacco smoke contained 
in a brass box on the desk, he provokes the murderer to fling the box to the floor and 
wave the smoke away.  In fact, there had been no substantial material evidence.  Stevens 
had filled the box with smoke himself, effectively creating rather than finding his most 
persuasive piece of evidence, a maneuver not unheard of in Golden Age genre fiction. 
Gavin’s entire account of the crime (and the family past that precedes it) is 
constructed for Dodge’s benefit, to convince him that Gavin has full knowledge of the 
situation and sufficient evidence to convict him in court.  As I mentioned previously, the 
ability of this narrative to provoke and thus produce the criminal renders ironic the 
foreman’s request that Gavin stop talking and instead apprehend the “body of the 
murderer” (26).  The completion of the story produces the body of the criminal in several 
of the Gavin Stevens stories, and in fact a trick much like the smoke-filled box catches 
the murderer in Intruder in the Dust, although there the murderer’s apprehension is only a 
subplot.    
In the story “An Error in Chemistry” (published in Ellery Queen’s Mystery 
Magazine in 1946), Gavin and the sheriff are stumped by the facts before them because 
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 The story is narrated, like “A Rose For Emily,” by what Theresa Towner and James Carothers call “the 
choric voice of Jefferson” (Towner, Reading Faulkner 85). 
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the story those facts suggest does not make sense: Joel Flint, “the outlander, the Yankee,” 
has killed his wife rather than his father-in-law, from whose death he could have 
benefitted materially by inheriting the older man’s farm and selling it to a group of 
Northern businessmen who want to pay a high price to extract the clay from a pit on the 
land (109).  Gavin first poses the standard generic question about motive in spousal 
killings, whether there was an insurance policy on Flint’s wife.  Then he tries to revise 
the explanatory narrative that the sheriff is promoting, suggesting that possibly “what has 
already happened is not finished yet,” rather than that “something went wrong in what 
has already happened” (116).  Flint is in jail, but Gavin suspects that he wanted to be 
there, and begins to try to imagine why.  The direction of his inquiry relies on his 
assumption that (no matter how) Flint is a charlatan.  He suspects future harm to Flint’s 
father-in-law Pritchel and repeatedly asks “Are you sure Old Man Pritchel—[is still 
locked in his room unharmed?]” even after the sheriff assures him the father-in-law is 
safe (118).  By the end of the story, when Pritchel has abruptly changed his mind and 
decided to sell the farm and clay pit, all three investigators (Chick, Gavin, and the sheriff) 
stand still when ordered out of Pritchel’s house; it is as though they know that at this 
moment whatever is causing their feeling that something is not finished yet will come to 
light: “But the sheriff didn’t move, nor did we” (126).  Flint, disguised as Pritchel, whom 
he has killed, makes the error in chemistry for which the story is named (somewhat 
obediently to the investigators’ need for a clue), but attuned as they are to the idea that 
this man who looks like Pritchel does not seem quite right, they immediately recognize 
the error and leap to stop him from escaping.  They have been looking for some deviation 
that will make the narrative work, after all. 
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Although Gavin, Chick, and the sheriff appear to be surprised to realize that Joel 
Flint has killed and then impersonated his father-in-law, Gavin nevertheless seems to 
have constructed an explanation of Flint’s activities that is specific enough to give him a 
sense of the kind of thing that is wrong—something about Pritchel, the father-in-law, just 
is not right since his daughter was killed and Flint imprisoned.  Pritchel is suddenly 
willing to sell his farm, which he has up to this point steadfastly refused to consider.  He 
is thus different, and while Gavin does not grasp that he is literally not himself (but 
instead being impersonated by his murderer), he is attentive enough that when the clue 
comes along (the error in chemistry, Flint-as-Pritchel trying to mix sugar into raw 
whiskey rather than into water), he realizes immediately what it means and leaps to catch 
the impostor.  Gavin remains preoccupied with the Pritchel case even when there is 
seemingly nothing left to be learned, and he therefore responds to Flint’s summons to the 
farm.  Although he does not know what the explanation will be, he recognizes that there 
is something left to be explained, and he is thus in a position to spot the error. 
In “Monk,” a man the text refers to as a “moron” goes to prison for a murder he 
did not commit, and is later pardoned but chooses to remain in prison because of his 
affection for the warden and his wife (39).  A week later, he shoots and kills the same 
warden.  Before he is hanged, he makes a nonsensical speech from the scaffold about 
“going out into the free world” to farm (49).  Gavin’s imaginative narrativizing is less 
explicit in this story, but when the needed evidence appears (an inmate named Terrel, 
who has persuaded Monk to kill the warden, repeats the exact words Monk has 
proclaimed from the scaffold), Chick reports that “Uncle Gavin was on the platform 
almost before Terrel quit speaking” (52). The immediacy with which he puts the story 
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together suggests he had already formulated a story in which an unidentified person had 
been repeating those lines to Monk, and in which that person had told him to kill the 
warden.  The only missing information is who, which becomes immediately apparent, 
and why, which Gavin goes on to discover. Gavin has already identified, as his comment 
to Chick about having the right ciphers shows, exactly what sort of evidence he will need 
to be attentive to, in order to discover who manipulated Monk. 
In “Hand Upon the Waters,” Gavin attends an inquest for “a sentimental reason” 
(65).  Having noticed that one detail in the case presented for accidental death by 
drowning is not quite right—what that detail is is withheld from the reader until the end 
of the story—he decides to linger after the inquest and question the youth who found the 
body about the details of his discovery.  Told by the young man who retrieved the boat 
from where the murder victim had been fishing that he had rowed the boat back from the 
middle of the stream, Gavin presses: “‘You mean you swam the boat back,’” and then, 
“‘What with? . . . What did you row it back with?’” (69).  The urgency in his questions 
suggest that the first potential explanatory narrative is already that there has been a 
murder, although he will not explain until his brief end narrative that the presence of an 
oar in the dead man’s boat prompted him to suspect murder because of insider knowledge 
he had, both local and personal: someone using a trotline does not row but rather pulls the 
boat, and the victim, whom Gavin knew, thus kept his oar in his house and had no need to 
bring it to his boat. 
Upon leaving the inquest, Gavin pushes his story further, guessing that the 
murderer likely has a close association with the victim, and goes to see who claims the 
body.  When he finds that Tyler Ballenbaugh, a shrewd businessman, and Tyler’s brother 
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Boyd have claimed it, his potential explanatory narrative fixes on life insurance as a 
motive, which sends Gavin in search of an agent who has sold such a policy.  His search 
in a neighboring county is both structured and open-ended: “although he would not know 
until he found it just what he was looking for, he found it before dark—the agent for the 
company which, eleven years ago, had issued to Lonnie Grinnup a five-thousand-dollar 
policy, with double indemnity for accidental death, on his life, with Tyler Ballenbaugh as 
beneficiary” (72).  He sets up a trap for the two suspects based on the idea that Tyler has 
masterminded the killing with his brother as a helper and that “when there are two 
[murderers], neither one is going to be satisfied that the other has left no ravelings” 
when they realize they are suspected (74, emphasis original).  (Gavin is actually wrong in 
his assumptions; Tyler has apparently bought the policy only as a gamble that he will 
outlive Lonnie, but his brother Boyd has murdered Lonnie and tried to convince his 
brother to file the claim and share the insurance money.)  He is able to convince them that 
he knows what they have done.  Gavin convinces the life insurance adjustor to stall on 
settling the life insurance claim on the murdered man and demand a meeting with Tyler 
Ballenbaugh.  When the brothers are convinced that Gavin knows the story, they go out 
to the scene of the crime to make sure there is no incriminating evidence.  Instead, their 
presence there, which shows that they know what a delay on the insurance claim means 
and are therefore indeed guilty, becomes the evidence.  Gavin’s conviction (in the sense 
of persuasion) of the criminals has a direct and immediate effect.  Their responses verify 
that his account of the crime corresponds sufficiently with what they have done.31  
                                                           
31
 Justice is actually done, however, by the “deaf and dumb” orphan, Joe, who had lived with the murdered 
man (“Hand” 65).  Joe jumps on Boyd Ballenbaugh when he shoots Gavin and then hangs him on the same 
trotline Boyd had previously drowned his caregiver on. 
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Though Gavin’s account is somewhat flawed, it is nevertheless accurate enough that he 
does find the brothers at the crime scene on the night he expects.  Boyd admits what he 
has done, shoots Gavin (who is only injured), and then is killed by Lonnie’s friend Joe. 
To be convincing during the course of an investigation, evidence has to support 
the imagined story only at a few crucial points; later those same few crucial details, in the 
context of a solid argument for what they mean and what narrative they therefore 
substantiate, are able to convince the audience who will convict or exonerate—be it jury, 
mob, or public opinion.  In “Smoke,” Granby Dodge is convinced that Gavin’s story will 
be enough to convict him with the aid of not much more than Gavin’s testimony that he 
saw the Memphis criminal’s car parked at Granby’s house and the presence of a box from 
the victim’s desk, along with a story that turns it into purported evidence.  Gavin reveals 
other points of confirmation to Virginius Holland later—that Granby had bought rat 
poison and had asked a telling question about the probation of a will.  But these points of 
circumstantial evidence, which might have overshadowed the effect of the story about the 
smoke-filled box, are left until after Granby has given himself away.  To draw out the 
murderer, evidence has to convince only the murderer.  Gavin will grimly joke about this 
idea in Intruder, saying of Hope Hampton’s merely good-enough plan to catch Crawford 
Gowrie, “‘We’re after just a murderer, not a lawyer’” (216).  The false Old Man Pritchel 
in “Error” purports to tell the insurance adjustor “the truth about his daughter’s death: the 
facts of it which the physical evidence—the truck and the three dead squirrels and the 
blood on the steps and on the ground—supported” (122).  Instead he re-deploys those 
facts as evidence for a different story to misdirect him.  Faulkner has effectively 
circumscribed the role of evidence in his detective fiction so that it is not the clue that is 
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important—the oar, Terrel’s speech—but instead the reason that Gavin knows it is 
important.  Clearly, Faulkner’s approach to detective fiction writing is not much different 
from that of most Golden Age writers, and indeed those of other eras: as usual, the 
evidence appears, but only the detective knows that it is evidence and why.  The variation 
in Faulkner is that rather than esoteric knowledge allowing the detective to identify the 
evidence as evidence, it is his in-progress story-spinning about the people who make up 
his community.  Evidence is shown to be a piece in a narrative and dependent on that 
narrative’s structure. 
The lawyer-as-detective’s method is to find (or create) that item which will 
eventually convince and produce the proper result. Gavin Stevens’ law is about justice, 
not about truth, and its procedures are oriented toward being just convincing enough to 
achieve the just ending that he is aiming for.  “But isn’t justice always unfair?” Stevens 
asks the grand jury members in “Smoke” who are concerned about the ethics of his ploy 
to cause Granby Dodge to reveal himself as the murderer (24).   Jebb has argued that the 
detective genre “may have attracted Faulkner because the detective hero unites practical 
abilities with idealism about justice and thus provides a model of the socially-useful 
intellectual” (99).  These stories are perhaps a precursor to Intruder and Go Down, Moses 
in more ways than one, following immediately, as most of them do (most having been 
written between 1937 and 1940) what Wagner-Martin in New Essays on Go Down, 
Moses (1996) identifies as the “definite end to Faulkner’s use of narrative form to 
interrogate, expand, and finally confound whatever ostensible ‘story’ he is telling,” in 
particular the “blockage” of Quentin’s narrative in Absalom, Absalom! (7).  Despair about 
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the inability to ultimately know is set aside in favor of a vision of justice that, when it 
doesn’t have evidence of what has happened, produces a convincing story instead. 
 
Narrative Investigation in Intruder in the Dust 
Intruder in the Dust, written and published in 1948, is not strictly speaking a 
Gavin Stevens detective story, though it represents the flowering of Faulkner’s ideas 
about evidence in detective fiction.  Gavin enters into the investigation of the murder of 
Vinson Gowrie rather late in the novel.  In fact, the original detective, according to 
Faulkner, was Lucas Beauchamp, the man who is nearly lynched because it is assumed he 
has killed Vinson.  Faulkner gave a plot summary to Harold Ober on February 1, 1948, 
when he had sixty pages written: “a Negro in jail accused of murder and waiting for the 
white folks to drag him out and pour gasoline over him and set him on fire, is the 
detective, solves the crime because he goddamn has to to keep from being lynched, by 
asking people to go somewhere and look at something and then come back and tell him 
what they found” (Faulkner, Selected Letters 261).  In Lucas’s stead, a community of 
investigators takes up the case: Gavin’s nephew Chick Mallison, Chick’s young African-
American companion Aleck Sander, and Miss Habersham, a 70-year old white woman 
who grew up with Lucas’s now-deceased wife Molly.  Eventually Gavin and Sheriff 
Hope Hampton do become involved.  In the final quarter of the novel Gavin provides an 
extensive explanatory narrative, similar not only to that of “Smoke” but also to those of 
Poe’s Dupin (and of Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, and a host of other tales of detection, 
though most of those narratives are more subordinate to the investigative action), which 
does put Intruder into a close relationship with the detective story tradition in general and 
  
67 
 
specifically the shorter Gavin Stevens stories.  This end narrative in particular 
demonstrates how both Chick and Miss Habersham and Aleck Sander’s investigation and 
Gavin and the sheriff’s are driven by rhetorical needs and narrative expectations rather 
than by clues in the sense of threads leading to a solution.  Reading Intruder in the Dust 
together with the shorter Gavin Stevens fiction makes more apparent the pervasive 
concern in all of these texts with rhetoric, evidence, and justice, as well as the degree to 
which the past can be known.   Such a paired reading also makes the detective content of 
Intruder more visible.  I will look first at Gavin’s role and then at his nephew’s. 
In Intruder in the Dust, Lucas has been taken to jail on suspicion (or something 
more like near-certain culpability) of Vinson Gowrie’s murder.  (Chick comes back from 
a ballgame through the Square and hears “that Lucas had killed Vinson Gowrie out at 
Fraser’s store” (27).  Lucas has been found standing over the body seconds after the shot 
is heard, holding a pistol that has just been fired.)  Gavin arrives in Lucas’s cell already 
producing the kind of potential explanatory narratives recognizable from the short fiction.  
We see his method at work as soon as he arrives at the jail.  But this time, Gavin will fail 
in his guesswork.  The only other story in which he does not solve the mystery alone is 
“Knight’s Gambit,” substantially revised after Faulkner had written Intruder in the Dust. 
Once he has talked at Lucas, Gavin demands that Lucas begin telling “exactly 
what happened out there yesterday” (60).  Prompted for the fourth time, Lucas does begin 
to tell, but goes back instead to the cause of the incident, a theft of lumber that had been 
taking place over the last several weeks .  When he pauses after this back story, Gavin 
intervenes and begins offering the most plausible end to the story, telling it to Lucas in 
the second person: “So you took your pistol and went to straighten it out . . . you 
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happened to find Vinson Gowrie first and followed him into the woods and told him his 
partner was robbing him . . .” (62).  Gavin generates not just one but several possible 
narratives; his practice as a lawyer and detective thrives on narrative-generation, on 
producing possible stories, possible explanations for the known facts.  It is also deeply 
marked by what he considers “natural”: “You . . . told him his partner was robbing him 
and naturally he cursed you and called you a liar whether it was true or not, naturally he 
would have to do that,” Gavin says to Lucas (62).   
Gavin’s fluency in narrative-generation is remarkable.  As in the short fiction, for 
him to investigate and solve is for him to tell and explain.   Already here at the beginning 
of the investigation, his eye is on the end narrative, on what he will need to discover in 
Lucas’s testimony and other sources to be able to make a compelling case about what has 
happened.  Presented, later, with confirmation that Lucas is not the killer (since the 
corpse has been moved while he is in jail) and finally motivated to join Chick, Aleck 
Sander, and Miss Habersham in their search, Gavin begins to generate a new set of 
narratives that will structure the subsequent investigation process.  His investigative 
techniques do not become fruitful, however, until later in the novel, when he has let go of 
what he is so eager to believe Lucas has done, even though he does not want the old man 
lynched.  Instead, Chick, the central consciousness of the story, pursues the first part of 
the investigation (a midnight dig in the cemetery to excavate Vinson’s body) after his 
uncle’s model.  Watson argues that Gavin’s thoughts and stories, told over many years, 
have worked themselves “so deeply into Chick Mallison’s consciousness as to be almost 
inseparable from his own” (115).  His investigative method, too, seems to have been 
shaped by Gavin’s.  The sheriff’s method is also similar: at one pivotal moment the 
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sheriff asks all the investigators to begin imagining what they would have done in the 
murderer’s place: ‘We’re going to find out right now where to start . . . It’s say around 
eleven oclock at night.  You got a mule or maybe it’s a horse . . . And you aint got much 
time . . . All right. What would you do?’” (164-65).32  
Toward the end of the novel, shut in his office with Chick and Miss Habersham 
while the sheriff and Lucas go out to catch Crawford Gowrie, the murderer, Gavin re-
establishes himself as the detective: he reconstructs the circumstances of the murder in an 
extensive end narrative that relies on a sort of character investigation of the Gowrie 
brothers and the other man involved, the timber-buyer Jake Montgomery, whose body 
Chick has found in Vinson’s grave.  As in the short fiction, Gavin substantiates his claims 
with the few facts Chick and his companions have uncovered, embedding those facts 
deeply in his explanatory narrative.  Gavin and the sheriff place a call to a lumber buyer 
in Memphis in order to verify that Jake, the middleman, had bought Crawford’s stolen 
lumber.  The reason for the call, Gavin’s speech suggests, was that he already knew Jake 
had to have been the buyer; the call’s purpose was to confirm a point already almost 
certain, because no other story fit.  The piece of evidence is sought because it would work 
well with the story the investigators are producing, and in fact relies for its 
persuasiveness as evidence on the way it fits into this story that explains so well.  Gavin 
                                                           
32
 This “what would you do,” the alignment of the criminal and the detective, is a classic detective story 
move.  G.K. Chesterton’s Father Brown explains it to an admirer:  “‘You see, I had murdered them all 
myself,’ explained Father Brown patiently. ‘So, of course, I knew how it was done . . . I had planned out 
each of the crimes very carefully . . . I had thought out exactly how a thing like that could be done, and in 
what style or state of mind a man could really do it. And when I was quite sure that I felt exactly like the 
murderer myself, of course I knew who he was’” (6).  Poe similarly compares the art of what he calls 
“analysis” to a scenario in which a schoolboy wins all his compatriots’ marbles by imitating the expression 
on his opponent’s face in an effort to begin to think like him, in “The Purloined Letter.” 
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works this detail about Jake being the buyer into an explanation of Crawford’s motive in 
killing Jake as well as Jake’s motive for digging up Vinson’s body:  
this part we dont really know either and with Jake Montgomery in his present 
condition we probably never will though that doesn’t really matter either since 
the fact remains, why else was he in Vinson’s grave except that in buying the 
lumber from Crawford (we found that out by a telephone call to the lumber’s 
ultimate consignee in Memphis this afternoon) Jake Montgomery knew where 
it came from too since knowing that would have been Jake’s nature and 
character too and indeed a factor in his middleman’s profit. (223, emphasis 
added)  
 
The single “factual” detail is deeply embedded in a series of speculations on motive and 
the “nature” of the people involved: that Jake Montgomery bought the lumber would 
hardly be a reason for killing him, unless he, too, knew that the lumber had been obtained 
by illegal means.  The text suggests, by putting the one verified detail in parentheses, 
breaking up a long sentence about Jake’s knowledge of the situation, that the 
corroborated fact that he did buy it is subordinate to his reasons for needing to know 
where it came from, which Gavin extrapolates from what is known of his character and 
his position in the community.  And for the force of Gavin’s narrative, it is indeed 
subordinate.  The narrative is about motive, and to state simply that Jake bought the 
lumber without making an argument for why that fact is significant is unpersuasive.  
Watson’s point that in legal argumentation “[e]ven tangible or ‘material’ artifacts such as 
weapons, damaged goods, personal belongings, and written documents are irrelevant 
unless incorporated into larger oral narratives” is significant here (18).  Intruder turns the 
a-ha moment, the moment of discovery of the crucial piece of evidence, into the 
afterthought that it actually is: the reasoning, the argument about who would have needed 
to kill whom and why, receives greater emphasis because it is the argument that makes 
the discovery into evidence. 
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We are asked to assume that Gavin Stevens’ reconstruction of Crawford’s and 
Jake’s behavior is mostly true primarily because Gavin’s story is convincing on the basis 
of the motives described, but also because it incorporates several pieces of more concrete 
evidence into its structure and uses them effectively as rhetorical evidence.  At certain 
moments in his explanatory narrative, Gavin even forgoes offering evidence because the 
strength of his narrative and its appeal to psychological motivations, filtered through an 
understanding of local practice, render more concrete evidence unnecessary for his 
audience.  He deliberately does not ask around in order to verify that Vinson and 
Crawford argued at Fraser’s store that morning: “And at least you can finish that,” he 
tells Chick and Miss Habersham; “no need to prove any quarrel between Vinson and 
Crawford nor rack your brains very deep to imagine what Crawford said and did” (221).  
Gavin brushes aside questions that do not affect the overall persuasiveness of the 
narrative.  What exactly Crawford Gowrie said to get his brother Vinson out to the store 
is guessed at, then dismissed: “because that doesn’t really matter either” (222).  The 
evidence that Gavin acquires is the evidence he goes looking for, and he goes looking for 
the details he knows will be most convincing, that will have strong connotations for his 
audience—ultimately the mob that might or might not lynch Lucas—who also knows 
about Lucas, the Gowries, and Jake. 
Gavin is blunt about both the origin and the force of his conclusions about Jake’s 
knowledge: “if this be surmise then make the most of it or give Mr Hampton and me a 
better and we’ll swap” (223).  Making the most of surmise when he knows that his 
audience will accept it and that it will be sufficient to achieve justice is Gavin’s normal 
mode of argumentation.  He admits his biases as well, and the effect that they have 
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probably had on his conclusions: “I like to think for Crawford’s sake,” he says, “that 
maybe Jake named the price of his silence and even collected it” (223).  The rest of his 
narrative depends on this conclusion that Jake has been blackmailing Crawford Gowrie, 
which Gavin admits has arisen from a desire to redeem Crawford’s character somewhat.    
Gavin relies largely on a plot imagined on the basis of motive—Crawford’s likely 
motive for not only killing his brother but framing Lucas.  Lucas’s testimony alone does 
not suffice; he wants to study Crawford’s actions by imagining what might have 
prompted them: “But even when Hope told me how he had finally got that much out of 
Lucas . . . it explained only part of it because I was still saying what I had been saying 
ever since you all woke me this morning and Chick told me what Lucas had told him 
about the pistol: But why Vinson?  Why did Crawford have to kill Vinson in order to 
obliterate the witness to his thieving?” (219).  Later he judges that Crawford will try to 
kill Lucas.  Even if “he already knew he was lost and nothing Lucas could testify . . . 
could harm him further,” Gavin reasons, he would still attack Lucas.  “[W]hat would you 
want to do first [before fleeing or being captured or killed], one last act and statement of 
your deathless principles before you left your native land for good and maybe even the 
world for good, if your name was Gowrie and your blood and thinking and acting had 
been Gowrie all your life,” he asks Miss Habersham (226).  Crawford still sees Lucas as 
the cause of all his shame and frustration, for having observed him stealing and 
threatened to tell, and for being a black man who would dare to tell, and Gavin judges 
(correctly) that he will feel compelled to take it out on him. 
The demand for motive is a rhetorical demand; it is a demand for plot and 
meaning.  It requires the field of evidence to be those findings which can be construed to 
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support the set of possible meanings, possible reasons for the crime.  Gavin’s perception 
of what motives are possible governs the process, and for him, both a set of professional, 
canonical possibilities (freedom from blackmail, revenge, monetary gain) and local 
gossip about the Gowries’ and Jake Montgomery’s character determines the set of 
possibilities.  While Gavin eventually succeeds as an interpreter late in Intruder, the 
novel suggests that he fails at the beginning because he is a grown man and a 
professional.  The approachability that Faulkner builds up as part of Gavin’s character in 
the short fiction and Intruder too—Chick says Lucas appreciates “that quality in his uncle 
which brought people to tell him things they would tell nobody else”—has its limits 
because of his age and professionalization (68).  He knows the patterns well but is no 
longer able to see anything that is outside of them.  Chick remembers “Old Ephraim” 
telling him when he was younger that “Young folks and womens, they aint cluttered.  
They can listen.  But a middle-year man like your paw and your uncle, they cant listen  
They aint got time  They’re too busy with facks” (70).  Gavin is too busy reciting the 
stories he already knows. 
Although Gavin Stevens assigns the final meaning to events and gives the account 
of the crime in Intruder in the Dust, it is Chick Mallison whose role as interpreter is 
staged for the reader, since readers are forced to interpret alongside him.  Chick’s 
consciousness is central to the narration although the novel is narrated in the third person.  
The present action of a detective story moves through what is encountered, what is 
coming at the investigator in need of interpretation.  The way Chick sorts through sensory 
input, by drawing conclusions about how to read it based on the history of 
Yoknapatawpha County that his uncle has instilled in him, is established in the first 
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chapter.  A young Chick goes hunting on Carothers Edmonds’ land, falls beneath the ice 
in a creek, and is commanded (by Lucas) to follow home a man whom he identifies as 
Lucas Beauchamp based on a correspondence between his uncle’s stories and the location 
of Lucas’s house and hearing his first name spoken.  Watson argues that this scene 
documents “a process that is genuinely epistemological.  We witness the coalescence of 
discrete perceptual stimuli into a cognitive whole” (122).  There is already, in this first 
chapter, an attention to how Chick knows what he knows.  Without knowing “how he 
knew it since there were no signs, traces, soiled plates to show it,” Chick is sure that 
“Edmonds’ boy” and Aleck Sander have eaten before he enters the kitchen (13).  The 
conclusion is based not on the interpretation of traces, as Chick realizes, but on the 
confirmation of expectations.  The subsequent story, too, will be based on expectations 
and imagined narratives that, when they are contradicted by material evidence that Chick, 
Aleck Sander, Miss Habersham, or Gavin Stevens interpret as contrary to the currently 
favored narrative, will be revised to accommodate the new evidence without completely 
displacing the expectations. 
Once the detective story plot begins, Chick encounters Lucas’s incomplete 
testimony, and then the body in the grave that he has not expected to find: the world 
comes at him in need of interpretation, and he attempts to find an adequate account of 
what might have produced these elements.  White, speaking of the historical operation, 
argues that a historian “must bring to his consideration of the record . . . general notions 
of the kinds of stories that might be found there . . . In other words, the historian must 
draw upon a fund of culturally provided mythoi” (Tropics 60).  Chick, following his 
uncle, whose opinions largely structure his way of thinking about the world, pursues his 
  
75 
 
interpretation through two related frameworks, a sort of psychological analysis of the 
individuals he is dealing with, which is dominated by a focus on motive, and a 
knowledge of the county, its families, and its customs.  Often this second rubric plays 
into the first, informing his understanding of the actors’ motivations.  The scene in which 
Chick helps his uncle, the sheriff, and Vinson and Crawford Gowrie’s father to locate 
Vinson’s body shows Chick’s investigative method at work.  While the sheriff directs the 
actual search, we watch Chick think through how it should be conducted, anticipating the 
sheriff’s and Mr. Gowrie’s movements.  Chick reasons that when disposing of his 
brother’s body, Crawford had time to consider what best to do with it, and thus would 
have put it into the patch of quicksand under the highway bridge.  Again, this is a “What 
would you do?” moment, pairing murderer and detective.  The murderer’s urgency to get 
the body out of sight is thus actually repeated in the investigation: Chick, looking down at 
the corpse on the bank beside the highway bridge, listens “harder than ever now with 
something of the murderer’s own frantic urgency” for a car coming, wanting to shield 
Mr. Gowrie’s grief from exposure and likewise Vinson’s body from a misinterpreting 
public who he fears might lynch Lucas after all (173-74). 
When Chick first looks at the quicksand, with Vinson’s body hidden below it, it 
appears to be free of traces, “an expanse of wet sand as smooth and innocent and 
markless of surface as so much milk” (172).  Yet he knows that the body will, indeed, be 
under that markless surface.  When Vinson’s body has been hoisted out of “the sand with 
a faint smacking plop like the sound of lips perhaps in sleep,” there remains “in the bland 
surface nothing: a faint wimple wrinkle already fading then gone like the end of a faint 
secret fading smile” (173).  In retrospect there is, after all, material evidence that the body 
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is hidden there—a “long willow pole lying above the bank edge and coated for three or 
four feet up its length with a thin patina of dried sand like when you thrust a stick into a 
bucket or vat of paint,” but when he first observes the stick which Crawford has 
apparently used to thrust his brother beneath the surface, Chick notes the pole just as an 
obstacle that Mr. Gowrie leaps on his way to the sand and the body (172).  While 
tracking prints has previously led the investigators to Jake Montgomery’s body, hastily 
buried under some dirt hacked off from a creek bank, tracking does not lead them to 
Vinson.  That better-plotted hiding place has to be discovered by a consideration of how 
Crawford might have plotted: he was not a fool, Gavin thinks, presumably trying to 
imagine an untraceable hiding place within reach.33  The experienced reader of detective 
fiction might notice the momentary attention the text gives to the quicksand when Chick, 
Aleck Sander, and Miss Habersham go to disinter Vinson’s body from his grave, might 
suspect that it will eventually be found there. 
Chick’s education in how to solve a crime is not only a professional education in 
uncovering murderers’ motives and movements in general, but much more an education 
in the psychology of the community.  It is conducted in part by his Uncle Gavin but is in 
fact furthered by Gavin’s failures to fully understand that community, as well as by 
Chick’s direct encounters with Lucas Beauchamp, Miss Habersham, and Mr. Gowrie.  
Intruder is a coming-of-age narrative because Chick is discovering not just bodies and 
murderers but adult motivations; he is coming to understanding, growing up.  In Intruder, 
                                                           
33
 The Gowries, on the other hand, cannot imagine it—“What?” one of the twins asks—“Sonabitch, 
Lawyer.  Put a man in quicksand? my boy in quicksand?” adds Mr. Gowrie (171).  Miss Habersham, who 
has likewise noticed the quicksand the night before without imagining that one of the bodies might be 
there, also experiences a horror beyond words.  Chick says that “Miss Habersham had done something he 
didn’t know what, no sound and she hadn’t moved and it wasn’t even that she had got any stiller but 
something had occurred” (222).  The “something” occurs again at almost every mention of fratricide or 
quicksand (Faulkner, Intruder 224, 225).   
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Miss Worsham from “Go Down, Moses” becomes Miss Habersham (both characters have 
grown up like sisters with Mollie/Molly Beauchamp and live on the edge of town 
subsisting off the sale of produce and eggs).  The name change recalls Great 
Expectations and Miss Havisham,34 and although Miss Havisham and Miss Habersham 
have little in common as characters, the similarity of their names reinforces Intruder’s 
coming-of-age novel structure. 
Chick is engaged in discovering not only who has murdered Vinson Gowrie, but 
in trying to figure out, for instance, why the Gowries never lynch Lucas.  He proceeds 
through several answers to that question as his understanding deepens, each time thinking 
to himself that he now “knows” the answer.  The first, “obvious,” reason that Lucas has 
ever reached town alive is that “there happened to be no Gowrie present at the moment 
but the dead one” (158).  Later he concludes—“he knew now,” the text says—that Lucas 
is not immediately lynched because “the Gowries themselves had known he hadn’t done 
it so they were just marking time waiting for somebody else” to do it to further the 
alternative narrative masking the fratricide (214).  But then a memory of Mr. Gowrie 
interrupts Chick’s conclusion, and he imputes the decision not to lynch Lucas instead to 
grief: “he [Mr. Gowrie] held nothing against Lucas then because there was no room for 
anything but his son” (214). In no sense does Gavin teach Chick about method.  He 
teaches him about people and their motivations; to study and apply that knowledge is 
Gavin’s method and becomes Chick’s as well.  As Gavin instructs Chick, he attempts to 
pass on some of his blindnesses as well, for instance the type of expectations that keep 
him from being able to hear Lucas’s claims to innocence in the first place, by trying to 
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 See Joseph Gold, “Dickens and Faulkner: The Uses of Influence,” 76. 
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turn Chick into a lawyer.  Rob Atkinson has argued that Gavin fails to see what is really 
going on, “not despite his legal training and practical wisdom, but precisely because of 
them.  His lawyerly professionalism, the skills and habits formed in years of law practice, 
are not only not the solution; they are as much a part of the problem as the more obvious 
racism of his redneck compatriots” (608).  Chick’s close contact with Lucas, Aleck 
Sander, and Miss Habersham keeps him from becoming overly professionalized. 
Watson argues that after Sanctuary, the ineffectual Horace Benbow “must yield 
his place in the Yoknapatawpha fiction to a man at law whose rhetorical, narrative, and 
theatrical skills exceed his own”—Gavin Stevens (75).  In Intruder and also the novella 
“Knight’s Gambit” (1949), where Chick solves the mystery by being on the spot and 
listening while Gavin is shut up with his translation of the Old Testament back into 
ancient Greek, Chick succeeds Gavin as detective, leaving him to his lawyering and his 
marriage in The Mansion, although he will do what might be called detective work in 
Requiem for a Nun.  As Lorie Watkins Fulton argues, “Chick seems far more sensitive 
than Stevens to the intrinsic humanity of all people, especially African Americans.  In 
stark contrast to his uncle’s inability to understand Molly’s grief in the final pages of Go 
Down, Moses, Chick recognizes as a child that ‘You dont have to not be a nigger in order 
to grieve’ after seeing Lucas just after Molly’s death (Intruder 302)” (70). 
One final element that Intruder in the Dust borrows and develops from the short 
fiction, though it is a less-central plot point in Intruder than in “Smoke” and “Hand Upon 
the Waters,” is the idea that a convincing story produces the criminal bodily and leads to 
justice.  Crawford attempts to murder Lucas when Sheriff Hampton’s car has to go into 
low gear to cross the unfinished fill on the trip he is widely known to be taking to the 
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next county, supposedly to testify at Jake Montgomery’s inquest.  Crawford does not 
know that Lucas does not need to be taken to another county since Jake was killed in 
Yoknapatawpha County; the piece of false information fed to him through a story 
whispered around the county is persuasive enough to Crawford to produce the intended 
(and just, in Hampton’s and Gavin’s view) outcome.  He drives down to the fill believing 
that Lucas will be coming past in a slow-moving car, and his attempt to kill Lucas is the 
clinching piece of evidence for the account of the murder that Gavin, the Sheriff, and 
Chick and his fellow investigators have produced.  Granted, there is probably sufficient 
legal evidence to convict Crawford because of the bullet.  But it is unjust in the eyes of 
the people concerned to make more of a spectacle of the fratricide; instead they return the 
evidence (Vinson’s body and the bullet lodged in it) to the family.  Believing that it is 
also unjust to let him escape, however, they tell a story and stage its supporting details to 
persuade Crawford to come out to the fill and then to commit suicide.  Gavin Stevens’ 
enormous extralegal power, his role as puppeteer or engineer of the future (although in 
Intruder the sheriff also has a major role in this puppeteering) works here on the basis of 
persuasiveness to a particular audience.  Gavin and Hope Hampton know that the origin 
of the story (the gossip Willy Ingrum) and its context will seem plausible to Crawford 
even if they are not correct (because he is just a murderer, not a lawyer).  The story again 
produces the body of the criminal, rendering material evidence extraneous.   
 
Local Detection  
Crimes and their solutions in Faulkner’s fiction are not isolated incidents in the 
history of the town, capped off by the departure of the visiting detective figure.  Gavin’s 
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end narratives constitute a continuing chapter in the stories about local families and local 
practices that Gavin and the citizens of Jefferson recite.  Genre detective fiction instead 
often has a detective who sees more clearly than others—usually than the local police—
because he is able to set aside his expectations about how the crime probably occurred 
and see the unexpected explanation.  By seeing events and suspects out of context, the 
detective, usually an outsider, structures his investigation in a mythically complete open-
mindedness.  (On the other hand, a thorough examination of these stories suggests that 
their detectives, too, run through a list of possible stories that ultimately depend on 
acquiring local knowledge and necessarily depend on experience with previous crimes, in 
spite of the generic preference for the abilities of non-professionals.)  This description of 
detective fiction is of course an oversimplification.  John Irwin in fact points out that 
Faulkner resurrects a device that originated with Poe himself on the occasions when 
Faulkner gives his investigators “a personal motive for becoming involved in the solution 
or prevention of a crime”35 (104).  Chick agrees to go out to Caledonia Chapel cemetery 
and disinter Lucas’s supposed victim because Lucas years ago saved him from drowning, 
gave him shelter, warmth, and a good meal, and then repeatedly refused payment.  The 
entire opening section of Intruder shows Chick struggling with his perceived debt to a 
black man and then, once Lucas has been accused of killing Vinson, torn between a 
desire to get on his horse and ride away or stay.  As he goes back to the jail once his 
uncle has left, Chick muses, “Maybe he will remind me of that goddamn plate of collards 
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 Poe’s Dupin takes on the case in “The Murders in the Rue Morgue” because the accused man once did 
him a good turn, and in “The Purloined Letter,” he “has an old score to settle with the Minister D—” (Irwin 
113).  
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and sidemeat, or maybe he’ll even tell me I’m all he’s got, all that’s left and that will be 
enough” (Intruder 66).   
Faulkner’s investigators not only solve crimes because of personal motives, but 
are able to identify and interpret evidence because they are locals.  Grimwood argues that 
“Gavin Stevens uncovers their [the criminal outsiders’] misdeeds not like Sherlock 
Holmes through esoteric knowledge of arcane disciplines, but precisely through his 
intimate familiarity with his neighbors and his county.  The clues he detects have 
significance within a local, rural context” (201-02).  In fact, “horsemanship, woodcraft, 
and familiarity with purely local customs often provide the detectives with their clues,” 
and a corresponding ignorance of these local customs (how to make a cold toddy, how to 
move a boat along a trotline) causes the murderers to reveal themselves (Grimwood 198).  
Watson shows that Chick, in Intruder, grows into this kind of “mastery of 
Yoknapatawpha lore . . . through the accretion of interwoven stories and anecdotes” told 
by Gavin (124).  They are what allow “a sixteen-year-old town boy, who spends most of 
his spare time at his uncle’s law office, [to] recognize, at a moment’s notice, in the dark 
of night, and in the most incongruous situation imaginable, the dead face of an obscure, 
itinerant working man who is not even from Yoknapatawpha but from a neighboring 
county” (Watson 124).  It is indeed almost unfathomable that Chick would recognize 
Jake’s body in the grave without having known a good deal about the man and his 
propensity to being mixed up in a crime like the one Chick is investigating for Lucas. 
Gavin, in his final explanatory monologue in Intruder in the Dust, directly names 
his method of coming to knowledge about a crime.  However, he identifies it not as his 
own method but as that of the murderer whose motivations and actions he is trying to 
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reconstruct narratively, underscoring Brooks’s point that one of the requirements of 
detective fiction is “that the detective repeat, go over again, the ground that has been 
covered by his predecessor, the criminal” (Reading 24).  Gavin calls Crawford Gowrie’s 
plan to frame Lucas for his murder of his brother “a scheme so simple and water-tight in 
its biological and geographical psychology as to be what Chick here would call a natural” 
(223).  It is indeed biological (if the term is expanded to include the understanding of race 
in the biological metaphors that Gavin seems to espouse36) and geographical psychology 
that Gavin pursues in order to reconstruct Crawford’s scheme, and that of all the 
characters involved in this case and the cases in other Faulkner stories.  Gavin follows the 
same set of assumptions that Crawford has followed: Lucas will come to see the receipt, 
will accept his challenge to hit a half dollar on a stump fifteen feet away with his pistol, 
and will wait in the woods until Vinson Gowrie approaches him.   The crowd at Fraser’s 
store will rush out at the sound of the shot to apprehend him, will verify that his gun has 
been fired, and will assume that he is contrary enough to have shot a white man in the 
back.  It is ultimately by imagining the plot Crawford, as they know him, would have 
constructed under the circumstances that Gavin and the sheriff figure out what did 
happen. 
Sassoubre stresses the “community-based legal authority” in Intruder: the sheriff 
and Gavin find the bodies “based on their specific local knowledge,” for instance where 
the quicksand is located, and determine who has done the killing because they know what 
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 See, for instance, Chapter 19 of Light in August (1932), in which Stevens, appearing for the first time in 
the novel, explains Joe Christmas’s final moments in terms of a struggle between his “black blood” and his 
“white blood”: “It would not be either one or the other and let his body save itself.  Because the black blood 
drove him first to the negro cabin.  And then the white blood drove him out of there, as it was the black 
blood which snatched up the pistol and the white blood which would not let him fire it” (449). 
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kind of guns Lucas and Crawford own (203).  I would add that, while they mention a 
Memphis expert who can be called in to identify the murder weapon from the shape of 
the wound, they never call him.  They return the body and any physical evidence: “not 
even Vinson Gowrie for somebody from the Memphis police to come and look at and say 
what bullet killed him because the sheriff had already let old Gowrie take him back home 
and wash the quicksand off and bury him” (Faulkner, Intruder 188).  The evidence they 
rely on instead, as I have argued, is the strength of their story based on knowledge of the 
parties involved and the way that a few details—Jake’s having been the buyer of the 
stolen timber, Vinson’s body being where they expect it to be, and finally Lucas’s 
testimony about who was stealing the lumber—corroborate that story.  They accept 
Lucas’s testimony not simply because he claims to be an eyewitness to the theft (Gavin is 
certainly not willing to listen to him early on) but because what he says does indeed fit in 
with the story they have constructed. 
 
Evidence and Interpretation in Go Down, Moses and Absalom, Absalom! 
Go Down, Moses and Intruder in the Dust, the novels on either side of Faulkner’s 
more or less fallow period from 1942 to 1948 (he wrote only short stories, most of which 
he struggled to publish, and part of A Fable, and spent much of the interval under 
contract in Hollywood) exist in a particular relationship to one another.  Michael Millgate 
argues that “there is a strong sense of continuity between the two books: both are largely 
concerned with the problem of White-Negro relationships; both have Lucas Beauchamp 
as a major character; and the final chapter of Go Down, Moses seems directly to 
anticipate the principal emphases and even something of the action of the later novel, 
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with the figure of Gavin Stevens serving as an active and thematic link between the two” 
(215).   Sassoubre likewise notes that the final chapter of Go Down, Moses (also titled 
“Go Down, Moses”), in which the execution of Lucas and Mollie Beauchamp’s grandson 
Samuel “is figured as a Northern lynching . . . sets the stage for Intruder in the Dust, in 
which Gavin Stevens and Sheriff Hampton save Lucas by preventing both a lynching and 
a trial” (197-98).  Both novels have a good deal to do with Lucas and Mollie/Molly 
Beauchamp.  Each also throws a certain light on the other.  The centrality of knowledge 
in Go Down, Moses suggests a reading of Intruder in which the knowledge component, 
the a-ha moment, of the detective story plot is readable in primarily racial terms.  To 
know whodunit is to know Crawford’s exploitation of Lucas, as well as Gavin’s 
infantilization of him.  Inversely, Intruder’s explicit focus on evidence suggests a re-
reading of Go Down, Moses as a text also concerned with the identification and 
interpretation of evidence, particularly in the McCaslin ledgers. 
While Go Down, Moses and Intruder have a more definite chronological 
relationship, even Absalom, Absalom! can benefit from a re-reading in light of the focus 
on evidence and the nature of investigation in the detective fiction.  That novel’s 
chronological relationship to the detective fiction is not entirely absent, either.  Faulkner 
had written “Smoke” years before Absalom, and he wrote “Monk” in the year following. 
Chick resembles young Ike McCaslin, and indeed also Quentin Compson, 
although the comparison should not be pushed too far.  It is just noticeable enough to call 
attention to the related activity of searching and interpreting in all three texts.  Quentin, 
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Ike, and Chick, all in their late teens, all after midnight, 37 engage in unearthing, either 
narratively or literally in the cemetery, in order to explain.  Watson calls Chick “a 
southern adolescent struggling against the inertia of his elders to translate moral 
awareness into moral action . . . a direct literary descendant of Isaac McCaslin, the 
protagonist of Go Down, Moses, who also tries, though less successfully, to expiate the 
sins he discovers in his southern heritage” (110).  Indeed, Watson says, “[t]he consonance 
between ‘Mallison’ and ‘McCaslin,’ ‘Chick’ and ‘Ike,’ only underscores the basic 
resemblance” (110). 
At some point in their search, all three begin to look for what they know they will 
find—Henry in the shell of the Sutpen house, evidence of some crime so terrible it caused 
a woman to drown herself in a creek, a body buried in quicksand.  In “The Bear,” Ike, 
locked in the commissary after midnight to open the ledgers with whose “scarred and 
cracked backs” he has been familiar since he was a child, “but with no particular desire to 
open them” (256), is now sixteen and goes looking for traces of a story he has begun to 
piece together: “He knew what he was going to find before he found it,” and finds “what 
he knew he would find, only this was still not it because he already knew this” (257).  As 
I argue in my Introduction, he knows he is looking for evidence of something more than 
miscegenation, something more than a sexual encounter between an old man and a young 
slave woman; he knows he will find evidence of that but knows he will find more, too, 
because it would have taken more to drive the young woman’s mother to drown herself.  
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 Isaac McCaslin gets the key to the commissary “after midnight” (Faulkner, Go Down 257), Quentin and 
Shreve are almost done revising their story when the chimes ring “for one oclock,” (Faulkner, Absalom 
299) and Chick and his fellow gravediggers return home “well before daylight” and are at Hope Hampton’s 
by four o’clock in the morning (Faulkner, Intruder 107).   
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Recognition, in Go Down, Moses as in Intruder in the Dust, is embedded in stories 
already known.    
Unwanted knowledge comes upon these adolescents suddenly, in both “The Bear” 
and Intruder.  Ike McCaslin finds evidence of incest between the lines of the ledger even 
as he spins a different tale: that Carothers McCaslin had held Thucydus, Tomey’s father, 
apart from his other slaves, and Thucydus and his wife (Eunice) and daughter had 
experienced themselves as distinctive not only because the husband and his parents were 
not field hands, but because he “and his father and mother too had been inherited by the 
white man from his father, and the white man himself had travelled three hundred miles 
and better to New Orleans in a day when men travelled by horseback or steamboat, and 
bought the girl’s mother as a wife for”—and suddenly the line breaks off; Ike realizes the 
first story does not explain, does not account for such a journey (258-59).  In the next 
line, knowledge breaks in upon him even as he denies it: “The old frail pages seemed to 
turn of their own accord even while he thought His own daughter His own daughter. No 
No Not even him” (259).  What he is realizing is, as I have previously argued, what Isaac 
“knew . . . he was going to find before he found it”—some act so egregious that it makes 
the story of Eunice’s suicide make sense (257).  He follows with a piece of logic made 
possible by a knowledge of family history: men who do not travel and do not need slaves 
do not make long journeys to buy them for any ordinary reason.  And then something he 
has known all his life suddenly becomes evidence, in the context of this new narrative 
that explains it: “he knew from his own observation and memory that there had already 
been some white in Tomey’s Terrel’s blood before his father gave him the rest of it” 
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(259). He has made these observations all his life, but only now, in the context of a story, 
do they begin to have a value as evidence.  
There is a scene in Intruder that echoes this one, although without the same level 
of personal involvement on the part of the central consciousness of the novel.  Watching 
Mr. Gowrie pursue the question of who shot his son, Chick puts up a mental resistance 
similar to Isaac’s: “And watching he thought No! No! Dont say it! Dont ask!” even when 
Mr. Gowrie has certainly already begun to know that the murderer was someone much 
closer to home than Lucas (175).  Watson calls Crawford Gowrie’s act of fratricide the 
“literally unspeakable . . . crime at the core of the novel” (131).  Chick suggests that the 
mob has dispersed quickly and in silence to keep from having to lynch Crawford Gowrie 
or indeed even admit to themselves that he killed his brother; Miss Habersham, as 
previously mentioned, “does something he didn’t know what, no sound and she hadn’t 
moved and it wasn’t even that she had got any stiller but something had occurred” every 
time the subject of fratricide is broached and repeats unbelievingly that Crawford put his 
brother in quicksand (222).  Gavin proposes that fratricide puts the whom into the 
accusative-less precept “Thou shalt not kill,” changes the weight of the commandment: 
“‘But thou shall not kill thy mother’s child.  It came right down into the street that time to 
walk in broad daylight at your elbow, didn’t it?’” (Faulkner, Intruder 195, emphasis 
original).  Both Isaac and Chick go through the process of realizing that a fact one has 
known in innocence can function as evidence that unspeakable crimes like fratricide and 
incest have taken place.  Quentin and Shreve in Absalom, Absalom!, of course, realize or 
at least imagine the same crimes. 
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The concern with epistemological processes that Faulkner imports from his 
detective fiction reading points toward the broader theme of knowability in his other 
work.  Lucas can be recognized by Chick but can never really be known; Chick, as he 
grows into adolescence in Lucas’s shadow in chapter 2 of Intruder in the Dust, is forever 
chasing knowledge of him, forever looking for evidence of Lucas’s grief over his wife’s 
death, all without really understanding him.  The closest he comes is to realize, in “a kind 
of amazement,” “You dont have to not be a nigger in order to grieve” (25, emphasis 
original).  Likewise, Isaac McCaslin can realize what has happened to the slaves, the 
barest traces of whose lives are represented in the ledgers, but he cannot begin to enter 
their thoughts.38  Like Chick, Isaac has the evidence only of the existence of the grief 
(and likewise the suicide and the incest) but not of who these people are.  The people 
whose stories are buried in the traces left in the McCaslin ledger books take “substance 
and even a sort of shadowy life with their passions and complexities too as page followed 
page and year year,” but only with the addition of Ike’s expectations, and with the stories 
he remembers (254).  Ike sees them come off the page almost as specters, as Quentin 
Compson does Henry, Judith, and Charles Bon—what he experiences is certainly the 
imaginative moment in a historian’s endeavors that White writes of, brought into the 
investigation itself: “and looking down at the yellowed page spread beneath the yellow 
glow of the lantern smoking and stinking in that rank chill midnight room fifty years 
later, he seemed to see her actually walking into the icy creek on that Christmas day six 
months before her daughter’s and her lover’s . . . child was born, solitary, inflexible, 
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 Minrose Gwin argues that the ledger books “are too small a space to contain, in all their cultural and 
historical implications, the outrageousness of old Carothers McCaslin’s crimes and the tragic stories of 
Eunice and Tomasina, whose lives are squeezed into cryptic phrases in the ledger book” (77). 
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griefless, ceremonial” (Faulkner, Go Down 259).  How so griefless?  His imaginings 
underscore their own failures of knowledge and understanding, perhaps Faulkner’s as 
well.  The focus in Intruder on evidence (and even the word “evidence” surfaces 
repeatedly in that novel, whereas it does not in Go Down, Moses) helps us understand 
how much Go Down, Moses, too, really is about trying to know.  In the final episode in 
Go Down, Moses, Gavin can discover that Mollie Beauchamp’s grandson is being 
executed, but that grandson’s history, and what he means to Mollie, remain hidden from 
him.  Intruder, conversely, practically begins with a recognition scene, and it continues 
with a Bildungsroman structure.   
Linda Wagner-Martin, as mentioned previously, stresses the importance of 
knowledge in Go Down, Moses.  Through the novel’s difficult structure, which compels 
“the reader literally to put together glimpses of information—often as indecipherable as 
the cryptic writing in the commissary books—Faulkner’s novel replicates the process of a 
mind coming to understanding” rather than the “endless repetition” and “blockage” 
performed in Absalom, which allows Quentin to avoid facing “the truth about either the 
South or himself” (Wagner-Martin 7).  Wagner-Martin extends the argument by saying 
that Go Down, Moses suggests action, “instead of forcing the reader to a willed passivity . 
. . as it did Ike,” (6) and is in fact “the beginning of Faulkner’s mature statement about 
responsibility” (7).  She declares bluntly that “Isaac McCaslin, often read as the 
protagonist of Go Down, Moses, is not another Quentin Compson,” and to read him as 
such ignores “crucial changes” between Absalom, Absalom! (and previously The Sound 
and the Fury) and Go Down, Moses (5).  Yet certainly there is a reason the two 
adolescents resemble each other so closely in many incidentals.  Their similarity in fact 
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highlights the call for an end to despair that Wagner-Martin argues that Go Down, Moses 
is. 
David Krause argues that Absalom, Absalom! is a novel about reading—“Reading 
. . . emerges not as just another detachable thematic strand in the novel’s dense tapestry 
but as the very stuff that makes up the book” (228).  If reading is inevitably an act of 
interpretation, the critical commonplace that Absalom is part detective story remains true.  
It seeks to explain “what happened here,” not in order to answer the question of who did 
it, but in order to answer the question of why, for which seeking to establish certain 
details is necessary—most critically what the basis was for Henry’s demand that Bon not 
marry his sister.  But what, for Quentin in 1909, remains to be read, to be interpreted, 
unraveled? What remains to demand explanation?  Certainly everything that Miss Rosa 
tells Quentin, certainly the fact that she is still obsessed by it all, certainly what he sees at 
the Sutpen house the night he goes out there with her.  But also the unsigned, undated 
letter, and also the gravestones, which immediately for Quentin raise the question of who 
would have erected them, and why, and with what funds.  
Quentin, as a listener, reader, and interpreter within the narrative in Absalom, 
Absalom!, encounters two forms of evidence for the lives of Sutpen, Judith, Bon, and 
Henry—of how they lived and what they did, indeed that they ever lived at all.  Some of 
the persistent objects in the text exist only in narrative, worried over by Rosa, by 
Compson, by Quentin and Shreve, but only described told, retold—the case, for instance, 
with the photograph in it varying depending on the teller, or the shot that killed Charles 
Bon, famously “heard only by its echo,” as Miss Rosa says (123).  Even Bon’s body 
leaves no trace, not even “the imprint of a body on a mattress” (123), and the women of 
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the Sutpen house “obliterate” the shot, in “a retroactive severance of the stream of event,” 
rob “the murderer of a victim for his very bullet,” simply by never speaking it (127).  But 
just a few objects remain for Quentin to see himself: the letter that Mr. Compson says 
Judith brought to his mother, the markers in the graveyard at Sutpen’s Hundred, the shell 
of the house, and the living bodies of Rosa, Clytie, and Henry themselves.  The text is 
insistent, however, that even these exist in the story only by means of the testimony that 
situates them there. Wade Newhouse argues that when Quentin “actually sees and speaks 
with the elusive subject [Henry] that has been at the heart of the multilayered tellings and 
retellings that have so defined his community’s memory and his sense of himself as a 
Southerner,” the meeting “does less to legitimize their identity through narrative than to 
frustrate such a search for authority, since the reality that they discover is not material 
enough (it is merely ‘wasted’) to carry the ideological and cultural weight of the stories in 
which they have invested themselves” (145).  The (mere) physical presence of Henry 
Sutpen “does not substantiate anyone’s particular version of the past or provide any new 
information” (Newhouse 145).  As Krause has argued, the letter can be seen as “just 
about the only scrap of documentary evidence (other than a gravestone) that a man named 
Charles Bon ever existed and intruded on the lives of the Sutpens,” and yet Faulkner 
“refuses to authorize any assumptions about who wrote the letter to whom” (225). It 
persists instead as merely a “faint spidery script not like something impressed upon the 
paper by a once-living hand but like a shadow cast upon it . . . without date or salutation 
or signature,” shedding in Quentin’s hands all the narrative baggage Mr. Compson has 
laid upon it (102).  In the scene in which Quentin encounters five Sutpen gravestones, 
Krause adds, the “emphasis . . . falls insistently on the problematic legibility of the ‘faint 
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lettering, the graved words’” (233).  Mr. Compson urges a Quentin in his early teens to 
determine who might have purchased each of the five stones in the Sutpen family 
cemetery.  The words engraved into the stones have to be coaxed into revealing even 
their literal content: Quentin smooths “with his hand into legibility . . . the faint lettering, 
the graved words,” (155) shrouded beneath composting leaves, with from a distance only 
“here and there a carved letter or even an entire word momentary and legible in the faint 
light” (153).  “‘Who would have paid for them?’ Mr. Compson asks; ‘Think.’” (155).  
Both letter and stones, despite their belonging to a class of objects whose purpose is to 
tell, to pass on information, function as evidence to be interpreted rather than objects 
whose meaning is unproblematic. 
Even the living bodies of the three characters from the Sutpen legend who remain 
for Quentin to see tell him almost nothing, leaving the story still open to his endless 
revisions with Shreve that winter.  It is in fact when Mr. Compson’s letter arrives with the 
news that the last of those bodies (Rosa’s) is dead and buried that their resurrection in 
narrative really begins, that the young men by means of their reasoning and imagination 
from the few pieces of evidence Quentin has beheld begin to create meaningful lives in 
the place of the inscrutable flesh Quentin has seen and touched.  In Shreve’s telling of the 
first visit to the house, Clytie remains silent: “she didn’t tell you in the actual words 
because even in the terror she kept the secret; nevertheless she told you, or at least all of a 
sudden you knew” (280).  In Quentin’s remembrance a few pages later, she speaks 
briefly, but when he picks her up after Rosa has hit her, she is insubstantial: “it was like 
picking up a handful of sticks concealed in a rag bundle” (295).  Clytie, as the house 
burns, has receded back into stories Quentin and Shreve are telling: she “maybe . . . 
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appeared in that window from which she must have been watching the gates constantly 
day and night for three months”—her very presence depends on the story (300, emphasis 
added).   
Even when all the storytelling finally produces Henry in the flesh, there is no 
sense of justice or finality attached to it.  Quentin thinks to himself, when he mounts the 
stairs during his trip out to Sutpen’s Hundred with Rosa, “‘But I must see [Henry] too 
now.  I will have to.  Maybe I shall be sorry tomorrow, but I must see’” (296).  (There is 
no description of Henry for the reader here, incidentally.  Quentin next comes back down 
the stairs.)  Who Henry is, what he did, are not there to read in the flesh of the man he 
sees there; even for Rosa, Henry at this point is more story than man.  Quentin has 
spoken to Henry, though, a fact which emerges later in the narrative.  He poses three 
questions, each asked and answered twice—Henry testifies to being Henry Sutpen, 
having been there four years, having come home to die.  Quentin’s repetition of the 
questions suggests the unreality of the scene for him, suggests the fact that the answers 
themselves do not answer his questions, do not further situate Henry—and indeed, though 
this scene is presented toward the end of Absalom, Absalom!, most of the action of the 
book takes place after this moment, as Quentin tries still to determine what the right story 
might be. Having seen the living, breathing man who should be the linchpin of the tale 
does not render its meanings any clearer.  It is the telling of the story itself that does that. 
Chick’s digging in the graveyard is the last of all the adolescent midnight 
excavation in Faulkner’s writing.  It brings the question of accountability and action into 
play, in a period in which Faulkner was shifting into an “aesthetic of engagement” and a 
belief in “authorial responsibility” (Dmitri 14).  Chick needs to know in a hurry.  He gets 
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dirt on his hands; he risks his life; but if he can learn and prove what to the rest of the 
community is unspeakable, he can see that Lucas is saved and Crawford punished.  The 
optimism of detective fiction, the sense that investigation and knowledge do something 
concrete in the world, is closely linked to the just-get-something-close-to-justice 
mentality of law.  Faulkner, who didn’t want to be a lawyer with a literary avocation,39 
turned often in his later fiction to the practicality of law and its ability to do something in 
the world even in the absence of the possibility of knowing the truth.  Knowledge 
becomes a tool in the production of justice, even as it remains always dependent on the 
narratives in which it is couched, even as evidence remains a rhetorical device. 
 
Conclusion: Investigation, Endings, and Justice 
Tony Bennett, in the chapter “Literature/History” in Outside Literature, sets aside 
the “widespread and endemic problem of a hermeneutic kind concerning how the 
horizons of past and present might be merged so as to recover the meanings lived and 
experienced by subjects in epochs remote from our own” (47) and stresses that the 
problem at the heart of historical inquiry is not this general epistemological problem of 
how the past might be accessed and known but is instead a disciplinary question, having 
to do with a “specific set of rules and precepts governing the discursive moves which 
may be made in relation to” the historical record (50).  Bennett suggests that “history (as 
a discipline) constitutes the locus through which the representations of the past circulated 
by the institutions comprising the public historical sphere are brought into contact with 
the historical record in order to be either corrected by it or allowed to change with it” 
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 See Susan Snell, “Phil Stone and William Faulkner: The Lawyer and ‘The Poet.’” 
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(50).  The discipline is thus “most appropriately regarded as a specific discursive regime, 
governed by distinctive procedures, through which the maintenance/transformation of the 
past as a set of currently existing realities is regulated” (Bennett 50).   These realities are 
what the past does now—the set of statements and beliefs that have actual daily political 
effect.  The procedures Bennett cites give history a particular “social productivity” that 
allows it to avoid becoming paralyzed by the question of its relation to the “real past” or 
the truth of the archives (51).  Historians approach the archive not “in the sense of an 
extra-discursive real, but as if it were such a referent in the sense that it constitutes the 
last court of appeal for historical disputes” (Bennett 50, emphasis original).  In Bennett’s 
view material and documentary evidence serves as a corrective.  When approached 
according to the rules and procedures established by the disciplinary structures of history, 
such evidence can be a productive tool for regulating the “public past,” the set of beliefs 
and statements that circulates in the present, regardless of its relation to the “real past,” 
but that serves as an incitement and as evidence in policy-making.  Historical rules and 
procedures, in other words, reign in the process by which “the past as a set of currently 
existing realities” is used to support decisions that will influence future actions (Bennett 
50).   
 In a way this understanding affords the historian an enormous amount of power, 
since appeals to a public past corrected by the historian’s work often are voiced as 
support for future action.  However, the rules of evidence de-personalize and moderate 
the way the archive can be brought to bear on the public past.  Lawyer and detective 
fiction dramatizes in miniature this process of bringing the set of circulating beliefs about 
the past into a corrective relationship with the archive.  The set of clues that are to be 
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interpreted and eventually become legal evidence as part of a legal narrative functions as 
a corrective to beliefs circulating publicly, but that set of clues must be interpreted 
according to the procedures of a discipline, in which the meaning of an object is 
controlled by a set of rules.  Yet ultimately, and this hovers at the edges of Bennett’s 
argument but is not stated, the historian’s relationship to the audience that must accept 
the version of correction brought to the public past by way of interpretations of evidence 
in the archive is rhetorical.  Professional standards establish what is admissible as 
evidence, but what is convincing is the most important determinant of policy.  Watson 
makes the point, in a general discussion of forensic practice in the introduction to 
Forensic Fictions, that in the courtroom, too, inadmissible evidence may be struck from 
the record but still have a bearing on the case: “leading, inappropriate, or even scabrous 
comments may be stricken from the record, but no juror instructed to disregard such 
comments can ever do so with the total and ideal amnesia of the stenographer” (18-19).  
Anything spoken in a courtroom narrative, then, “can secure a rhetorical effect even in its 
‘official’ graphological absence” (Watson 19).  The district attorney’s comment in 
Sanctuary that the gynecologist, “an authority on the most sacred affairs of that most 
sacred thing in life: womanhood,” has said that the case “is no longer a matter for the 
hangman, but for a bonfire of gasoline,” has just such a non-recordable, invisible effect. 
(376).  (Horace objects, and the judge sustains the objection, striking the comment from 
the record but not from the minds of either jury or audience.) 
Gidley argues that the entire structure of Absalom operates in this way with 
respect to the notion of historical truth: “it ultimately becomes well-nigh impossible for 
the reader of Absalom to distinguish between facts and assertions.  Quentin and/or 
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Shreve, to advance the metaphor slightly, are like lawyers advocating points to a jury: a 
particular point may be disallowed, or cancelled by more concrete evidence, but each 
member of the jury has already heard it; it has registered and, to differing degrees for 
each member, becomes for the jury part of the case, part of the version of the case which 
each juryman believes and upon which he will base his final verdict” (112).  The action 
of historical expertise on the “public past” Bennett speaks of is similarly only partially 
moderated by professional historians’ rules of evidence, which take their concrete form 
primarily in peer review, and have a powerful effect there but cannot restrict every 
utterance of the historian. 
The relationship between what, in legal practice, is public and what is bound by 
the procedures of a discipline and between the rules of evidence and rhetorical and 
narrative skill makes a compelling analogy to historical work.  Here Bennett cites Mark 
Cousins, who likens history, which he calls a “definite technique of discovery,” to law 
(55).  Cousins limits both “truth” and “past” in order to redeem them as usable concepts: 
the “truth is the most certain representation of the past,”  and the “‘past’ is not the past in 
general, but only the past as it concerned the event and the questions of responsibility” 
(132). Law is the arena in which audiences are used to seeing and accepting provisional 
truth, truth good enough for conviction, good enough for justice, despite the notion of 
reasonable doubt.  In historical work, truth established in an acceptable manner according 
to practices upheld by the training, authority, and professionalism of the discipline, 
becomes good enough for underwriting political action, which, like legal conviction, is a 
way of acting on the future.  Bennett describes establishing provisional truth as 
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“determining that [certain propositions] meet conditions which justify our regarding them 
as true and so as capable of serving as a basis for both further thought and action” (55).   
In the wake of post-structuralist explosions of notions of truth, ideas of 
provisional, procedural, and audience-bound truths have emerged and have been applied 
to historiography.  Martin Jay, for instance, responds to some of Hayden White’s 
concerns about the ways in which the past can be adequately represented by bringing in 
the notion of communicative rationality as articulated by Jürgen Habermas.  Jay stresses 
the “professional institutionalization” of truth in discursive communities that base 
judgment on procedures “that satisfy the conditions of rationality” (106).  Faulkner’s 
literary vision of detection and lawyering anticipates some of the concerns on both sides 
of this problem, both the unknowable nature of the past and its management through 
procedural, institutionalized truths, suggesting that these questions belong, of course, not 
only to the last forty or fifty years.  Faulkner’s work also gestures toward the risks of too-
conclusive judgments about the past and on the other hand the despair of ever 
understanding it, represented on the one hand by Gavin Stevens and/or Chick Mallison in 
Intruder in the Dust and the Knight’s Gambit stories, and on the other by Ike McCaslin in 
Go Down, Moses and Quentin Compson in Absalom, Absalom! and The Sound and the 
Fury. 
In the detective stories, Gavin’s major preoccupation is that the outcome be just, 
and his investigation is structured so as to make justice happen.  (His notion of justice is, 
however, largely undermined by his diatribes in Intruder.)  An orientation toward justice 
is about shaping the future in a particular way.  It is unconcerned with the reality or the 
truth of the past except insofar as, first, it is true enough to indicate what is just; and 
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second, the story told about the past is persuasive enough, to the audience that matters 
and at the moment at which it matters, to shape the future justly.  There is of course a 
circularity here, indeed a frightening instability of the relationship of evidence to justice.  
Someone must assume authority about what has happened in order to determine what is 
just.  “Smoke,” “Hand Upon the Waters,” and Intruder in the Dust each have a scene in 
which Gavin (and also the sheriff, in Intruder) tries to force a certain future action by 
demonstrating to the appropriate audience (primarily the criminal, in each case) that he 
can produce a persuasive and damning account of the past.  Although Gavin admits to 
uncertainty at the end of “Smoke,” (after his purpose has been successfully 
accomplished), answering Virginius Holland’s query about how he knew the smoke 
would be in the box by saying in the course of explaining his trick, “I didn’t know.  I was 
a lot scareder than Granby Dodge,” his actions in all of these stories suggest a high 
degree of confidence in his own interpretive work, though it is often partially incorrect 
(36).  In “Hand Upon the Waters” he is confident enough in his plan, including his 
predictions of the Ballenbaughs’ response to being caught, that he goes out to the fish 
camp alone and without his gun.  Yet he has completely misunderstood the nature of the 
brothers’ cooperation in the crime.  In the Knight’s Gambit stories, the point is that his 
work is good enough for justice.  In Intruder, on the other hand, part of the point is that 
his work has its flaws.  Although he achieves the end result of freeing and saving Lucas 
and trapping Crawford Gowrie, not only would he never have accomplished either end 
alone (indeed he may never have recognized Lucas’s innocence), but he often teaches 
Chick by negative example.  Says Atkinson, “Scholars are finding [in Gavin’s politically 
incorrect monologues] the foils for his nephew’s maturer vision of race and gender” 
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(606).  It is these failures of Gavin as a lawyer, Atkinson suggests, that makes Intruder in 
the Dust such a good comment on the limitations of the “lawyerly mindset” (607). 
Gavin Stevens sets himself up as the arbiter of justice, so that the investigation is 
done when he decides that it is, and then he encourages the criminal to reveal himself.  
His system of checks is persistent; he always requires the person to act to corroborate his 
guilt.  It is tested against experience, needs to be verified by the person who knows it and 
could testify to it, were it not against the criminal’s self-interest.  Because detective 
fiction’s time frame is more condensed than that of the historical novel, the initial event, 
the crime, is closer in time.  Although as an event the crime is as irretrievably past as the 
life of Thomas Sutpen or Charles Bon, the detective’s explanatory narrative can be 
measured against the criminal’s reaction to it, and its ability to present a convincing 
account of the crime contributes directly to the success or failure of justice, which means 
that the detective story can engage in a unique way with the question of the extent to 
which the past can be known and the extent to which truthful representation matters. In 
Faulkner’s detective fiction in particular, this verification takes the form of the detective 
prompting self-revelatory action on the part of the criminal, indicating that the criminal 
has found the detective’s narrative convincing enough (or believes it would be 
convincing enough to a jury) that he must risk exposing himself to prevent it from being 
heard.   
But it is verified as true enough rather than as absolutely true: Granby Dodge is 
not going to quibble about details.  He is simply going to knock the box off the table if he 
believes Stevens’ story is close enough and persuasive enough to convict him.  Tyler 
Ballenbaugh may not have killed Lonnie Grinnup himself, but Gavin nevertheless finds 
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him late at night at the fishing camp.  Gavin still imparts the final meaning to the story, in 
his final telling.  This pattern from the detective fiction is mirrored in Light in August, in 
which readers walk away with Gavin’s final explanation even though he knows so little 
of the story.  When Gavin appears in chapter 19 to tell the story of Joe Christmas’s 
capture to a college friend, Christmas’s story is suddenly much more prominently about 
race, which had been a subtler theme prior to that moment in the story.  A significant 
portion of Light in August scholarship focuses on race, which perhaps attests to the power 
of Gavin’s pronouncement.  His authority is rhetorical, primarily, in that what he 
provides is a striking representation of the final events, but his authority is also situated in 
a professional context, lawyer to professor, both Harvard graduates, as though they have 
the distance that allows them to judge and to endow an account of the past with moral 
significance, to put the conclusion on the Joe Christmas story in a way that even his death 
was not able to do, his death alone having left things ambiguous.   
Whereas Gavin’s summary of the story at the end of Light in August is reductive 
in its tidiness and its attempt to close a case that the novel has left ambiguous, and his 
judgments in Intruder are ambiguous, in at least the short detective fiction, particularly 
“Smoke” and “Hand Upon the Waters,” Gavin’s concluding narratives are spun as real 
and productive closure.  Stevens saves Virginius Holland’s life in “Smoke” and sets the 
stage for a murderer to be brought to justice in “Hand Upon the Waters.”  His drive for 
closure, from the very first moments of his investigation, both leads to practical 
accomplishments and is dangerously at risk of creating false closure, as it does in Light in 
August and the “Go Down, Moses” chapter of the novel of the same name; in both, Gavin 
imposes an ending and a meaning on the events of other people’s lives.  Faulkner’s 
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detective stories reveal the machinery and the moral stance of the genre, and likewise of 
the law.  It would be presumptuous to suggest that Faulkner comes down on either side of 
this question of the value of practical professional activity, but by approaching history 
work in two distinct ways, his writing is able to gesture both at the unknowable nature of 
the past and at useful accounts of it, even when Gavin Stevens’ notions of justice sit a 
little uneasily, sometimes, at the end of the story.   
The function of the investigation in Faulkner’s work is not to know everything.  It 
is to know those things which matter and to know enough of the truth to have convinced 
yourself that you are aiming at the right kind of justice.  In Faulkner’s historical fiction, 
the function of the end is less concrete than in the Gavin Stevens stories.  Quentin and 
Shreve aim to understand and explain the motivations of the Sutpen family members, but 
the effects of their final re-hashing of the material are less clear than in Faulkner’s 
detective fiction.  Whereas the story Gavin Stevens tells about the past achieves its end in 
every case, Quentin Compson’s desire to know all, not only to answer the pertinent 
questions and make the pertinent judgments about what to do in the future, is destructive; 
he refuses to believe in the possibility of justice to the past.  We could read this split the 
way so many people read Poe’s, that Faulkner, like Poe, had moments in which he 
wanted to nail down ambiguity,40 or likewise that finality sells better than open-
endedness.  Or we could read it as a morally undecidable presentation of law’s encounter 
with the past, driven by particular questions and set on a particular result, and able to 
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 Howard Haycraft, for instance, in his still much-respected 1941 study of the origins of detective fiction, 
cites Joseph Wood Krutch’s “brilliant oversimplification,” that “‘Poe invented the detective story that he 
might not go mad’” (9). 
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make the future happen in a particular way—as an alternative, though with its own 
weaknesses, to Quentin Compson’s impasse. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
HARDBOILED SLEUTHING AND HISTORIOGRAPHY IN ROBERT PENN 
WARREN’S ALL THE KING’S MEN 
 
While many scholars have examined the role of history and even of 
historiographical theories in Robert Penn Warren’s All the King’s Men (1946), which 
Glen Johnson calls a novel “of and about history” (554), and while Henry Cuningham has 
presented a detailed comparison of Jack Burden’s investigations in the novel to those of 
private investigators in the hardboiled detective fiction of Dashiell Hammett and 
Raymond Chandler,41 those two branches of criticism have not yet been drawn together 
in any substantial way.42  Cuningham’s essay, which is exhaustive in its catalog of ways 
that Warren’s novel resembles those of Hammett and Chandler, and to which my work in 
this chapter is greatly indebted, does not make a connection between the novel’s reliance 
on detective fiction and its engagement with historiography.  Yet I would argue that it is 
the method of Jack’s detective work in the three major investigations he completes in the 
novel, and the attention afforded to him as both investigator and narrator of the 
investigations, that most sheds light on how historians identify and interpret evidence.  
(The three major investigations Jack pursues in the novel are the research for his Ph.D. 
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 Norton Girault and Kenneth Bruffee have also written briefly about Jack as “the Boss’s private detective” 
(Girault 33) and the novel being “a sort of detective story” (Bruffee 151).   
42
 Larry Gray does compare Jack Burden to Chandler’s Philip Marlowe in an essay subtitled “Jack Burden 
and History in All the King’s Men,” arguing that the novel “breaks newest ground not as a political saga but 
as a genre-transcending work of noir fiction” and connecting this observation to his arguments about Jack 
Burden’s failures as a historian (79).  However, Gray’s focus is on the “noir world of the existential 
present, where . . . . history provides no help,” rather than on historiography (87).  Gray also focuses on the 
aesthetics of noir fiction rather than on the detective fiction content of Chandler’s work. 
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dissertation on the life of Cass Mastern; the “Case of the Upright Judge,” in which he 
looks for “dirt” from Judge Irwin’s past in an attempt to bring him politically to heel for 
the Boss (Willie Stark, called Willie Talos in the 2001 “restored” version of All the 
King’s Men compiled by Noel Polk43); and his investigation into who tipped off Adam 
Stanton that his sister Anne was having an affair with Stark and incited Adam to 
assassinate the Boss.)  This chapter traces two ways in which All the King’s Men inhabits 
and yet revises the hardboiled detective tradition.  In each, the novel uses the trappings of 
hardboiled detective fiction to examine a critical problem in historiography.  My analysis 
considers the relationship between research method and the story that is produced by that 
research, specifically considering Jack as, first, a detective who is torn between several 
different types of commitments, and, second, a detective who also narrates his own 
investigation.   
History—by which critics have meant a number of different things—has been a 
major focus of critical work on All the King’s Men from soon after its publication to the 
present.  Early critics, for instance Hamilton Basso (1946) and Ladell Payne (1968), 
approached the idea of history in All the King’s Men quite directly, comparing the 
historical details of the novel to those of the life of Louisiana governor Huey Long, on 
whom All the King’s Men’s Willie Stark is modeled to a degree.44  Richard Gray (1972) 
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 Except where otherwise noted, all citations from the novel are to the 1996 Second Harvest Edition of All 
the King’s Men, which follows the originally-published 1946 text. 
44
 Though he sometimes “ma[de] the disclaimer” that “Willie Stark was not Huey Long,” Warren wrote in 
the preface to the 1953 Modern Library edition of All the King’s Men (also published in The Sewanee 
Review, cited here), he did “not mean to imply that there was no connection between Governor Stark and 
Senator Long.  Certainly, it was the career of Long and the atmosphere of Louisiana that suggested the play 
that was to become the novel” (480).   When Warren made these disclaimers, he wanted instead to stress 
that Stark was not merely “a projection of Long” but rather “one of the figures that stood in the shadows of 
imagination behind Willie Stark” (Warren, “A Note” 480).   
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instead examines “what made Warren change history [the congruence of the novel with 
the Huey Long story] the way he did and whether his motives . . . are an adequate 
justification for his changes” (299).  Another set of critics in the first few decades after 
the book’s publication focused less on the Huey Long story and instead attempted to 
diagnose historian-narrator Jack Burden’s attitude toward the past.  In Robert Penn 
Warren and History: The Big Myth We Live (1970), for instance, L. Hugh Moore argues 
that Jack’s conclusion that history is blind but man is not—that “man faced with 
overwhelmingly complex and blank forces must make human, moral sense of them”—is 
one of the linchpins of Warren’s philosophy of history, established in his poetry, non-
fiction, and other novels as well as in All the King’s Men (16).  For Warren, Moore 
argues, “history requires a myth to accommodate it to man,” to enable people to make 
moral sense of those blank forces (18).    
 Most recent critics working with the idea of history in the novel have continued to 
focus on Jack, placing a new emphasis on not just his theories of history but his actual 
work as a historian.   Larry Gray (2012) has argued that Jack fails as a historian and 
“remains devoted to the inescapable present that has dominated all of his narrative “(79).  
Jack, Gray says, “hesitates to the end rather than attempt a full explanation of how 
Cousin Willie and the Boss could be the same person” (83).  James Perkins (2012) has 
argued that Jack is a successful historian in the three major investigations described 
above but that he does fail as a historian when he accepts his mother’s claim that Judge 
Irwin is his father “at face value and does no research into the issue” (“Jack Burden” 
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95).45  Perkins has argued elsewhere (2005) for the centrality of the Cass Mastern story 
(the account of Jack Burden’s dissertation research, for the Ph.D. in history, into the life 
of a 19th-century ancestor) to the work performed by All the King’s Men (Cass Mastern 
Material).  Andrew Hakim (2012) attempts to locate Jack—and Warren—“within the 
historiographical discourse of the novel’s era: namely, the scholarly debates between 
traditional, conservative historians and their Progressive counterparts during the early 
decades of the twentieth century over the proper vision of American history” (121).  
Hakim’s essay, very importantly but in a different way from what I hope to accomplish in 
this chapter, focuses on the dimension of historiographical debates that affect the content 
of the histories produced, particularly the choice of many early and mid-20th-century 
historians to exclude women and minorities from their narratives in order to “valoriz[e] a 
limited” but unified “vision of the national story” (123).   
Like these recent critics, I think here about Jack as a historian and about the 
historiographical concerns of the novel.  As I said previously, I consider the effect of 
Jack’s commitments not only to Stark but to the Stantons, his mother, and Judge Irwin, as 
he conducts the “Case of the Upright Judge,” and likewise of the specter of his own 
involvement in Stark’s death, as well as his loyalty to both Stark and Adam Stanton, as he 
investigates the circumstances that led to the Boss’s murder.  I also consider the 
implications for Warren’s historiographical vision that Jack narrates his own 
investigations and does so from a point over a year removed from the action.  Like Jack’s 
multiple commitments, his position as a narrator removed from the history of the case(s) 
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 Perkins is famous for arguing on the grounds of the genetic principles behind eye and hair coloring that 
Jack’s mother is mistaken about Jack’s paternity and that the Scholarly Attorney (her husband), rather than 
Judge Irwin, is Jack’s father after all, as he believes for most of his life until his mother claims upon the 
Judge’s death that Jack has killed his father (“Human Genetics”). 
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he is narrating and his rejection of a conclusive detective fiction ending disrupts the 
normal operation of hardboiled detective fiction, and it sheds light on a second 
historiographical problem: the way the end point chosen for the story helps to determine 
the way it is told and the moral meaning it is given.   
As I have argued in the Introduction, literary texts that represent investigation are 
able to disrupt “the notion of history writing as the best possible reconstruction of the 
past—in a seamless narrative by an omniscient, invisible narrator” that Susan Stanford 
Friedman claims “continues to underwrite many [history] projects” despite theorists’ 
arguments over the last forty years about the situatedness of the observer (201).  That 
notion of history writing also continues to underwrite projects despite the emergence of 
the idea, which originated primarily with Hayden White, that the narrative forms in 
which past happenings are presented in history writing necessarily add content to those 
histories—in particular moral judgments.  The historian, in academic history writing, is 
(despite all theorizing to the contrary) still generally expected to disappear.   
As a literary text, on the other hand, All the King’s Men attends to the history of 
the investigator himself, probing what his memories allow him to perceive and what his 
commitments allow him to articulate in the course of his investigations, in precisely those 
ways which academic writing overwhelmingly does not.  In addition, the stakes of 
investigation in the novel are high: in the world Jack Burden describes, knowledge is 
currency; what Jack discovers builds up the Boss’s career and diminishes the careers of 
his opponents, and the discoveries Jack makes are responsible for at least one death.  
Although detective fiction and historical investigation in the academy both produce 
fantastic spaces of investigation supposedly freed from constraints, investigation usually 
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has real effects.  Judgments about the persuasiveness of interpretations have very real, 
sometimes life-changing, outcomes in legal battles, for instance.  All the King’s Men, I 
argue, both revises the conventions of the detective story and fictionalizes the 
historiographical endeavor, with the result that the stakes of the investigations and the 
commitments of the investigator determine the shape of the investigation, thus permitting 
a reconsideration of what counts as evidence, in an investigation into the past, and why.   
Traditionally in detective fiction, particularly from Doyle through the Golden 
Age, the detective comes to the scene free to consider the problem without interference, 
as if it were a logic puzzle.  The locked room, one could say, not only reduces the set of 
possible explanations for who could have committed a crime and how; it also locks out 
any concerns that might compete with the puzzle.  Genre fiction detectives, particularly 
early ones, are emotionally aloof from the problem to be solved, not under any sort of 
legal or institutional timelines, not under any obligation to consider the impact of their 
findings on human lives, and not bound by any professional methodologies of 
investigation or standards of evidence.  The archetypal detective story is not only outside 
the realm of the professional but indeed determined to outwit professionalism by means 
of an ingenuity freed from the ways that expertise conditions thought—Sherlock Holmes 
stories are an excellent example of this trend, for instance, although it also goes back to 
Poe’s work and appears throughout more recent detective fiction.46   
Commitments, however, have been part of detective fiction from the beginning, 
though detectives in genre fiction typically try to minimize them.  Dupin’s investigation 
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 “‘The Parisian police,’” Dupin says, “‘are exceedingly able in their way.  They are persevering, 
ingenious, cunning, and thoroughly versed in the knowledge which their duties seem chiefly to demand’” 
(Poe 166).  The trouble, he says, is that often their measures are “‘inapplicable to the case’” (Poe 166). 
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into the murders in the Rue Morgue is inspired in the first place by his fidelity to a man 
named Le Bon, who has been falsely imprisoned for the murders, and his desire to clear 
him from suspicion.  (In “The Purloined Letter,” Poe’s third and most famous detective 
story, Dupin is similarly committed—he is a partisan of the “royal personage” who has 
been threatened with exposure [159, 176].) It is at least plausible that in “The Murders in 
the Rue Morgue” his desire to find someone who is decidedly not Le Bon responsible for 
the murders directs Dupin’s attention to the persistent foreignness of the voice described 
in the newspaper report and then to the likelihood that the sounds described are not even 
human, which in turn leads to his solution of the mystery.  Dupin’s claim that his 
deductions from the reports of the voice are “the sole proper ones” and that “the 
suspicion arises inevitably from them as a single result” appears to be an exaggeration 
fueled by hope (138, emphasis original).  Dupin repeatedly closes off avenues of 
investigation.  Almost in one breath, he dismisses the chimneys as a possible means of 
escape for the murderer:  
Let us turn to the chimneys.  These, although of ordinary width for some eight 
or ten feet above the hearths, will not admit, throughout their extent, the body 
of a large cat.  The impossibility of egress, by means already stated, being 
thus absolute, we are reduced to the windows. (139) 
 
Dupin’s insistence in his end narrative on the evidential status of a spring-loaded, self-
closing window and a broken nail head that appears to prevent it from opening is a 
rhetorical flourish meant to hasten the movement toward the end of the story and close 
off the infinite avenues of inquiry that cannot really be disproven.   
When it comes to all other possible avenues of escape other than the windows 
through which he believes the orangutan entered and escaped, Dupin does almost exactly 
what he accuses the police of doing in their shortsightedness: “having once satisfied 
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themselves that no egress could have been made in this quarter,” Dupin says about the 
rear windows, the police “would naturally bestow here a very cursory examination” 
(142).  His claim that his deductions “are the sole proper ones” is part of his argument for 
the innocence of Le Bon and the guilt of the orangutan (138).  However, the way such 
commitments are framed in genre fiction from its beginnings through the Golden Age 
glosses over their relation to the way evidence is sought and interpreted.   
The private investigator of hardboiled detective fiction,47 on the other hand, is 
most often committed to the person who has hired him, and his investigation proceeds in 
the direction it does because of that commitment—Jack’s determination to discover the 
“truth” about the Judge is of course initially not a quest for truth in the idyllic sense of the 
whodunit (and also how-dunit) of a locked-room mystery, but instead a quest for 
politically-damning dirt that he and the Boss think will force the Judge to withdraw his 
support for the Boss’s rival MacMurfee (228).  All the King’s Men complicates the idea 
of commitment further than most of Hammett’s or Chandler’s novels, however, because 
the political commitment Jack is paid for is by no means the totality of his fidelities.  He 
is loyal to the Boss, the person who sends him seeking, but he also has prior, if 
conflicted, loyalties to several of the people from whom he initially seeks evidence: the 
Scholarly Attorney, who he thinks is his father; Anne Stanton, the woman he has loved 
                                                           
47
 A distinctly American tradition, hardboiled detective fiction did overlap somewhat with what was called 
the  Golden Age (the 1920s and 1930s).  It grew out of the dime detective story tradition of “action-hero 
detectives” but came into its own with the work of Dashiell Hammett, who published the first installment 
of his first major novel, Red Harvest, in the pulp magazine Black Mask in 1927 (Rzepka 181).  Rzepka 
writes that in Red Harvest and the short stories that preceded it, the Continental Op “is meant to contrast 
specifically with the unthinking, trigger-happy vigilante figure” of one of the examples of action-hero 
detective fiction that preceded it (187-88).  Hammett had written all of his most famous novels by 1934.  
Other contributors to the hardboiled tradition in Black Mask included Carroll John Daly, Raoul Whitfield, 
and Erle Stanley Gardner (Rzepka 184). Chandler wrote somewhat later; he published most of his work in 
the genre between 1939 and 1953. 
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for almost twenty years; and Adam Stanton, his childhood friend.  All of those loyalties 
impinge on what he can ask, how he can ask it, and what he can hear in response. 
The second section of this chapter, which looks at the status of Jack Burden as 
both investigator and narrator, also considers the novel’s relationship to both Golden Age 
and hardboiled detective fiction.  Whereas detective fiction from Poe through Doyle 
through most of the Golden Age relied upon an observer-narrator who was often a friend 
of the detective but very seldom the detective himself,48 most hardboiled detective fiction 
and likewise Warren’s novel are narrated in the first person by the investigator.49  When 
the early or Golden Age detective does tell the story of his own investigation, it is in the 
type of end narrative that I have described in this dissertation’s Introduction—enclosed in 
quotation marks, presented either immediately after the moment of the revelation of the 
criminal or at that moment, indeed often functioning to prompt the criminal to reveal 
himself.  Jack narrates instead from a point of further remove, past the revelation of the 
last criminal in the novel, Tiny Duffy, who has incited Stark’s murder, but unlike the 
other culpable parties has done it “cold,” for reasons of gain (411).  The moved-back 
vantage point affects Jack’s description of his search for and interpretation of evidence 
because he has a more complete sense of the long-term stakes of what he describes 
himself finding.  (While hardboiled detective fiction is usually narrated by the detective 
from the end of the story and does not have the dramatic, revelatory end narrative of so 
much early and Golden Age detective fiction, there is seldom any evidence of a 
                                                           
48
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Faulkner used the observer-narrator technique in most of the 
Knight’s Gambit stories, having Chick Mallison narrate his uncle’s investigations.  His use of the technique 
becomes slightly more complicated in Intruder in the Dust when Chick steps in as detective for most of the 
story and in addition is no longer the narrator but instead the central consciousness of a story told in the 
third person. 
49
 A notable exception is Hammett’s The Maltese Falcon (1930), narrated in the third person. 
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significant remove from the events narrated; the detective’s experiences in the interim do 
not intrude into the story.)    
Jack attempts to describe what could have been almost a traditional detective 
fiction ending to his final investigation (the question of who “had killed Willie Stark as 
surely as though his own hand had held the revolver”), and the potential of the pure, 
contained feeling of the wrapped-up investigation and the caught criminal of early 
detective fiction is captured for a moment in his retelling: “And that left Duffy.  Duffy 
had done it.  And strangely, there was a great joy and relief in that knowledge.  Duffy had 
done it, and that made everything clear and bright as in frosty sunshine” (411).  But Jack 
sets aside that first potential ending to tell the story—ending it in the present—just over a 
year later, in the early months of 1939, at a remove from the revelation of the criminal 
and the pure, free feeling of discovery and of not being the culprit.  In the meantime, he 
has rejected the idea of the poetic justice of indirectly killing Duffy by telling the Boss’s 
gunman Sugar Boy what Duffy has done.  Jack knows that there are many possible 
answers to the question of who has killed Willie “as surely as though his own hand had 
held the revolver,” and one of those answers is Jack Burden (411).  As Cuningham 
argues, Jack’s recognition of his own culpability in the deaths of his friends, his “vision 
of the universality of guilt,”  which he reaches after setting aside his initial satisfaction in 
having identified Duffy as a scapegoat, “ends Jack’s career as a detective” (42).  I extend 
Cuningham’s claims by arguing in the final section of this chapter that Jack then 
substitutes another conclusion to the narrative, one that is decidedly not out of detective 
fiction, one that is instead committed to not knowing.  In telling his story the way he 
does, Jack demonstrates a commitment to a historiography of self-determination that is 
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based on philosophies, emotions, and choices rather than on knowledge.  Recognizing 
that he chooses the end, and thus the moral meaning, of his own story, Jack nevertheless 
refuses to impose endings or interpretations on the stories of others: his mother, Cass 
Mastern, Willie Stark’s wife Lucy, and even Stark himself. 
 
Loyalty and “Technique”: Jack’s Commitments and His Investigative Method 
 It is important to realize how similar Jack is to a hardboiled sleuth before 
considering the degree to which Warren’s novel operates differently from those of 
Hammett and Chandler.  Cuningham notes that Jack Burden “not only talks like a private 
eye, he acts like one too” and compares Jack to Ned Beaumont in Hammett’s The Glass 
Key: “a special investigator who does the dirty work of a mayor” (35).  Not only does 
Jack investigate Judge Irwin’s past crimes and discover who set up Adam Stanton to kill 
Willie Stark, Cuningham reminds us, but in the first chapter, Stark also orders him to 
“find out something about Malaciah’s boy and the killing” but “keep out of sight,” thus 
introducing the reader to the kind of work Jack does (qtd. in Cuningham 36).   At the 
Boss’s orders he also uncovers the link between Marvin Frey, the father of the woman 
who is purportedly carrying the Boss’s son Tom’s child, and MacMurfee, the Boss’s 
political opponent.  He later conducts a search for Tom Stark and then (though 
unsuccessfully) for Adam Stanton. Any of these maneuvers would be appropriate in a 
hardboiled detective novel.   
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Cuningham argues that “all of chapter 5, with its focus on the investigation of 
Judge Irwin, could have come straight from a private-eye novel” (38).50  In this chapter 
Jack, who is telling his story from a vantage point set back from the events themselves, 
gives a sardonic (since he knows the consequences) and yet somehow still enthusiastic 
account of his “technique” as what he calls a “student of history,” but which in fact is 
much more like that of a detective, focused as it is on motivations for crime (193).  Jack 
begins with no evidence at all that the Judge has “stepped over the line”—in fact, he 
doesn’t believe it himself; he has just been hired to proceed on the assumption that there 
is dirt in the Judge’s past (193).  (“‘There may not be anything,’” Jack tells the Boss 
several times [192].)  He begins his search by looking where what he calls his 
“technique” as a historian (really the fruit of his journalism experience) tells him that 
there would be evidence, if there were a crime in the Judge’s past.  In this respect, Jack’s 
investigations are much like those of Gavin Stevens in Faulkner’s detective fiction.  
Jack’s eye, like Gavin’s, is on the end narrative that he would have to tell to the Boss and 
the Judge in order to convict—in this case to convict, or convince, the Judge that he had 
better switch his loyalties or else face exposure.  (When, at the end of the successful 
search, the Judge tells Jack that his evidence wouldn’t “stick in a court,” Jack replies, 
“‘But you don’t live in a court.  You aren’t dead, and you live in the world and people 
think you are a certain kind of man.  You aren’t the kind of man who could bear for them 
to think different, Judge” [346-47].)  Convinced by what he sees in the envelope of 
evidence Jack hands him, as well as the way that Jack frames it, the Judge kills himself to 
avoid either his exposure or cooperating with the Boss.  While from his position after the 
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 In the revised edition, chapter 5 from the 1946 version is instead the second half of chapter 4, combined 
with the Cass Mastern material into a single chapter. 
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end of the search, Jack proclaims that “There is always the clue, the canceled check, the 
smear of lipstick, the footprint in the canna bed, the condom on the park path, the twitch 
in the old wound, the baby shoes dipped in bronze, the taint in the blood stream,” it is not 
that logic that structures his search at the outset, but instead the logic of the question and 
the anticipation of the end (228).   
Beginning without clues and with only a proposed end in mind, Jack starts his 
inquiry into the Judge’s past much like an armchair detective (though more like a 
hardboiled detective the chair he does his thinking in is in “a beer parlor in the city”) 
(193).  He sits, drinks, and poses a question to himself: “For what reason, barring 
Original Sin, is a man most likely to step over the line?”, then answers it: “Ambition, 
love, fear, money” (193).  Yet Jack has a level of intimacy with the material he is 
examining that is far beyond that of the Golden Age detective, who is almost always an 
outsider, and quite different from the usual commitment of the Hammett or Chandler 
detective, which is at least initially to his employer (even if sexual attraction or 
competing plotlines do sometimes complicate that commitment in hardboiled detective 
fiction).  If Jack could be said to have any clue at all to pursue at the beginning of the 
investigation, it would be the “voice out of [his] childhood” whispering something that he 
cannot catch: “I had the vague sense, rising from a depth of time . . . of entering the room 
where the grown people were, of knowing that they had just that instant stopped talking” 
(193).  He had been present himself as the Judge’s financial crisis, which he goes on to 
uncover, had occurred, and an echo of it is embedded in his childhood memories.  When 
he looks for confirmation of his “vague sense,” he turns to his two most intimate friends, 
Anne and Adam.  Adam, not knowing that the information is for the Boss, is able to 
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“dredge up” a memory from the appropriate era of an argument between Irwin and 
Governor Stanton about money (211).  The Scholarly Attorney, Jack’s supposed father, 
confirms the report just by means of his body language, though he refuses to speak about 
it: “He seemed about to say something, his lips opening.  Then they closed” (202). 
Leaving the old man’s apartment, Jack says, “But I got one thing.  I was sure that he had 
known something.  Which meant that there was something to know” (203). Jack is able 
not only to prompt but also to recognize these leads, especially what the Scholarly 
Attorney gives away, because of his familiarity with the people connected to the case. 
When Anne undermines Jack’s initial lead with a report from her Cousin Mathilde 
that the Judge fixed his money problem by marrying a rich wife, Jack decides to reject 
Cousin Mathilde’s testimony and continue the search by focusing more insistently on the 
Boss’s desired ending—that there nevertheless be something “hollow” in the story (216).  
At this point his search moves farther away from home and from his own past and 
becomes more singularly focused on the Boss’s needs.  Jack outlines a general method 
and then applies it to his own search: “When you are looking for the lost will in the old 
mansion, you tap, inch by inch, along the beautiful mahogany wainscoting, or along the 
massive stonework of the cellarage, and listen for the hollow sound.  Then upon hearing 
it, you seek the secret button or insert the crowbar” (215).  He puts in the crowbar.  This 
idea of a general method continues to guide this second phase of his search: even if there 
is testimony to the contrary, you tap for the hollow sound.  Even if there is evidence that 
the “rich” woman did inherit money, you look in the docket book in the courthouse to see 
if she has been brought to judgment for money owed to creditors.  You tap for the hollow 
sound or look in the docket book not because you have a reason to suspect, but because 
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you have been hired to suspect and hired to use your method.  Jack refers repeatedly to 
what “us historical researchers” believe and do, but the novel’s previous section, Jack’s 
account of his doctoral research in a history department, belies that comparison (228).  In 
his Cass Mastern research, which I will discuss in more detail at the end of this chapter, 
Jack does very little tapping.  (The exception is when he discovers the names of Cass’s 
lover and her husband in an old newspaper.)  He has since augmented his historian’s 
skills with those of the investigative journalist and private detective. 
A major part of Jack’s method is posing questions and making arguments to 
himself about what he discovers in newspaper files, company records, and conversation 
with locals in Savannah, where the Judge’s wife had originally lived.  When a piece of 
information doesn’t “prove anything,” Jack asks a question: “Now, I argued, if this 
amiable failing [not paying creditors] had been merely the result of temperament and not 
of necessity, why did it come on her [Irwin’s future wife] all at once?” (217), or “What 
had [the Judge] been doing in 1914 to get money?” (219).  He looks for possible alternate 
sources of income since he knows Irwin would not have been able to pay off his 
mortgage with either his Attorney General’s salary or the income from his plantation, and 
then, locating a record of the Judge’s sale of five hundred shares of stock, tries to put 
together into a single story any possible scandal and the acquisition of that stock.  Jack’s 
clinching piece of evidence against the Judge, the “it” that he acquires “after all the 
months”—“So I had it after all the months,” he says (228)—is a letter in which former 
American Electric Power counsel Mortimer Littlepaugh denounces the Judge for having 
“let up on the suit against the Southern Belle Fuel people” as attorney general and then 
being made “vice-president for taking a bribe” (227).   Broke and humiliated, Littlepaugh 
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jumps to his death, and the letter condemning the Judge is the suicide note he addressed 
to his sister.   
According to Jack’s own account, he gets that letter by a stroke of luck, having 
reached the stage in his problem “where there was nothing to do but pray”—at which 
point Littlepaugh’s name, which he has previously seen in a newspaper account of a 
coroner’s report ruling his death an accident, comes to him “just as I fell asleep one 
night” (221).  But what Jack suggests is intuition has almost certainly been enabled by the 
fact that he has been on the lookout for any of the elements of scandal—deaths that 
would require autopsies because they may have been suicides, for instance—in any of the 
corporations with which the Judge had been associated at the time of his financial crisis.  
(He first sees Littlepaugh’s name in a news item in which his death is ruled an accident.)  
Even if he does not identify the report of Littlepaugh’s death as evidence the first time he 
sees it, Jack has read it as belonging to the category of potential evidence—something 
that might show the Judge to be involved in a scandal.  The fact that he has mentally filed 
it as potential evidence, as something that could produce the desired outcome, allows him 
to hear it drifting around in his head later.   
In the sections of his investigation narrative in which he is far from home and 
interviewing strangers, Jack, by shutting out competing claims for his loyalty, is able to 
locate and see how to use the needed evidence on the basis of his professional 
commitment and what has become, during his years working for the Boss, a professional 
method.  But with the close of the chapter and its hollow concluding boast—“And all 
times are one time, and all those dead in the past never lived before our definition gives 
them life, and out of the shadow of the past their eyes implore us.  That is what all of us 
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historical researchers believe.  And we love truth”—his commitments again become more 
complicated (228).  He delays giving the information to the Boss until the Boss has 
basically demanded it, and he shows Littlepaugh’s suicide note to the Judge, at Anne’s 
request, before giving it to the Boss51 (which he never does because the Judge commits 
suicide first).  The structure of chapter 5 (the increasing emphasis on professionalization 
and technique, after Jack has started out by having conversations with his friends, the 
subsequent physical removal from his home state to do research in professional places 
like newspaper archives and stock record rooms, the encounter with a fortune teller, 
which as Cuningham points out “has been a part of the hardboiled tradition from the 
beginning”— part of the realm of the private, professional investigator—and then the 
complete closure of the investigation and the chapter with the discovery of the clinching 
piece of evidence, followed by a new chapter that recounts a different part of the 
Governor’s story) suggests Jack as narrator is supremely aware of the artificiality of his 
attempt to limit his interest in the Judge’s affairs to the perspective of only one of the 
people to whom he is loyal (40). 
 
Knowledge, Narration, and the Ending(s) of All the King’s Men 
 In his preface to a volume of essays on All the King’s Men, Michael Meyer quotes 
Jack Burden saying, “‘the end of man is knowledge . . . the end of man is to know,’” and 
goes on to ask (following Maurice Beebe and Leslie Field’s preface in Critical Handbook 
to All the King’s Men, he says), “Does [the phrase] suggest a human goal or end, or does 
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 “‘Boss,’” Jack says, “‘I’m going to give Irwin a break.  If he can prove to me it isn’t true, I won’t spill it . 
. . I promised two people I would do it’” (337).  Asked if the information “will stick,” Jack replies, “‘I’m 
afraid it will’” (337).  Willie repeats Jack’s “afraid,” emphasizing it. 
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it intimate that when he attains knowledge or discovers the ultimate truth, man reaches 
his end, his destruction as the Adam/Eve myth suggests”? (ix).  The idea of the end looms 
large in Warren’s novel, especially its relationship to knowledge.   
There are several flirtations with detective fiction endings in All the King’s Men, 
all of which Jack ultimately rejects.  The first is the mild exultation Jack experiences 
when he connects Mortimer Littlepaugh’s suicide to Judge Irwin’s bribe taking, near the 
end of his search for evidence against the Judge—“That was it,” he says, after the 
newspaper page with the coroner’s report on Littlepaugh’s death “waver[s] up slowly, 
like a chunk of waterlogged wood stirred loose from the depth,” in his mind (221).  The 
search, extended over several months, is close to complete, and Jack’s pleasure in finding 
the connection hints that the end of the case and the end of the story is approaching.  As 
noted previously, however, Jack presents the end of the “Case of the Upright Judge” as 
broken into two parts: his realization of what happened and securing of the letter from 
Littlepaugh’s sister, and then, much delayed, his presentation of the evidence to the 
Judge.  The trouble that registers in Jack’s narrative—that causes the delay, that is behind 
the sardonic tone of the last paragraphs of chapter 5, in which Jack asserts that “There is 
always the clue” and that “all of us historical researchers . . . love truth”—is that, 
removed from the generic frame of detective fiction, knowledge of what has happened 
does not automatically imply the end of the story (228). Jack, connected not only to the 
man he is working for but to the man he is investigating and to a community that values 
that man, cannot just exult, end with the knowledge he has achieved of what happened so 
many years back (and of what is indeed the Judge’s one-time villainy, if only in 
  
122 
 
desperation), and have the audience presume that he is going to nail the Judge and that 
there will be a happy, tidy ending.   
It is important to note that while hardboiled detective fiction concludes much 
more pessimistically than Golden Age puzzle stories that expunge the criminal and show 
a society returned to its happy order, hardboiled detective fiction does end with the facts 
of the case established.52  Those facts just have a different effect—to show how wide, 
rather than how contained, the circle of guilt and corruption is.  In this sense, chapter 5 
does end like hardboiled detective fiction: the Judge is guilty of taking a bribe and 
hurting another man’s career to the extent that the other man kills himself, and the 
supposedly saintly Governor Stanton is guilty of covering up the Judge’s offense and 
refusing to help Littlepaugh.  The implication is that the whole of the state government, 
even before Stark’s time, has been involved in bribes and cover-ups.  The end of chapter 
5 (“The Case of the Upright Judge”) or even the scene in chapter 8 in which Jack presents 
his evidence and the Judge kills himself, is significantly not the end of the story Jack tells 
in the novel. 
 From the beginning of his telling of the story of the Case of the Upright Judge, 
Jack has presented the story of his investigation as connected to the question of why 
someone would want to know what happened in the past in the first place, why someone 
would want, in Jack’s phrase, “to dig up the dead cat, to excavate the maggot from the 
cheese, to locate the canker in the rose, to find the deceased fly among the raisins in the 
                                                           
52
 Rzpeka points out that “At the end of The Maltese Falcon we get a complete analeptic account of events, 
just as we do at the end of a story by [Agatha] Christie or [Dorothy] Sayers.  Recited at length by Spade to 
Brigid O’Shaughnessy, this recapitulation sets out the complete array of the novel, including both what has 
transpired in the course of the narrative and what has led up to the opening scene . . . In fact, no Hammett 
story ends with uncertainty regarding the material facts of the case” (186-87). 
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rice pudding” (192).  And the reason to seek this knowledge is not the reason so often 
implied in genre fiction—that, as W. H. Auden says, “society has to take the place of the 
victim and on his behalf demand atonement or grant forgiveness” (17).  Jack shows 
himself, in one of his periods of soul-searching before he finally chooses an end point for 
the story, flirting for a moment with telling himself a story where his discovery makes 
things right: “I . . . thought how by killing my father I had saved my mother’s soul.  Then 
I thought how maybe I had saved my father’s soul, too.  Both of them had found out what 
they needed to know to be saved” (429).  The fact that we know why the evidence has 
been wanted, have known all along what it would mean if it were found, means that the 
story is not over when the evidence has been found and determined by Jack to clinch the 
case.  When Jack returns to the city after the Judge’s death, he says, he “felt that a story 
was over, that what had been begun a long time back had been played out, that the lemon 
had been squeezed dry.  But if anything is certain it is that no story is ever over, for the 
story which we think is over is only a chapter in a story which will not be over” (355).  
The fact that we know the evidence is wanted for reasons much more complicated than 
an idea of atonement or justice keeps Jack’s narrative from behaving like genre fiction 
and means that the story is not over when the evidence has been found and interpreted. 
The second moment in All the King’s Men that is akin to the big moment of 
clarity at the end of a detective novel, and which I have mentioned already, occurs when 
Jack concludes that it is Tiny Duffy who is ultimately responsible for the Boss’s murder 
(along with Sadie, whom Jack has already forgiven).  “Duffy had done it, and that made 
everything clear and bright as in frosty sunshine,” Jack says, and goes on to say: “There, 
over yonder, was Tiny Duffy with his diamond ring, and over here was Jack Burden.  I 
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felt free and clean, as when you suddenly see that, after being paralyzed by ignorance or 
indecision, you can act” (411).  Later Jack says, “When I found out about Duffy’s killing 
the Boss and Adam I had felt clean and pure, and when I kicked Duffy around I felt like a 
million because I thought it let me out. Duffy was the villain and I was the avenging 
hero” (417).  But then “all at once something happened and the yellow taste was in the 
back of my mouth” (417).  Jack attempts to establish his own innocence by means of 
knowledge of Tiny’s guilt.  As critics of detective fiction have mentioned, this doubling 
of criminal and detective and their eventual opposition is central to the ending of 
detective fiction.53  Jack, however, goes on to realize “that I had tried to make Duffy into 
a scapegoat for me and to set myself off from Duffy” and directly refuses the early and 
Golden Age detective fiction ending (417).   
He then tries on another hardboiled detective fiction ending: “It was as though I 
were caught in a more monstrous conspiracy whose meaning I could not fathom,” he says 
(417).  In this phase he sees himself as guilty, Anne as guilty, guilt and corruption as 
completely pervasive.  Rzpeka explains that hardboiled detective fiction portrayed “an 
America in which no one could be trusted . . . and where society itself, especially in the 
big bad city, seemed to be so thoroughly steeped in graft and self-interest that it was 
hardly worth rescuing” (186).  “That was the way it was for quite a while,” Jack says 
about this phase (417).  But ultimately he refuses the ending of this alternative form of 
detective fiction as well.  Relating the story from a vantage point that is set back more 
than a year from his attempt to name Duffy as the guilty party and remove blame from 
himself, Anne, and Sadie, for whom he feels sorry because she has done what she has 
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 The detective, Lehman says, “may be seen as the new hero, who arrives to replace the fallen hero (the 
victim) and to confront his double (the culprit)” (xviii). 
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done “hot,” Jack imposes yet another ending on the story, and his imposition of this new 
ending broadens the consequences of the case (411).  When the story ends with Jack 
looking back on what has happened, living in Judge Irwin’s house, writing a book on 
Cass Mastern, married to Anne and taking care of the dying Scholarly Attorney, it is no 
longer detective fiction.  Although Jack makes comments about his increased 
knowledge—that he now understands that Adam Stanton and Willie Stark were doomed 
to kill each other, “to yearn toward and try to become the other, because each was 
incomplete with the terrible division of their age,” for example—he has in a number of 
ways refused the idea that knowledge can be certain and that judgments about how to 
proceed in the present should be based in knowledge of what has happened in the past 
(436).  
 When Jack refuses the detective fiction ending and imposes another, he exposes 
the artificiality of what imposing any given ending does to what is seen as evidence.  As 
much as James Perkins’ conclusions about Jack’s paternity54 might be framed a bit too 
certainly and might rely a bit much on pinning down Warren’s intentions and what 
Perkins calls the “dramatic irony” of the close reader supposedly knowing more than Jack 
does at the end of the novel, Perkins does make an important point: why does Jack, who 
is relentless in pursuit of the truth throughout the rest of the novel, who “inserts the 
crowbar” even when Cousin Mathilde has claimed the Judge married a rich wife and 
                                                           
54
 See all three cited Perkins sources, all of which include Perkins’s arguments, outlined previously, that a 
mother who has been married to one man for only about a year and is having sex with another man 
probably does not “know” who the father of her child is; her opinions are likely influenced by who she 
would like the father of the child to be, especially when they contradict basic genetic principles.  Perkins 
claims that Jack’s dark hair and eyes are genetically very unlikely to have come from his mother’s blond 
hair and blue eyes and the Judge’s red hair and yellow eyes, and thus that Jack’s father is really the (dark-
haired) Scholarly Attorney, and that Jack fails as a historian by refusing to investigate this particular 
mystery.  Regardless of whether it matters that Warren’s characters’ genetics do or do not behave according 
to scientific principles, Perkins’ point about Jack’s refusal to question his mother’s statement is strong. 
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saved himself in a legal way from his financial crisis, not stick in the crowbar when his 
mother asserts that Judge Irwin is his father? (“Human Genetics” 74; Warren, All the 
King’s Men 215).    The closest Jack comes to questioning the truth of what his mother 
has said is to consider whether he “feels bad” about having “swapped the good, weak 
father for the evil, strong one” and then to conclude: 
So I quit trying to decide.  There was no use trying to probe my feelings about 
them, for I had lost both of them.  Most people lose one father, but I was 
peculiarly situated, I had lost two at the same instant.  I had dug up the truth 
and the truth always kills the father, the good and weak one or the bad and 
strong one, and you are left alone with yourself and the truth, and can never 
ask Dad, who didn’t know anyway and who is deader than a mackerel. (354, 
emphasis added) 
 
This paragraph begs the question of what Dad “didn’t know anyway”—whether Jack 
feels bad about swapping fathers?  The truth about the bribe Judge Irwin took?  Irwin 
certainly knows that.  Neither reading makes sense.  I argue that the phrase raises the 
possibility that Jack might indeed think that neither his mother nor the two candidates for 
father could have known who his father was.  But Jack lets the question sit unanswered 
and goes back to the city.  While he shows what is possibly some uncertainty about who 
his father is, he decidedly does not want to know, even if he thinks that he could ever 
know; the most recent truth that he has dug up has been painful to him, to the Judge, and 
to his mother.  Instead he goes into his future committed to not knowing.  (Even when he 
tracks down Sadie and Tiny as the inciters of Adam Stanton, he quickly dismisses the 
consequences of his knowing and the idea that it should guide his actions in the present or 
cause him to try to get revenge for the Boss.  He acknowledges the idea of universal guilt 
instead and turns down the opportunity to tell Sugar Boy what Tiny did, knowing that the 
Boss’s gunman would shoot Tiny.)  From this position of unknowing, Jack can take care 
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of one dying father while living on the inheritance of the other father.  He can write about 
the ancestor of the one while living in the house of the other.  He can talk about “each of 
us” being “the son of a million fathers” (436).  He can make his choices on the basis of 
his feelings and his philosophies, rather than on what he has discovered.  Jack makes a 
definite commitment to not knowing, to being at the end of the story rather than 
continuing his investigations.   
 When Jack tries at the end of his narrative to sum up what he calls “my story, too . 
. . the story of a man who lived in the world and to him the world looked one way for a 
long time and then it looked another and very different way,” he walks his listener 
through some of the stages of his life: belief in the “Great Twitch,” whereby no one has 
“any responsibility for anything” (435), then the application of that belief to himself 
“because it meant that he could not be called guilty of anything, not even of having 
squandered happiness or of having killed his father, or of having delivered his friends 
into each other’s hands and death” (436).  He then goes on to define himself twice with 
respect to his no longer believing in the Great Twitch.  First: “As a student of history, 
Jack Burden could see that Adam Stanton, whom he came to call the man of idea, and 
Willie Stark, whom he came to call the man of fact, were doomed to destroy each other” 
(436).  But then: “So now I, Jack Burden, live in my father’s house” (436).  He opposes 
Jack Burden, student of history, to “I, Jack Burden,” in the present, who lives in his 
father’s house and is married to Anne Stanton.  He may be writing his book on the life of 
Cass Mastern, but if his contemporaneous presentation of that material in chapter 4 is any 
indication, Jack Burden the historian may in this new book—he says that he is 
“writ[ing]” it, not that he is finishing it—do two things that historians generally do not 
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do: first, establish his own relationship to the material, and second, quote large, 
uninterrupted sections of Cass’s journals (438). 
The novel ties the story of Jack’s search for evidence against Judge Irwin directly 
into the account that precedes it and that in Warren’s typescripts (and in the revised 
edition, the most widely available edition today) was part of the same chapter: the 
account of Jack’s study of the life of Cass Mastern.  Both are stories of historical research 
(though the investigation of Judge Irwin has more direct implications in the present), and 
they seem clearly meant to be read in light of one another, jointed together as they are by 
the following sentences: “That was the end of my first journey into the enchantments of 
the past, my first job of historical research.  It was, as I have indicated, not a success.  But 
the second job was a sensational success.  It was the ‘Case of the Upright Judge’ and I 
had every reason to congratulate myself on a job well done.  It was a perfect research job, 
marred in its technical perfection by only one thing: it meant something” (191).  Yet the 
two investigations are largely unalike.  Whereas in his pursuit of the Judge’s past Jack 
comes to the archive with questions, in his work on Cass Mastern, at least as presented 
from his vantage point in 1939, he appears to try to allow Cass’s journals, rather than his 
own questions and methods, to structure the narrative. 
I would like to suggest that Jack’s heavy reliance on directly-quoted journal 
entries and letters in the Cass Mastern chapter is a function of his retrospect as a narrator 
and hints at his method in the book he is writing at the end of the novel.  Jack’s 
professor’s recommendation during his graduate school days is that he not only “edit the 
journal and letters of Cass Mastern” but also that he “write a biographical essay, a social 
study based on those and other materials” (163).  Such a study would likely have 
  
129 
 
included quotations from the journals, but not quotations of several pages at a time.  It 
would instead have been Jack’s assembly of the material into what he and his professor 
considered a coherent narrative that could be construed as having a larger, “social” 
meaning (163).  The version of the Cass Mastern material that Jack presents as a chapter 
of his own story, on the other hand, makes very few gestures toward larger social 
meanings; it seems to hesitate to apply meanings even to Cass’s choices themselves.  
There is relatively little investigation and relatively little interpretation.  The major 
research work that Jack carries out, as he presents it, is to read Cass’s writings—which 
appear themselves to attempt to narrativize Cass’s life, and which constitute not just a 
thread leading through Jack’s investigation but instead such a burden of potential 
evidence as to make it difficult for Jack to tell the story from any perspective but Cass’s, 
even when he claims not to be able to understand Cass—and then to discover the names 
of the players in Cass’s tale.  Annabelle is referred to as “she” and “her” in the source 
materials, but Jack discovers “the name by going back to the files of the Lexington 
newspapers for the middle 1850’s to locate the story of a death” (164).  This is the only 
significant investigative maneuver he describes, however.  From his vantage point years 
later, he tells very little of the story of himself naming and categorizing Cass’s world, as 
opposed to his insistent focus on method in “The Case of the Upright Judge,” and instead 
to at least a moderate degree allows Cass to present the elements that were important to 
Cass.  This choice represents a more severe demurral than the tendency of the historian to 
try to disappear from his account of the past.  Instead, Jack puts himself as historian and 
his personal relationship to the material front and center by framing Cass’s story within a 
story about his own experience as a student researcher, and then, after an introduction to 
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Cass’s story that Jack does tell in his own words, he quotes increasingly longer sections 
of source material.  He refuses historical interpretation. 
There is one section of the Cass Mastern narrative where Jack behaves more like a 
historian and quotes little other than dialogue, composing the rest of the narrative 
himself: the account of Cass’s search for the enslaved woman Phebe, whom Annabelle 
has sold to a trader.  As Hakim has pointed out, Jack shows, in this section, a “troubling 
view of women, race, and U.S. history” because of his “restrictive . . . historical outlook” 
(132).  Hakim diagnoses Jack as “afraid, maybe, of how Cass’s tale illuminates Jack’s 
own ignoring and marginalizing of African-Americans, and draws attention to the ways 
Jack depicts women, too, past and present, as ‘Other’” (133).  In the parts of the story of 
Cass’s search for Phebe in which Jack does reproduce the journal entries and letters 
rather than paraphrasing them, however, he manages to allow some of that pain—or at 
the very least Cass’s worries about having caused that pain—to register.  We as readers 
are most aware of the trauma Phebe endures not when Jack is summarizing her story but 
when the quotations from Cass’s journals—which are fewer and more isolated, in the 
Phebe section of the narrative, than in the rest—appear.  Jack’s presentation of the story 
in chapter 4, with its focus on how he could not know who Cass Mastern was, is already 
reductive when he tries to tell it rather than to quote it; indeed, one can only assume that 
Cass, too, despite his attempts to redeem Phebe, reduces her story when he tries to 
interpret it and tell it in his journals and letters. It is therefore troubling when Jack at the 
end of the novel says that he is writing “the life of Cass Mastern, whom once I could not 
understand but whom, perhaps, I now may come to understand” (438).  If he does decide 
that he understands Cass, will he also move further toward putting his own narrative arc 
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on the portions of the story that focus more on Cass himself, put his technique to work on 
it, insert the crowbar?  Or by “understand,” does he mean something other than the idea 
of acquiring knowledge about a past life and trying to organize it in a narrative? 
Hayden White has argued that endings are possible only in light of a notion of 
“moral meaning” (Content 21).  A concluding point for a story is imaginable because it is 
a point of triumph or failure.  Jack’s failure to conclude Cass’s story in chapter 4—he 
ends abruptly with a short quotation from Cass’s final, dictated letter and then returns to 
his own story—is perhaps the most honest conclusion he can give it.  For his own story, 
however, he experiences a need for a conclusion in order to be able to assign it a meaning 
and move forward.  It is perhaps for this reason that he refuses to put in the crowbar on 
the question of his paternity and decides to let go the question of who is most guilty of 
Adam’s and the Boss’s deaths.  Whereas, immediately before handing the envelope of 
evidence to the Judge, Jack thinks of how he could destroy “the stuff from Miss 
Littlepaugh” but then instead thinks, “But I had to know.  Even as the thought of going 
away without knowing came through my head, I knew that I had to know the truth,” he 
decides after all the violence to refuse being a detective and trying to know (343).  Jack 
acknowledges universal guilt, but then, unlike in hardboiled detective fiction, he does not 
let this acknowledgement, paired with and enabled by a full account of the events of the 
crimes, become the ending of the narrative.  Instead, having recognized his guilt and 
Anne’s, he chooses to stop detecting, to stop acting as a historian, and to stop trying to 
know.  His retrospective account of his research on Cass Mastern suggests that, as 
opposed to in his research during graduate school, he no longer wants to solve the 
mystery of Cass Mastern; instead he wants to imagine that Cass is going to tell about 
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himself.  Jack is refusing historical interpretation, and his choice represents—certainly 
for a historian or a detective—a radical acceptance of other people’s interpretations.   
Toward the end of the story he is telling, Jack goes on to accept, serially, a great 
number of other people’s interpretations of events.  He accepts his mother’s claim that 
Irwin is his father.  Then, effectively concurring with Sugar Boy’s assessment that Sugar 
Boy has done something great with his life by serving as the Boss’s driver and gunman, 
Jack agrees with him that the Boss “‘was a great talker,’” after Sugar Boy has declared 
his admiration for the Boss—“‘When a m-m-made a speech and ev-ev-everybody y-y-
yelled, it looked l-l-like something was gonna b-b-burst instead y-y-you’” (421).  Jack 
then visits the Boss’s wife Lucy Stark and accepts her decision to claim Sibyl Frey’s 
baby as her son Tom’s and adopt him, in spite of a lack of evidence that Tom is the 
baby’s father.  Lucy bases her conclusion on the fact that, when she goes to see the baby 
wanting him to look like Tom, he does: ‘I know it’s Tom’s,’ she declared fiercely to me, 
‘it’s got to be Tom’s, it looks like him’” (425).  Lucy goes on to tell Jack that her 
husband “‘was a great man,’” and Jack approves of her decision to choose a conclusion 
she can live with: “Yes, Lucy, you have to believe that.  You have to believe that to live . 
. . And I would not have you believe otherwise” (427).  He then sees his mother off on a 
train as she leaves her husband because she has come to the conclusion that “‘it was 
always Monty [Judge Irwin]’” that she loved; “‘I knew it when he was dead,’” even 
though her actions when they were both alive suggest that her final interpretation is 
perhaps a bit too strong (429).  Jack lets his mother believe, too, that he had not found out 
anything damning about the Judge’s past.  He accepts Cass Mastern’s beliefs about 
having redeemed himself by marching in the Civil War and not firing at the enemy, 
  
133 
 
allowing his story in chapter 4 to end, as I said previously, with an excerpt from Cass’s 
last letter and then four simple sentences about Cass’s death, rather than with any 
significant interpretations put onto the final letter by Jack. He even forgoes putting a 
conclusion on Willie Stark’s story, allowing it to end relatively unconcluded, with an 
uninterpreted quotation of some of the Boss’s final words (“‘It might have been all 
different, Jack.  You got to believe that’” [436].)   
All of these acceptances constitute, perhaps, Jack’s reparation for having tried to 
rewrite Adam Stanton’s interpretation of his family’s past and his belief in the possibility 
of good in the world.  For his own story, however—“This has been the story of Willie 
Stark, but it is my story, too,” he says—the end Jack chooses and his decision to make his 
commitments (to Anne and to the Scholarly Attorney) in the realm of feelings, rather than 
knowledge and investigation, provide the kind of freeze frame necessary in order to make 
the past a past and make it mean something, to make it accessible to the moral decisions 
that need to be made in the present (435).  The “end” of knowledge, the assigning of 
moral meanings, whether that end is the revelation of who has done wrong and the 
promise of justice in detective fiction or the position Jack chooses from which he can 
conclude, for instance, that the Boss “was a great man,” appears, by the end of All the 
King’s Men, as arbitrary as it is necessary (427).  To make his story mean something, 
Jack needs to put a period on it so he is not still in the middle of it.  Jack’s choice to put 
an ending on one part of his story enables, first of all, his narration of the story of the 
previous part of his life, and, second, his making a new start.  But he rejects all possible 
detective fiction endings and likewise the certainty of a conclusion for Cass’s story.  He 
decides to base his decisions in the present on his feelings, his philosophies, and his 
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present needs, rather than on what he has discovered and thinks he can know about the 
past.  Jack is advocating a historiography of self-determination as opposed to the 
pretension to objective, detective-like presentations of past events that dominated the 
historiography of his time.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
GHOSTS IN THE LOCKED ROOM: SPIRITUAL FORMS OF EVIDENCE AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE UNDISCIPLINED ACADEMIC IN LOUIS OWENS’S 
MYSTERY NOVELS 
 
 James Kincaid, who reviewed Louis Owens’s second novel, The Sharpest Sight 
(1992), for the New York Times, called himself “bamboozled” by what in the first fifty 
pages had seemed to be “an intriguing but rather easily handled whodunit” but became 
more: though the mystery story persists to the end of the novel, Kincaid says, it becomes 
entwined with “[a]n artfully interfolded story of how knowledge is reached, constructed, 
approximated, or just plain faked.” Its major question is how “we arrive at what we are 
finally willing to take as ‘knowing’” (Kincaid).  The Sharpest Sight, as well as Owens’s 
next novel, Bone Game (1994), makes heavy use of elements from the detective fiction 
genre.  However, like All the King’s Men, though for different reasons, it goes on to 
refuse the ending of genre fiction.  It overturns the set of expectations in detective fiction 
which suggest that complete knowledge is possible and that knowledge leads to justice.   
A brief introduction to each of these novels will facilitate the more detailed 
explanation of my argument in this chapter that follows.  Prior to the beginning of The 
Sharpest Sight, Attis McCurtain, newly back from Vietnam, has killed his girlfriend 
during a flashback and is taken to a California mental hospital.  One rainy night, he 
escapes and disappears. Attis’s best friend Mundo Morales, now a police deputy, sees his 
body spinning beneath a bridge over the river that runs alongside the town and the mental 
hospital.  Attis’s father, Hoey, and his Choctaw great-uncle Luther, who lives back in 
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Mississippi where Attis grew up, dream that he has been murdered. His younger brother 
Cole receives word around the time of his brother’s death that he has been drafted to fight 
in Vietnam. At his father’s advice, he goes to Mississippi to hide with his great-uncle 
Luther and learns there that he must find his brother’s bones and return them to 
Mississippi.  The search in The Sharpest Sight is ultimately less for the solution to what 
happened to Attis than for his bones and peace for him, and the information Mundo and 
Cole piece together as they search comes largely from rumor and false testimony.  The 
most reliable information, the evidence that keeps the search going despite cease and 
desist orders from Mundo’s chief of police and the FBI (who would rather Attis stay 
missing and the truth about him stay hidden), comes from ghosts and dreams. 
Bone Game, Owens’s next book (1994), continues Cole and his family’s story 
twenty years later, when he has become (much like Owens) an English professor, 
specializing in Modernism and Native American literature.  Bone Game, also a sort of 
murder mystery, adds scholarly knowledge as yet another area in which knowledge, in 
Kincaid’s words, is achieved, constructed, and faked.  The “mixedblood” Choctaw-
Cherokee-Irish professor McCurtain teams up with the cross-dressing, card-carrying 
Navajo anthropology professor Alex Yazzie to try to investigate a series of dreams Cole 
has had about a painted Native gambler, an Ohlone man who had lived trapped in the 
Santa Cruz mission in the early nineteenth century under the supervision of a cruel 
Spanish priest, and later about a present-day series of murders on and around the Santa 
Cruz campus (46-47).  Chris LaLonde argues that the juxtapositions of nineteenth and 
twentieth-century events “put us in the same position as Cole McCurtain . . . as readers 
and protagonist try to see and understand the connections between past and present, 
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between the Ohlone and other Native peoples, and between an individual’s story and a 
story of the People” (101). 
This chapter will consider the tension, in these two Owens novels, between 
institutional means of evaluating evidence (legal, in The Sharpest Sight, and academic, in 
Bone Game) and the value the investigators place on Indigenous epistemologies, in 
particular the consideration of dream knowledge and spiritual and supernatural events as 
evidence.  The Sharpest Sight and Bone Game’s final positions on the reconcilability of 
institutional and Indigenous forms of evidence take shape in two related areas: the 
generic and the epistemological.  While the novels’ epistemological concerns are 
certainly connected to their use of detective fiction forms, Bone Game also goes on to 
consider the tension between Indigenous and specifically academic epistemologies in 
ways that exceed the novel’s play with the genre. 
 With respect to detective fiction, both novels end up de-emphasizing solving in 
favor of a broader notion of learning and justice in favor of empathy.  They cease to be 
detective fiction by the end.  The solving of the crimes is multiple, leads to a deeper 
understanding of the causes of evil in the world, and must continue even after the 
circumstances of the murders have been reconstructed.  The reconstruction of the crimes 
not only does not lead to justice; it does not lead squarely to a single culprit.  A young 
woman named Diana in The Sharpest Sight is probably Attis’s murderer, but the novel is 
never completely clear about whether she is and if so whether she acted alone.  Even if 
she is the murderer, the novel locates her guilt not in her, individually, but in the cycles of 
hurt and violence that drove her to kill Attis.  In Bone Game, there are two separate 
murderers, each of whom is fueled in a different way by colonial legacies of violence that 
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remain tied to the land the university is built on and that are to some degree perpetuated 
by the intellectual work of the university.  The killing of these two murderers (which is 
done in self-defense) does stop the crimes, but it does not resolve the painted gambler’s 
restlessness. Not even when Cole says his name, as the gambler has wanted all the time, 
is the ranging nature of his hurt solved or ended.  At the end of the novel, the gambler’s 
“shadow falls across the town and bay, undulating with the slow waves” (243).  “Eran 
muy crueles,” the novel concludes, as though the gambler, whose Catholic name is 
Venancio, is once again repeating the words about the cruelty of the Spanish priests that 
his son spoke to an interviewer years after his death, and which have appeared in Cole’s 
dreams (243).   Cole’s “solution” to the gambler mystery is instead a recognition of who 
the gambler is, what he endured, and why he participated in the Spanish priest’s murder.  
Cole’s solution leads to empathy rather than justice, the end result of the hyper-rational 
Western genre of detective fiction, and one which is in genre fiction mapped 
unproblematically onto the reconstruction of the crime and the identification of the 
criminal, as though perfected knowledge always produces a just ending.  In place of 
detective fiction endings, Owens’s novels open up into wider notions of experience rather 
than collapsing down into a solution.  
 In addition to its detective fiction content, Bone Game is also about being located 
in the university and about two Native academics, Cole, a professor of literature, and 
Alex, an anthropologist, and it is an ideal text for thinking about the ways of knowing and 
of gathering evidence and reaching conclusions that belong to academic work, too.  Bone 
Game (The Sharpest Sight does not weigh in on this issue) does not ultimately argue for 
forcing the university to contend with Indigenous ways of knowing.  It does, however, 
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force Cole, the initially struggling and displaced “mixedblood” professor, to contend with 
and reconcile multiple ways of knowing and recognize that Indigenous ways of knowing 
offer him a powerful supplement to the limitations and blindnesses of professional, 
academic ways of knowing.  In concert with Owens’s later critical arguments in 
Mixedblood Messages: Literature, Film, Family, Place (1998), Cole “does not have the 
luxury of simply opting out” of the dominant, Western discourse; he is already long since 
implicated in it (52).  Neither, however, can he be at home in it; to do so would 
impoverish his way of understanding the world and reduce his contribution to academic 
knowledge.  The novel shows Cole and Alex, in their healthiest moments, making use of 
academic forms of evidence, which throughout the novel have been intertwined with 
Indigenous and spiritual forms—Cole dreams about an interview recorded by an 
anthropologist, for instance—without letting those forms completely determine the way 
they think.  However, in the context of the university at least, the two professors still need 
to communicate what they learn using academic language and academic evidence, and 
they therefore must perform the difficult work of translating spiritual forms of evidence 
into academic discourse, with the result that some ideas inevitably will be left out, but 
that their research will be better informed.  The two major areas in which the novel ends 
up claiming that academic and Indigenous knowledge are not only actually but also 
functionally reconcilable, however, are, first, in the world beyond the university, 
specifically the circle of home, friendship, and family; and, second and crucially, in 
fiction, which Cole’s Great-Uncle Luther and Luther’s friend and lover Onatima, figures 
of wisdom in his life, encourage Cole to return to writing.   
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When Cole and Alex are able to use a wider circle of forms of evidence, in the 
research they do together in their time at home, off campus, and which the novel suggests 
Cole will also rely on in his fiction writing, they have a clearer sense of what is 
happening and has happened, both historically and in the present-day crimes, and of who 
the gambler is.  Owens, in Mixedblood Messages, calls the “act of appropriating the 
colonizer’s discourse and making it one’s own . . . collaborative and conjunctural” (52).  
Cole and Alex have to negotiate intellectualism in the academy, which is framed in 
primarily Western terms, and struggle to integrate it with their belief in dreams and 
evidence from spiritual experiences, a challenge for both of them, one that leaves Alex 
“lonesome” and initially drives Cole into drinking and a loss of professional discipline, as 
he deals with his dreams of the gambler on his own, without the support of friends and 
family (151).  However, this negotiation, which Owens in his critical writing links to his 
idea of frontier, eventually puts them at an advantage rather than a disadvantage: as 
undisciplined academics, who form extra- and cross-disciplinary friendships and take 
Indigenous ways of knowing seriously, they have more practice than other scholars in 
negotiating multiple ways of understanding the world.  The term undisciplined could 
apply to them throughout the novel, but for Cole in particular the term is revalued as he 
moves from lecturing drunk and skipping faculty meetings to re-imagining his 
intellectual work in less disciplinarily-bounded ways.  For Cole and Alex, the university 
is what Owens in his critical writing calls the frontier—“an appropriation and 
transvaluation of this deadly cliché of colonialism”—a “transcultural zone of contact . . . 
the zone of the trickster, a shimmering, always changing zone of multifaceted contact 
within which every utterance is challenged and interrogated, all referents put into 
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question” (Mixedblood Messages 26).  They thus have a wider vision of the real and the 
knowable than academics who cannot escape from the limitations of professional 
discourse.  They have insights into postmodernism in particular, of which Owens’s 
concept of frontier is a more expansive version.  Their more comprehensive, 
undisciplined knowledge shows Western/European ways of knowing to be particular—an 
operation along the lines of what Dipesh Chakrabarty calls “provincializing Europe.”  
The novel suggests that all ways of knowing are committed, dependent upon the values 
and beliefs of the investigator, but that academic and Western ways of knowing 
masquerade as universal.  Yet Cole and Alex choose to maintain a strategic position in 
the university, one that gives them access to power, even in circles beyond the university. 
“‘If I had a Ph.D., I’d be in Washington, D.C., giving everybody hell,’” Onatima tells 
Cole (144). Bone Game suggests, ultimately (in an extension and illustration of Owens’s 
arguments in his critical work), that while Western ways of knowing may be provincial, it 
is crucial to be able to use them to be heard in the university (and, as Onatima suggests, 
in government).  The trick is for Cole and Alex not to get swept up in them, conditioned 
by them, until they can no longer make arguments (within the circle of friends and family 
and also in fiction) using all the forms of evidence available to them—and additionally 
letting all these forms of evidence inform the arguments they make even in the academy, 
until it comes time to translate them into Western discourse.  Without these two 
professors’ commitment to being undisciplined academics and open to multiple ways of 
knowing, no one would have recognized who the gambler was and given him the 
empathy he desired.  Because Cole and Alex’s research in the novel is historical in 
nature, not only the novel’s overturning of detective fiction’s promises but also its 
 142 
 
engagement with academic research in the frontier zone of the university has 
historiographical implications.  Bone Game ends up privileging the academic as fiction 
writer over the academic as investigator, but Cole and Alex also remain researchers and 
teachers.  Bone Game and The Sharpest Sight attempt to broaden notions of evidence 
beyond what is accepted in the university and the law, respectively, in order to take 
seriously all the ways things can be known. 
 
Ghosts in the Locked Room 
The detective fiction genre relies on the past being done and closed, accessible 
only through the traces it leaves behind, so that the past structures the present 
investigation, but only by means of a notion of interpretation and reconstruction, not by 
other forms of mediation, revelation, or the intrusion of the past into the present in the 
form of a ghost.  Working within the genre of detective fiction, a genre deeply indebted 
to rationalism and European ways of knowing, Owens challenges detective fiction’s 
traditional frameworks of investigation, evidence-gathering, and detective-style 
deduction.  The consideration of evidence that does not abide by the laws of nature 
effectively unlocks the locked room and makes pinning down a solution based on 
rationalist methods impossible.   
In neither detective stories nor historical research is the supernatural traditionally 
allowed to count as evidence or explanation for what may have occurred in the past.  In 
Poe’s “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” the supernatural is ruled out as a premise, so 
that the investigation can proceed neatly: “It is not too much to say that neither of us 
believe in praeternatural events,” says C. Auguste Dupin to his companion (139).  
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“Madame and Mademoiselle L’Espanaye [the victims] were not destroyed by spirits.  
The doers of the deed were material, and escaped materially.  Then how?” (139).  Julian 
Lethbridge argues that without the central assumption that Poe’s detective figure, Dupin, 
chooses to make—“that the world is rational and rationally explicable, that action is 
performed in the world by the world”—any mystery is unsolvable (93).  This 
championing of mind, reason, and logic has dominated later detective fiction, as well.  
The second item of Msgr. Ronald Knox’s 1928 “Ten Commandments of Detective 
Fiction” stipulates that “all supernatural or preternatural agencies are ruled out as a matter 
of course.”  In Tony Hillerman’s Navajo mysteries, which Owens’s mystery novels were 
often measured against in the press when they first appeared, witches and other religious 
or supernatural phenomena appear but are repeatedly explained away.55  The crimes 
prove to be material, the invocation of supernatural elements a deliberate cover-up by the 
criminals.   
The initial critical reception of Bone Game and The Sharpest Sight tended to view 
them strictly as mystery fiction. Bone Game, as well as Nightland, another Owens novel 
involving search and discovery, “got no more than brief notices in the weekly ‘Crime’ or 
‘Mysteries’ columns of major newspapers” (Helstern 15).  This “pigeonholing,” (15) 
Linda Lizut Helstern argues, limits readers’ ability to see how Owens has appropriated 
genre fiction structures “for his own ends” (16).56  Helstern writes that Kincaid, the 
reviewer who noted that The Sharpest Sight was multilayered and dealt in part with the 
                                                           
55
 In the first of Hillerman’s Navajo mysteries, The Blessing Way (1970), for instance, a criminal from Los 
Angeles simulates witchcraft in an area of the Navajo Nation where he and his fellow criminals want to be 
unobserved for their spy work.  All of the people occupying the area flee for fear that he is a witch, leaving 
the criminals to work in privacy. 
56
 Robert Gish argues, in addition, that The Sharpest Sight mixes “realism and magic realism, the Western 
and mystery genres” (433). 
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achievement and construction of knowledge, “saw a great deal more that spring than the 
reviewers for either the Washington Post [or] the Los Angeles Times,” who both “read 
The Sharpest Sight as a local color mystery in the [Tony] Hillerman tradition, making 
explicit comparisons between the two writers” (15).  Hillerman’s Navajo mysteries, 
detective fiction with an anthropological bent, belong much more clearly to the detective 
fiction genre than Owens’s work.  In addition to the novels’ rejection of detective fiction 
endings, Mundo functions as a detective in The Sharpest Sight but is not the person who 
discovers Attis’s body, and there is no detective in Bone Game, though murder and 
discovery are involved.   
Owens’s work, contrary to the claims of scholars of detective fiction, indicates 
that to let go of dream knowledge and evidence from spiritual experiences, such as Cole’s 
encounter with a bear after the Native American Church service, would in many cases be 
to lose any access to solving the mystery or narrating the past.  The physical and archival 
evidence about, for instance, a discredited and mentally unstable veteran like Attis or the 
lives of the Native Californians who appear in Cole’s dreams in Bone Game is considered 
too thin by the parties in power to support conclusions about what may have happened in 
these lives.  Dreams and ghosts are necessarily the primary sources of knowledge about 
lives like these.  As Esther Fritsch and Marion Gymnich argue in their study of Bone 
Game’s detective fiction elements, dreams and ghosts turn out to be essential to solving 
the crimes, despite the fact that “[g]hosts and the supernatural have traditionally been 
regarded as inimical to the genre of the detective novel” because they establish a direct 
connection between past and present (204).   
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In 1998 Kathleen Brogan, in Cultural Haunting: Ghosts and Ethnicity in Recent 
American Literature, pointed out how pervasive ghosts are in contemporary American 
literature, especially minority, immigrant, and Native literature.  Brogan argues that these 
contemporary ghost stories do not, for the most part, partake of the Gothic tradition, in 
which “at the most basic level . . . ghosts function as plot device—providing crucial 
information, setting in motion the machinery of revenge or atonement” and “on a more 
sophisticated level . . . serve to illuminate the more shadowy or repressed aspects of 
characters” (2).  Instead, the “pan-ethnic phenomenon” of the contemporary American 
ghost story functions “to re-create ethnic identity through an imaginative recuperation of 
the past and to press this new version of the past into the service of the present” (Brogan 
4).  In so doing, Brogan claims, these texts register “a widespread concern with questions 
of ethnic identity and cultural transmission” (4).  Brogan highlights texts such as Louise 
Erdrich’s Tracks, Toni Morrison’s Beloved, Gloria Naylor’s Mama Day, and Cristina 
García’s Dreaming in Cuban. 
Owens’s work, while certainly part of the phenomenon that Brogan identifies, is 
nevertheless a bit different from the rest of this body of work precisely because of its 
detective story elements.  Ghosts, just as physically present in Owens’s novels as in many 
of the texts Brogan analyzes, are even more emphatically not metaphorical.  They 
function as sources of not just information about identity, but of evidence about the past 
that has to be used in the making of life or death decisions in the present. Ghosts are 
always about knowing.  Brogan argues, in fact, that “the turn to the supernatural in the 
process of recovering history emphasizes the difficulty of gaining access to a lost or 
denied past, as well as the degree to which any such historical reconstruction is 
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essentially an imaginative act” (6).  Owens’s novels appeal to more than what Brogan 
calls “imagination” in their scenes of historical reconstruction.  Detective fiction, as I 
have argued elsewhere in this study, renders more concrete the concept of access to a lost 
past and reconstruction of it.  The ability to determine and then make a convincing case 
about what happened is often the deciding factor in whether or not justice is done.  
Owens’s placement of his ghosts in texts that borrow formal and thematic elements from 
detective fiction means that their importance to the question of how the past can be 
known is more concrete than in other contemporary American ghost stories.   
 Knowledge founded on material evidence is often undercut in Owens’s work, 
especially in The Sharpest Sight, where it is shown to be unreliable even as institutional 
authority figures privilege it over intuition and ghostly encounters.  In The Sharpest 
Sight, Mundo Morales, who has been in Vietnam with Attis before becoming a deputy in 
Amarga, the little California town where the first part of the story takes place, tells the 
sheriff, a psychiatrist from the hospital Attis has been held in, and a federal investigator 
that he has seen Attis dead in the river (probably in a vision, though the novel lets this 
point remain unclear).  The sheriff and the federal investigator “exchange a quick look,” 
and the psychiatrist “emit[s] a heavy sigh” and asks, “‘Are you sure that’s what you saw? 
. . . It couldn’t have been something you imagined because of . . . fatigue?’” and goes on 
to say, “‘You and the escapee were in Vietnam together, I understand?’” (41).  Mundo’s 
thoughts transition immediately into a story told to him by his grandfather, called “the 
viejo” in the novel, in which the grandfather of current town bigwig Dan Nemi gets his 
cattle onto Mundo’s family’s large land holding “for a quart of whiskey” and then within 
ten years seizes it all (42).  “Back when it was illegal for a Mexican or an Indian to testify 
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against a white person in court,” Mundo’s grandmother adds, these things could happen 
easily (42-43).  But the juxtaposition of the old story with the current situation, in 
Mundo’s thoughts, shows that he feels that the kind of injustice that arises when one 
party’s testimony is invalidated persists into the present—not only did he have to endure 
Vietnam, but having been there has left him an invalid witness.  Dan and Helen Nemi, the 
parents of the girl Attis has killed, act guilty of the murder when Mundo comes to 
question him and yet mock Mundo for his inability to do anything about it.  They sigh as 
well when he tells them he knows he has seen Attis dead, and Dan says, “‘In my war 
some of the boys got hit pretty hard, too.  We called it shell shock then, or battle fatigue’” 
(51-52). 
 It later becomes clear that the official investigators have actually been instructed 
not to be able to hear testimony like Mundo’s.  Lee Scott, the federal investigator, says to 
Cole, “‘Know why I’m here?  They sent me to make sure that your brother never 
surfaced again.  They want him controlled and invisible.  He’s too fucking embarrassing 
to them.  You see, they were afraid he was loose and was going to dance the ghost dance 
some more and remind people’” (254).  Despite all this undercutting of testimony, there 
is a certainty in the novel that Attis has been murdered.  All knowledge of Attis’s death 
comes from dreams and intuition, unless the reader accepts that Mundo may have had the 
perfect timing to physically see Attis float by under the bridge rather than in a vision.  
Hoey drops in on Mundo in his office late at night, just after Mundo has seen Attis in the 
river, to say, “‘Something happened to my son.  That’s why I came . . . I dreamed it—part 
of it’” (33).  Told that the mental hospital says Attis has escaped, Hoey says, “‘No . . . No 
. . . He didn’t escape’” (33).  Uncle Luther, back in Mississippi, dreams of Attis as well 
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and takes an active part in the story from a distance by intervening in the movement of 
Attis’s shilup and shilombish, his inside and outside shadows (7).  In Mundo’s case, there 
is also knowledge imparted by ghosts—the viejo (his grandfather) and the Mondragon 
sisters.  Onatima calls these three characters “Catholic ghosts,” saying, “‘I went to the 
university and read up on Catholic ghosts . .  . They’re sort of allowed to come back to try 
to fix things that are wrong, to balance things you might say’” (224-25).  Mundo’s 
grandfather and the Mondragon sisters interfere actively in his investigation, and though 
their contributions sometimes turn out to be inaccurate, the viejo gets wiser and more 
helpful as the story goes on.  Attis’s Choctaw ghost, on the other hand, is silent and 
passive.  Attis’s family is guided by dreams, but the only conclusion they are able to draw 
based on the dark form of Attis’s shadow in the corner of Luther’s house is that he is 
definitely dead.  Ghosts in The Sharpest Sight are not a vague or culturally unspecific 
source of information.  Instead they suggest an opening up toward the various ways that 
each of the investigators in the novel is able to know the world. 
 Attempts to secure material evidence and testimony from the living, on the other 
hand, fail in The Sharpest Sight.  Mundo tries to conduct a systematic search for both 
Attis’s body, which he regards as evidence in the case (planning to match the bullet to 
Dan Nemi’s gun because he is convinced Nemi is the murderer), and for evidence that 
Nemi’s alibi is false.  All he finds, however, is a swirling mass of statements from people 
trying to mislead him, and he cannot locate Attis’s body.  Dan Nemi and his wife taunt 
Mundo, saying, “‘Maybe they just lost him, you know, misplaced him out there in that 
great big hospital’” (49).  When Mundo goes to the tavern in town to verify Nemi’s alibi, 
the tavernkeeper Jessard Deal minimizes both Attis’s and Mundo’s importance, telling 
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him, “‘That guy out there playing with his pecker at the funny farm wasn’t . . . your 
buddy, Mundo.  Your buddy didn’t come back from Nam, Mundo.  He ain’t out at that 
hospital and he ain’t never been out there, get it?’” (82).  Deal follows up by saying, 
“‘Hell, you hardly exist yourself anymore.  You walked through that door, I thought I’d 
just made you up’” (82).  Most of the town seems to be trying to undercut Mundo’s 
ability to make meaning out of Attis’s disappearance.  The FBI agent tells Mundo that 
Mundo himself is a suspect: “‘It’s logical.  The missing man’s last known visitor, best 
friend’” (84).  Later Dan Nemi whispers to Mundo, “‘It was me, Mundo.  I did it’” (106).  
That supposed admission directs the rest of Mundo’s search, but evidence that appears at 
the end of the novel embedded in threats made by Jessard Deal to Dan’s daughter Diana 
Nemi suggests that most probably she did the killing. 
 Fritsch and Gymnich argue that “it is indicative of the importance assigned to an 
intuitive rather than a predominantly rational approach in The Sharpest Sight that Cole is 
successful while Mundo, systematically searching the riverbanks, fails” (206).  Cole has 
initially “tried to penetrate the leaping darkness” as he begins his nighttime search for his 
brother’s body, but he quickly admits that he cannot see (251).  He feels “something 
pulling him toward the heart of the river, and he moved in that direction . . . After an hour 
he broke through a tangle of brush into a small clearing, and he knew he was there” 
(251).  Giving up on the idea that he might be able to see his way clear to the solution 
seems to be what allows him to find Attis. 
Bone Game’s use of detective fiction structures invokes historical practice more 
directly, as the novel takes on the idea of discovery.  The novel’s epigraph, which 
consists of two dates and descriptions of events in Santa Cruz over 180 years apart, 
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immediately compares history work to the detection of crime.  As Rochelle Venuto has 
noted, both notices are in the terse language of a police blotter (26).  They begin the story 
with what has been discovered.  “October 15, 1812,” begins the first one: “Government 
Surgeon Manuel Quijano, accompanied by six armed men, is dispatched form the 
presidio in Monterey with orders to exhume the body of Padre Andrés Quintana at the 
mission of Santa Cruz . . . The priest is found to have been murdered, tortured in 
pudendis, and hanged.”  “November 1, 1993,” begins the second: “The dismembered 
body of a young woman begins washing ashore on the beaches of Santa Cruz, 
California.”  LaLonde has made the point that the epigraph, by fixing “in chronological 
time not the murder . . . but the government act of dispatch that leads to its discovery,” 
not only “accentuat[es] the trope of discovery that will be carried through the novel,” but 
makes it clear that it is the activities of the Spanish authorities—“their ability to discover 
what has been concealed,” rather than the actions and motivations of the Indians who did 
the killing—that have been entered into the historical record (103).  History work, here, 
oversimplifies, privileges power, and is potentially dangerous.  When Alex is explaining 
the history of the Ohlone people and the Franciscan Mission at Santa Cruz to Cole, he 
argues that because the Ohlone destroyed everything connected to the dead, there was not 
any history until the Spanish “came and taught them history and death in a single 
moment” (Bone Game 54).   
Much as The Sharpest Sight opens with familiar detective fiction tropes—a 
policeman driving through town and spotting a body, resistance by local officials to the 
idea that the man he saw could be dead—Bone Game opens with a woman’s body 
washing ashore in Santa Cruz.  By a few pages in, we have heard of the present-day 
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crimes, have seen the murderers, blended in with the rest of the introductions to 
characters but marked by clues that will eventually lead us to suspect them, and have seen 
warnings, in dreams and on campus alert posters, of the dangers that will emerge in the 
story.  Cole, however, despite his search twenty years earlier for his brother’s body, is no 
detective, and he initially considers the events of the murder to be quite separate from his 
own life.  He feels a connection, viscerally, but resists it.  He is maintaining a general 
distance at this point in the story—away from his home in New Mexico following a 
divorce, he has been experiencing a malaise and a confusion regarding his dreams about 
the gambler and whether he is cut out to be a professor.  Hearing students talking about 
the death, he feels “as if he should know, as though it were something just at the edge of 
his memory, ready to come into focus” (14).  When his teaching assistant explains that 
several women are missing and one has washed up on the beach, saying, “‘It’s terrible, 
isn’t it?’”, Cole stares at the student, thinking, “Was it terrible that a young woman, 
perhaps one of his students, had been murdered and strewn in pieces upon the sea?” (18).  
But later that morning he opens a beer in his office and sits back, “thinking of the girl 
they’d found in the sea, imagining a story that could end that way.  Somewhere in that 
story was a moment of shrieking horror so great it struck at his soul.  And again, he felt 
the strange sense of responsibility, a terrible weight” (21).  Alex, Cole’s Uncle Luther, 
and Luther’s companion Onatima will later convince Cole that confronting these deaths is 
in fact his responsibility: his dreams have already signaled that it is. 
 In Bone Game, Owens directly invokes not only the detective story tradition in 
general, but Hillerman specifically, with two separate Hillerman jokes: Cole tells Alex he 
knows about ghost sickness because he has “‘read Silko and Hillerman.  He is Navajo, 
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isn’t he?’” (96).  (He is not, and Cole of course knows it.)  Later Alex, having captured 
one of Santa Cruz’s killers after an accidental encounter, jokes to Cole that he learned his 
trade in “‘Jim Chee tribal investigator correspondence school’” (223).  (Chee is a 
Hillerman detective.)  The idea that Alex is the detective-hero is a misinterpretation by 
the media: as the television screen shows “a profile the world knew well: the Indian 
warrior come to rescue the white world from its nether self,” the reporter, “in a voice 
edged with awe and what Cole suspected to be lust, explained that Alex Yazzie, a Native 
American professor and martial arts expert, had taken it upon himself to trap the killer, 
dressing as a woman and hitchhiking with the daughter of another Native American 
faculty member” (222).  In fact Alex has not searched for the murderers at all; he has 
even let down his usual caution and caught a ride with a stranger, dressed in his normal 
female attire, with Cole’s daughter Abby along.57  He catches the murderer only when the 
murderer tries to kill the two of them.  Since becoming involved, Alex has attended only 
to the religious aspects of the problem in Santa Cruz.  He has tried to identify the painted 
gambler, has ascertained that Cole is in need of something spiritually, and has set up a 
sweat and then a Native American Church service, both of which bring Cole into a 
greater understanding of why he keeps dreaming of the gambler.   
Very little of the knowledge Alex and Cole attain can be attributed to any 
searching.  Alex makes a comment when he first meets Cole, out in front of his faculty 
apartment field-dressing a deer, wearing a skirt and heels, that “‘This fine animal just 
gave himself to me.  I was driving up the hill over there, just going along you know like I 
                                                           
57
 Alex enjoys cross-dressing but refuses to allow Cole to label him as gay.  “‘Call me a creature of 
boundless interests,’” he says (31).  At the end of the novel, he falls in love with Cole’s daughter Abby.  
(Alex is a new faculty member and much younger than Cole.) 
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always do, when he jumped in front of my truck’” (26).  Alex is in high parody mode in 
this moment, and yet there is often a strain of seriousness beneath his jokes.  The one 
thing Alex does seem to be serious about, in this encounter, is that he needs deer sinew 
for a reason that has arisen in a dream, and it has been provided for him (26).  Similarly, 
he and Cole and Abby are later provided what they need to stop the violence.  Both Alex 
and Cole wait for and then accept the help of the various great-uncles and aunts who 
arrive on their doorstep unsolicited. 
 When clues do appear in Bone Game, they are presented in language that makes 
them feel like dreams.  Several times short chapters punctuate the longer ones (which 
describe Cole, Alex, and Abby’s experiences).  Some of the shorter sections are from the 
perspective of one of the murderers.  Early in the novel, a short chapter with no clear 
pronoun reference acquaints us with a character who will turn out to be responsible for 
some of the murders.  The man, who it seems has painted himself like the gambler in 
Cole’s dreams, thinks about voices giving him commands and imagines himself to be 
“like Jonah, who couldn’t get away even in the belly of the ocean but had to come back 
and do what he was told” (13).  At this point so early in the novel, many different images 
and characters are being presented in succession, and only very limited recognition is 
possible.  The painted man resembles the gambler in the dream—the rest must be stored 
away to make sense of later.  There is a tone of potential evil or violence to this section, 
but it is not yet really evidence for anything.  When, thirty pages later, after the first 
killings have been discovered, Alex has been introduced, Cole has given two lectures, 
and more of Cole’s background has been presented, we hear Cole’s teaching assistant tell 
him, “We can’t hide.  Just like Black Elk could not hide from the Thunder Beings, and 
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Jonah couldn’t hide even in the belly of a whale,” the effect of what could be considered 
a clue is actually more like a memory—the mention of Jonah just feels familiar, part of 
the weave of complicated imagery in the novel (42). 
Bone Game draws together these dreamlike experiences and Cole’s experience of 
the Native gambler in his dreams.  After the peyote ceremony he participates in, he seeks 
historical evidence for some of the same events he has glimpsed, rather than disqualifying 
historical and legal evidence outright as The Sharpest Sight does.  In an interview with 
John Purdy in 1998, Owens explained how Bone Game got its start.  He had spent time in 
Santa Cruz in the 1970s and then again in the 90s, and “the place had a feel to it, a—I 
don’t know—a dark presence” (9).  Owens followed up on that feeling by doing some 
reading about the area: “Santa Cruz had a definite, haunted feeling for me, and I began 
researching the history of the place. What really stood out for me was what seemed like a 
pattern of almost ritualistic violence spanning almost two centuries. I came across a 
reference to the killing of a Spanish priest at the Santa Cruz mission in 1812, and I found 
an interview conducted with the son of one of the Ohlone Indian men who killed the 
priest. That became the genesis of Bone Game” (9).  There is a similarity here to the way 
Cole’s encounter with Santa Cruz’s violent past begins. He first experiences the Ohlone 
painted gambler in his dreams, and feels an unease around his house and in the woods, 
and then in conversation with his anthropologist friend Alex learns about the interview 
that Owens mentions, and about the priest’s cruelty and assassination.  
Bone Game directly engages and incorporates parts of two real historical texts.  
The first is what might be called a primary source, an 1879 interview that recounted the 
assassination of Padre Andres Quintana at the Santa Cruz mission in 1812, an event 
 155 
 
witnessed by the father of the informant.  (The other, which I won’t deal with here, is a 
1941 historical monograph that demonizes the natives of the California coast.)  The 
interview, conducted in Spanish, was translated and edited by Edward Castillo, a Luiseño 
anthropologist, and published in English in 1989.  While the interview’s status as 
evidence is complicated—it is testimony produced by Venancio Asisara’s child, not 
Venancio himself, more than sixty years after the event, and both a transcriber and a 
translator are involved in its transmission to Cole and Alex—it is still upheld as a useful, 
though not comprehensive, source of information.  Alex is familiar with the document 
and says Castillo is a friend of his; he also knows the general outlines of the story just 
from living in Santa Cruz.  The old priest, he says, is “somewhat famous around here” 
(52).  Alex’s account is professional, academic, based on sources.  
While Alex is able to track down Venancio in the historical record, Cole has 
already come to know the gambler’s name through a dream.  “‘The name was in my head 
when I woke up this morning,” Cole tells Alex.  “‘In fact, it woke me up.  I don’t know 
why, but I think he’s an Indian from around here, from the old days.  You know how 
dreams are’” (Bone Game 53).  Oddly, however, one of the phrases from his dream, “The 
padres were very cruel toward the Indians,” comes directly from the interview with the 
son of the man Cole is dreaming about (Bone Game 6, Castillo 124).  It is not a quotation 
from Venancio Asisara in the interview, but the son’s summation of the circumstances of 
mission life.  Cole is actually dreaming of the document as well as the event itself, 
suggesting that evidence from dreams and from documents are closely intertwined 
methods for coming to understand the past in Bone Game. 
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The evidence that enables the interpretation of the interview as important to the 
current-day situation in Santa Cruz is located only in Cole’s dream.  Owens’s novel 
inverts the usual scheme of the detective story, the one in which supernatural 
explanations are ruled out and the investigators proceed on the evidence that remains.  
Instead, it is spiritual and dream experiences that enable the interpretation of academic 
forms of evidence for the historical situation and the material evidence from the present-
day murders.  LaLonde asserts that Bone Game “both turns on the idea of discovery and 
turns the idea of discovery around” (101).  At the end of Bone Game, after the natural 
mysteries have been solved and the natural murderers apprehended, Cole, the most 
central of what we might call the community of investigators, must still deal with the 
spiritual forces and with what he has come to understand only through dreams. 
 Just as the idea of the primacy of material and documentary evidence is 
supplanted by spiritual and dream evidence in Owens’s fiction, his novels replace 
detective fiction’s reliance on closure and a just ending with a turn to empathy.  In The 
Sharpest Sight, justice is presented as not just a questionable Western goal, but also as a 
supposedly traditional Choctaw goal that may be more problematic in the 20th century 
than it was previously, indicating the novel’s stake in the idea that tribal values are part of 
the negotiations every generation engages in, rather than something static.  At Uncle 
Luther’s prompting, Cole convinces Hoey to give up on the idea of justice.  Hoey, who 
has been trying to be a good man by getting as close as he can to being an old-time 
Choctaw, thinks that he needs to kill Attis’s killer because, as Luther says, “‘Us 
Choctaws, you know, have always believed in blood revenge.  Somebody kills your 
relative, you got to kill that person or one of his relatives’” (96).  But according to Luther, 
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it has become complicated in the present day: “‘You see, Hoey’s son killed that girl and 
so her folks killed him.  They was acting like Choctaws.  Now Hoey thinks he’s got to 
revenge their killing.  So it won’t end.  But my nephew [Hoey] is wrong” (96).  Luther 
has been dreaming about “‘something loose in the world now . . . What your brother was 
doing in that war, that was part of it’” (97).  In the war, “‘they put a terrible medicine in 
Hoey’s other son, and then he done a terrible thing.  And now somebody else has done a 
terrible thing, and it’s got to end’” (97).  Luther convinces Cole to talk Hoey out of his 
idea of justice.  Diana Nemi, the likely killer, is a nineteen-year-old young woman who 
was deeply hurt by Attis’s killing of her sister.  The viejo originally calls Diana a witch, a 
bruja.  Later, however, when Mundo says to him about Diana, “‘It was her, wasn’t it, 
grandfather?  She did it,’” the viejo replies that it was necessary for Mundo to go talk to 
her because “‘one must know what one is looking for,’” but that “‘this girl is just part of 
it . . . I am sorry for her now’” (223).  The idea of an individual perpetrator is being 
undercut.  Onatima calls Diana “‘poor little thing,’” and Luther wishes he could help her, 
but it is too late for him to stop Jessard Deal from raping her.  Deal thinks he can rape 
Diana with impunity by threatening to turn over evidence that she murdered Attis, 
specifically evidence of a withdrawal from her bank account of the money that was used 
to pay the orderly who let Attis escape through the fence to the place near the river where 
Diana was waiting (225).  This potential evidence is called somewhat into question when 
Diana is willing to tell people about the rape, but her motivation to stop protecting herself 
from a murder charge seems more to parallel Luther’s thoughts—that the cycle of 
violence must stop now. 
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 Hoey not only agrees to end the search for evidence against the Nemi family, but 
he also takes care of Diana, guiding her through a healing ritual after she has been raped.  
Cole defends his brother’s bones from the FBI agent at gunpoint and then picks them 
clean as Luther has told him to do, gladly destroying any evidence in the process, in order 
to take the bones back to Mississippi as quickly as possible.  By reducing Attis’s body to 
clean bones as Luther says Choctaw people do, he keeps him from being a legal object, to 
be fought over, hidden, or used as evidence according to the whims of the government.  
Cole destroys one half of the physical evidence by stripping his brother’s bones of flesh 
to prepare them for a Choctaw burial; he forgoes a conclusion to the case in order to let 
his brother rest.  Lee Scott absconds with the other half of the potential evidence, Dan 
Nemi’s gun, and Hoey lets him get away with the gun.  Breaking the cycle of violence 
requires letting go of the search: knowing and revenge turn out to be too closely tied 
together. 
Mundo initially does not agree that the search for Attis’s killer should end.  “‘I’ll 
find Attis . . . And I’ll find out,’” he says.  “‘What was done and who did it’” (52).  Even 
at the end of the novel, Cole uses Mundo as a threat of an unsatisfied need for justice.  
“‘If you don’t leave,’” Cole tells Scott while he has him at gunpoint, “‘I may not kill you, 
but I’ll have to turn my brother’s remains over to Mundo then.  And Mundo won’t let 
things rest’” (254).  When Scott steals away with Dan Nemi’s gun after Nemi’s death, 
Mundo is incensed: “‘What the hell? . . . He’s tampering with evidence. Why didn’t you 
tell me?’”  Hoey, however, believes that Jessard and Nemi have “‘canceled everything 
out’” with their deaths and that proving who killed Attis “‘don’t matter no more’” (258).  
Mundo has originally conceived of his job as a policeman as something out of detective 
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fiction.  His boss tells him that instead he is supposed “to keep punks from stealing 
chickens . . . Your job don’t have to do with solving jack shit” (199).  While Mundo does 
resist his boss’s minimalization of his abilities and responsibilities and helps Cole find 
Attis’s bones, at the end of the novel he, too, has to accept a lack of knowledge and the 
falseness of the detective fiction ending: “There were so many things no one would ever 
know . . . there was no body, only a cedar box full of bones . . . And now there was no 
gun” (262).  Attis is left entirely out of the “official story” that the police and FBI will 
record (262).  Hoey tells Mundo, “‘You’d better start making up your story,’” to which 
Mundo replies, “‘What do you mean, “making up my story”? . . . There isn’t any story, 
just the facts, just what happened’” (258).  “‘It just depends on how you put things 
together,’” (258) Hoey replies, thinking of how the versions from all the players (Hoey, 
Mundo, Diana, Helen Nemi, and the dead bodies of Jessard Deal and Dan Nemi, which 
are “‘already telling more’n anybody wants to hear’” [259]) will not simply reconcile 
themselves; anyone who wants to be heard had better give a convincing account.  Fritsch 
and Gymnich argue that The Sharpest Sight “deviates from traditional crime fiction, 
where law and order are reestablished in the end” (209).  Instead, the story “reaches only 
partial closure . . . a rejection of the binary opposition of justice versus injustice that 
traditional crime fiction is based on” (209).  Whether it is known that Diana killed Attis 
or not, Hoey, Cole, and eventually Mundo decide to proceed on the assumption that more 
than enough punishing has been done.  Jessard and Dan Nemi, who consistently abuse the 
power they have over others, are dead (Jessard having killed Nemi and Hoey having shot 
Jessard to save Mundo).  Diana has shown a desire to escape the cycle of violence.   
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Owens uses the happy ending and the wrapped-up feel typical to Golden Age 
detective fiction, showing all of the characters back to their normal lives or on to better 
ones, even in the absence of a notion of justice—and the happy ending of empathy and 
reconciliation seems perhaps fuller than the one where the criminal is expunged.  Hoey 
and Cole go “home” to Luther and Onatima in Mississippi (263).  Mundo bounces his 
daughter on his knee, dances happily with his wife, and welcomes the three “Catholic 
ghosts” into his home.  He also, the viejo says, “‘knows at last who he is,’” part of which 
involves the discovery that he, too, is a mixedblood (262).  Diana watches fish swim in a 
pool of water and thinks ahead to when she will leave for Berkeley in a month (260-61).  
Peace and order have been restored, even in the absence of standards of justice being met. 
At the end of Bone Game, the solving is multiple: first the serial killer of local 
females, Paul Kantner, is killed when he tries to abduct Abby and Alex; later Cole’s 
teaching assistant Robert, who thinks he is preventing a cataclysmic earthquake by 
making thirteen human sacrifices, is shot in self-defense by Abby.  But Cole and his 
daughter Abby still have to face the painted gambler, who is no longer just a dream but 
rather a physical presence who confronts Abby in the woods at the end of the novel. Yet 
even after Cole acknowledges Venancio Asisara, the gambler, by saying his name and 
listening to him tell that the priests were cruel, and after the gambler has walked into the 
trees and transformed into a bear, Asisara’s consciousness seems to be responsible for the 
closing line of the novel: “It is a world so like his own, of black streams and changeless 
skies.  His shadow falls across the town and bay, undulating with the slow waves.  Eran 
muy crueles” (243).  There is no complete solution, no complete closure.  Fritsch and 
Gymnich argue that Cole’s recognition that saying the gambler’s name “‘was what he 
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wanted all the time’” (Bone Game 243) explains “both Cole’s recurring dreams and the 
previous apparitions of the gambler as an appeal to recover the memory of events and 
persons that have been forgotten . . . an expression of an imperative to remember a people 
who had been wiped out” (Fritsch and Gymnich 211).  That imperative remains even 
after Cole has said the gambler’s name. 
The cause of the crimes is not entirely apprehended—not entirely understood or 
entirely caught and stopped—though that double apprehension, missing here, is the 
resolution typical to detective fiction.  Paul and Robert die, and the immediate problem is 
fixed, but as in The Sharpest Sight, it is not entirely certain where the ultimate blame for 
the violence should be directed.  Paul has been in the military in Special Forces, has been 
trained in violence, and Robert hears voices whose origin is in the colonial evils left over 
in the land and talks about his killings in terms of responsibility and what he must do to 
save the world.  There is a solution of sorts, but very much a multiple one.  Fritsch and 
Gymnich point out that the fact that there end up being two killers suggests that “violence 
cannot simply be explained as the result of the doings of an individual” (213).  Likewise, 
in Bone Game “evil can be contained only by communal effort rather than by the 
activities of a single detective figure” (Fritsch and Gymnich 213).  Bone Game also sets 
aside the idea of justice, replacing it with Cole’s empathy for Venancio.  There is no clear 
sense of whether Venancio’s revenge is good or bad, or of to what extent Robert and Paul 
have been culpable and to what extent influenced by forces in the world and philosophies 
in the university.  The mystery is still a mystery at the end. 
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Indigenous Epistemologies and the Undisciplined Academic 
Bone Game ultimately de-emphasizes solving in favor of emphasizing a broader 
notion of learning.  Onatima, Uncle Luther’s friend and lover, represents a nuanced 
conception of learning and knowledge.  She has learned largely from college and from 
books and yet has remained critical of what books tell her.  “‘We read their books and 
find out we’re supposed to die,’” Onatima tells Cole, explaining that his malaise at the 
beginning of the story is a kind of survivor’s guilt (165).  Cole, trying to prepare for a 
lecture, sees “an image of Onatima in Uncle Luther’s cabin as she had been when he met 
her, pulling a paperback from the pocket of her apron . . . ‘That’s how they make the 
world,’ she had said that day, and for twenty years he’d tried to make his own world with 
words, like they did, always remembering Onatima” (20).  She reads books (and gives 
them to Luther and others) with an eye to understanding where other people are coming 
from, but also with an eye to realizing where they are wrong.  In Huckleberry Finn, for 
instance, she locates a non-Indigenous American romance with death: “‘Remember how 
that boy kept making up stories and they were always about death?  They have a romance 
going with death, they love it, and they want Indians to die for them’” (Sharpest Sight 
216). 
Onatima also learned in childhood from her Choctaw grandmother, who died 
before she was born but would often visit her at night to sit on the edge of her bed, eat 
pecans out of a paper sack, and “‘brush the hair from my face and tell me stories about 
the way it had been’” (140).  “‘Many years later I told Luther,’” she says, “‘and he said 
I’d learned too many stories in school and from books to learn properly from a ghost with 
a mouth full of nuts.  Luther Cole never did have enough respect for either school or 
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ghosts’” (140). Onatima has a clear fidelity to both. When Onatima arrives in Santa Cruz, 
she refocuses Cole and Abby by bringing this kind of grandmotherly wisdom and stories 
from her childhood (now that she is an old woman whom Abby calls “grandmother”) and 
also stressing the importance of Cole’s work as a writer and teacher, asking to see him 
“function as an elder” in the classroom and wondering when he is going to start writing 
fiction again (144).   
Cole and Alex’s style of doing history, like the detection in the novel, is not 
closure-oriented.  They are academics, opening up questions that were once thought to be 
closed, being skeptical of what can be known.  If there is a postmodern pretension to 
disliking the coherent tie-up narrative, the kind of thing the detective story finishes up 
with, where we know who did it and justice is about to be done, it is the same value 
system that operates in historiography to call any search for truth (including revisionist or 
alternative truths) into question, thus, as many people have complained, undermining the 
basis for political action.  Craig Womack has argued passionately that it is “way too 
premature for Native scholars to deconstruct history when we haven’t constructed it yet” 
(3).  Bone Game’s refusal of the detective fiction conclusion runs alongside its fun with 
academic indeterminacy.  The novel plays with the possibilities of the Native American 
academic speaking from a frontier location that makes it, as Owens says in an essay on 
postcolonial theory and criticism, “difficult . . . to assume any kind of essential stance” (I 
Hear 208). 
In his 2001 essay “As If an Indian Were Really an Indian: Native American 
Voices and Postcolonial Theory,” Owens restated and expanded his earlier, rather 
devastating critique of several major critics who deal with ethnic difference in American 
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writing and of many of the major postcolonial theorists.  These critics and theorists, 
Owens argues in both this essay and his 1998 book Mixedblood Messages, fail to 
acknowledge both the literature and the critical work of the descendants of the 
Indigenous populations of the Americas.  Although the U.S. never became postcolonial, 
since the colonizers stayed and changed their names to Americans, Owens argues, the 
perspectives of Native American writers are crucial in global conversations about 
speaking from the margins and taking Indigenous ways of knowing into account, and the 
theorists who make a profession “of challenging the orthodoxy and monologic authority 
of the imperial powers” cannot “be excused for the same ignorance” and deafness as the 
rest of the world (I Hear 212).  They are, he concludes, “[q]uite ironically . . . products of 
the imperial crucible of the Western university, speaking the languages of Cambridge, 
Oxford, Harvard, Yale, Princeton, the language of the imperial center” (I Hear 213). 
“As If an Indian Were Really an Indian” is not only a critique, however; Owens 
takes up certain ideas of critics such as Gayatri Spivak and Edward Said and develops 
them with respect to his own work.  One of these is Said’s notion of “strategic location,” 
the clearly stated position of the author with respect to the material he writes about.  
Owens defines his own strategic location as that of the “frontier zone,” the unstable and 
hybridized space he identified in Mixedblood Messages that comes not from the heart of a 
traditional culture but from a zone of displacement; here he makes a comparison to what 
postcolonial theorists have called “‘diasporic’ writing,”  pointing out that “urban centers 
and academic institutions have come to constitute a kind of diaspora for Native 
Americans who through many generations of displacement and orchestrated ethnocide 
are often far from their traditional homelands and cultural communities” (I Hear 208).  
 165 
 
The value of this frontier or diasporic location, he says, is that it is “an inherently 
unstable position, and one from which it is difficult and undoubtedly erroneous to assume 
any kind of essential stance or strategy” (Owens, I Hear 208).   
Margaret Dwyer has argued, in an essay on The Sharpest Sight, that Owens’s 
autobiographical inclusions are “one tool for maintaining his cultural identity, through 
which he presents the experiences of ‘we’ (his family) and not just ‘I’ (the educated 
author)” (45).   In other words, including autobiographical details is a strategy for being 
Indian enough without essentializing.  Cole McCurtain is, like Owens, of Choctaw, 
Cherokee, Cajun, and Irish descent, has spent some time in Mississippi and some in 
California growing up, and has had a brother go to Vietnam and come back 
psychologically devastated.  Those “I” experiences, the experiences of the highly 
educated author, were also very much a part of Owens’s background, however, and so it 
is significant that in Bone Game, Cole resurfaces twenty years later as a literature 
professor who also writes fiction.  
Much of Owens’s critical work deals with the possibilities of criticism in the 
frontier zone.  Even when his essays do not deal directly with his own position as a writer 
and literary critic of mixed Choctaw-Cherokee-Irish descent who wrote on the work of 
both Native American and European American writers, questions about the 
responsibilities, risks, and possibilities of such a writer and critic seemed to be there 
implicitly.  Although “As If an Indian Were Really an Indian” is a criticism primarily of 
what Owens refers to as the “real ‘Indians’—with such names as Chakrabarty, 
Chakravorty, Gandhi, Bhabha, Mohanty, and so on” and goes on to celebrate the 
possibilities of the frontier space (read: city and university) inhabited by so many Native 
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American writers, its underlying worry is that the Native academic, too, risks being 
conditioned by university training until even in the process of trying to voice his 
perspective, he speaks only the language of the university (I Hear 207).  Owens cautions 
that “what we are calling Native American literature is represented largely, if not 
exclusively, by . . . those migrant or diasporic Natives who live lives of relatively 
privileged mobility” and have obtained an “impressively high rate of education” (I Hear 
224).  At the end of the essay, he implies that precisely the set of conditions—in 
particular the reliance on academic language—that has made critics such as Said 
incapable of taking Native American writing and criticism seriously is a risk for Native 
academics.  In “giving voice to the silent,” Owens worries, “we unavoidably give voice 
to the forces that conspire to effect that silence” (I Hear 226).  It is an old problem but 
one that for Owens, clearly, remains unresolved.   
In a chapter on literary theory in Mixedblood Messages, Owens responds to calls 
for autonomous Native intellectual traditions, for instance by Robert Warrior, who calls 
for Native “intellectual sovereignty,” by arguing that Native intellectuals “do not have the 
luxury of simply opting out” of the theoretical discourse that “originates from the very 
center of colonial authority,” despite all the reasons to distrust it, because they “already 
function within the dominant discourse” (Warrior xxiii; Owens 52).  To think that one 
can opt out, Owens says, “is naïve at best, for the choice was made for all of us 
generations ago” (52).  If it is the language of the university that has led postcolonial 
theorists astray, even as they must communicate in it in order to be heard, then the Native 
academic, or the “mixedblood” whose possibilities Owens celebrates, can certainly not be 
at home in the university and its language. Owens draws on Gerald Vizenor’s work to 
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discuss this concern: “Vizenor, the most aggressively intellectual of Native American 
writers, has illuminated Native Americans’ problematic but unavoidable participation in 
this dialogically agitated discourse, writing that ‘The English language has been the 
linear tongue of colonial discoveries, racial cruelties, invented names . . . at the same 
time, this mother tongue of paracolonialism has been a language of invincible 
imagination and liberation for many tribal people in the postindian world’” (Mixedblood 
Messages 52).  Owens thus calls for the “liberation” of English itself but warns that “a 
very real danger faced by the Native American, or any marginalized writer who would 
assume the role of scholar-critic-theorist, is that of consciously or unconsciously using 
Eurocentric theory merely as a way of legitimizing his or her voice” (53).  Such a pose 
can lead, Owens argues, to “a split that will not heal” (53). 
Drawing on the work of Arnold Krupat, Owens warns readers of Mixedblood 
Messages that there is a tendency in postmodern thought to divide modes of thought into 
two sharply-defined models, Western-scientific-rational-historical, and non-Western-
religious-vaguely “Indian” (49).  Bone Game brings knowledge from dreams and 
religious occurrences together with not just the scientific/academic, but also the 
classically European-American, hyper-rational genre of detective fiction.  It jumps into 
the middle of the divide Owens and Krupat are so concerned about.  It shows a 
community of investigators making sense of a mystery without excluding forms of 
knowledge that would be excluded in traditional detective fiction, and it gives us two 
academics making use of academic forms of evidence without letting those forms 
completely determine the way they think about their fields of inquiry.   
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A direct exclusion of supernatural forms of evidence exists in historiography, as 
in detective fiction.  Hayden White argues in The Content of the Form that the exclusion 
of “the kinds of events traditionally conceived to be the stuff of religious belief and ritual 
(miracles, magical events, godly events)” from representation in a historical narrative is a 
matter of style that is made to appear “to be solely a function of the rigorous application 
of ‘rules of evidence’ to the examination of the ‘historical record’” (66).  This stylistic 
exclusion effects “a disciplining of the imagination” and sets “limits on what constitutes a 
specifically historical event” (66). 
Owens’s use of ghosts thus points toward an actual problem in the historical 
sciences.   Colleen Boyd and Coll Thrush, in the introduction to Phantom Past, 
Indigenous Presence: Native Ghosts in North American Culture and History (2011), raise 
the question, “What do we as academics do with ghosts[?]” (xxx).  (Boyd is an 
anthropologist, Thrush a historian, both non-Native though Boyd is married to a member 
of the Lower Elwha Klallam, a Coast Salish tribe [xxvii].)  “What does a contract 
anthropologist do, for example,” they add, “when faced with an elder’s ‘powerful 
feelings’ about the presence of ancestors in a place not documented through archival 
records or oral tradition?” (xxix).  And should the anthropologist decide to take the elder 
seriously, how can she account for her decision when she seeks further funding?  Most 
scholars “writing on ghosts and the supernatural generally dismiss specters as little more 
than anti-colonial metaphors and psychological manifestations of the repressed,” Boyd 
and Thrush say, but argue, “This demurral regarding the dead, when considered in the 
context of Indian ghosts and hauntings, is squarely at odds with the increasingly 
compelling consensus regarding the need for academic scholarship to take Indigenous 
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epistemologies and ways of knowing and being seriously” (xxxi-xxxii).  According to 
Boyd and Thrush, ghosts are always political, bringing the demands of the past to the 
present, whether we believe they are real or metaphorical.  
 At the beginning of Bone Game, Cole, whose thoughts are largely occupied by the 
dreams of the gambler that he has been having and who is going through what Onatima 
later calls “Indian male menopause,” is in a period of crisis regarding his vocation as a 
teacher (145).  He feels ill-equipped for his role and like an imposter as he tries to explain 
texts and ideas to his students, with whom he fails to connect.  Someday, he thinks, “the 
university would find him out, would recognize him as an imposter and have him 
removed.  The ones who really belonged there, by birthright and Yale, would know 
they’d been correct all along.  Indians, even mixedbloods or especially mixedbloods, did 
not belong” (22).  Trying to discuss a poem with a student in his office, he says “‘Yes, 
that’s a powerful sonnet,’” and “heard his own words as though on stage, the absurdity of 
them striking him with such force that he almost laughed.  He imagined how his own 
father or Uncle Luther would hear such words” (22).  As The Sharpest Sight presents his 
childhood and young adult life, it is quite different from the academic world he is trying 
to live in now as a middle-aged man.  Cole considers himself “a mixedblood clown 
playing the role of college professor” (193).  Playing into what Onatima later calls “the 
worst Indian cliché of all,” he drinks too much and sometimes lectures drunk (145).  His 
students admire him but are often a little scared of him.   
  The positive side to Cole’s feeling that he is an outsider is that he is able to look at 
the university critically.  Despite the fact that he has clearly been at universities as a 
professor or student for years, his position on the edge means that he continues to see the 
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university as a strange place with strange customs.  This perception is emphasized by 
some of the other outsiders to the university in the novel, for instance Alex’s friend Emil 
Redbull, who comes to construct a sweat lodge for Cole at Alex’s request.  Emil asks 
Cole (Dr. McCurtain), “‘What kind of doctoring do you do?’”, and Alex explains, 
“‘Cole’s a teacher, like me’” (161).  Cole himself knows how the university and 
academia work, but he also knows it well enough to parody it.  Looking over his cluttered 
desk, he thinks: 
Someday . . . a Santa Cruz anthropologist could chart the collapse of his 
personal microculture by conducting a stratigraphic dig of his desk.  As you 
can see, coincidental with this October level is a rather obvious decline in the 
mixedblood’s socially acceptable behavioral characteristics.  Notice the 
Mexican beer stains on the unopened envelopes, indicative of low survival 
quotient, intense liminality, possible homophobia.” (17, emphasis original)   
 
LaLonde explains this passage by saying, “The anthropologist’s language obfuscates 
rather than illuminates, and its incorporation here stands as a tacit critique by Owens of 
anthropology, or at least ‘bad’ anthropology, and the social sciences in general” (111).  
When Cole is called in, because he is part Native American, to help when Alex (whom he 
does not yet know) is found field-dressing the deer on the front lawn of faculty housing, 
Cole is able to anticipate the nature of the administration’s concerns.  The administrators 
are afraid of Alex, the full-blood Navajo whom they see as definitely other, as evidenced 
by their repeated attempts to use Cole as an intermediary and their willingness to believe 
that what Alex is doing is traditional.  On the other hand, they do not want to upset what 
Cole facetiously calls “the cultural traditions of an indigenous person of color, a real 
Indian” (27).  Venuto points out that “Cole is brought in as a kind of mediator, to 
translate for the distraught Vice Chancellor Spanner who cannot seem to imagine the 
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possibility of direct communication with an Indian, or that a Professor of Anthropology at 
UCSC just might speak English” (31). 
Cole, understanding how the university works but having some insight into Alex’s 
trickster persona once he has exchanged a few words with him, is able to work out a 
compromise that keeps Alex from being fined or even fired.  (Alex of course also has a 
pretty thorough understanding of how the university works, but in his desire to open eyes 
by joking, as he continues to play up the role of Indian once he has been sighted with the 
deer, he has perhaps gotten himself in a bit too deep in this particular situation.  Cole 
calls him back to reality by asking if he has tenure yet; Alex sighs and puts his knife 
down [28].)  While Cole has the requisite knowledge to smooth out the situation, 
however, he refuses to interpret in the ways he is asked and expected to.  Given subtle 
hints about the delicate nature of what is repeatedly called a “situation”—for instance the 
voice of the woman who calls from the Vice Chancellor’s office “sounded delicate, and 
he had an image of an animal stepping through shards of glass”—he insists on seeing the 
fact that the administration would come to him, the only other Native American faculty 
member, as a joke at their expense (23).  He first calls the situation “some kind of Indian 
emergency” (23) and then, when asked by the vice chancellor to talk to Alex, responds, 
“‘Skin to Skin?’” (24).  He takes pleasure in making the administration uncomfortable. 
In more ways than one, Cole and Alex are what I have described at the beginning 
of this chapter as undisciplined academics.  Cole has never attended a faculty meeting, 
and Alex loves to create scenes. They get distracted from their research interests by the 
question of who the painted gambler is.  But in a more important sense than what appears 
to be a lack of discipline in their professional lives, they are undisciplined academics 
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because they cultivate a friendship and academic partnership across disciplinary lines, 
one which enables them to think about the historical problem in non-disciplinary ways.  
They do research about the Santa Cruz mission but also take part in a sweat and a Native 
American Church service, during which Cole learns just as much in a vision as he has 
from his reading.  Their modes of investigation into the actual problems of their lives 
demonstrate a blend of academic and non-academic strategies.  Cole and Alex, in many 
ways, inhabit the space that Owens calls the frontier.  They allow authority figures from 
each other’s lives (Emil Redbull, Uncle Emmett, Uncle Luther, and Onatima) to become 
sources of not only general wisdom about life, career, and family, but also sources of 
specific knowledge about the gambler, for instance, as dreamed about by Luther and 
Onatima.  Venuto calls the group of people who help Cole a “dynamic, syncretic 
community, crossing boundaries usually delineated by tribe, geography, and blood” (32).  
In this description she includes a character named Robert Jim who “remains on the 
Navajo Reservation and never actually sets foot near Cole’s house” because “he is 
keeping track of the story, and he gives Luther and Hoey pollen to add to Cole’s 
medicine pouch” (Venuto 32). 
Alex  and Cole make a point to get off campus, meeting primarily at Cole’s rental 
house in the woods, and to interact whenever they are not working with family members, 
non-university friends, even the dog Alex brings home, keeping them grounded and free 
from the kind of delusions that Robert encounters in his solitary, bookish life, lived in 
“the cell of a scholarly monk”—delusions that Cole is also tempted by in the beginning 
of the novel before he meets Alex and before Abby comes to live with him (213).  The 
two professors make jokes about their fields and distance themselves from what is 
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normally taught and thought—and yet they take their academic work and the historical 
questions seriously in a way that can coexist with their jokes about it and their critical 
view of it.  Cole approaches the Modernists, for instance, like a sort of anthropologist, 
comparing them to “some of the old men and women he’d met on reservations,” who 
“knew they had lost something precious and indispensable” and “lived in a world bereft 
and haunted” (39).  He zooms out broadly from his period of specialization during a 
lecture, comparing the Modernists’ “violent and bloody and holy and wonderful 
insistence that death is not an end but a beginning” and that “we accept responsibility for 
our place on earth” to that of the Egyptians, the Jews, the Christians, the Pueblo, and the 
dancers of the Ghost Dance (40, emphasis original).   
Perhaps the most prominent strategy of Bone Game’s two professors is to call 
attention to their locatedness before they speak, the most amusing and literal version of 
which is Alex the cross dresser adjusting his breasts just before almost all of his informed 
and otherwise thoroughly professional pronouncements on anthropological and historical 
topics.  Laughter is important here.   In what is perhaps one of Owens’s own examples of 
getting rid of the distance between commitments to various intellectual traditions, Owens 
writes in Mixedblood Messages, drawing on both Mikhail Bakhtin and Gerald Vizenor, 
that “Gerald Vizenor, writing from a professorship within the University of California, is 
still exploring . . . the zone of the Native American trickster, s/he who brings the world 
close and directs this ‘comical operation of dismemberment’ [the quotations are from 
Bakhtin], laying bare the hypocrisies, false fears, and pieties and clearing the ground ‘for 
an absolutely free investigation’ of worldly fact” (39).  It is laughter, according to 
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Bakhtin, that clears the way for investigation in this manner.  Bone Game fleshes out 
these comments from Mixedblood Messages.   
Alex creates an NSF proposal “‘for a team of Indian anthropologists to do a dig in 
the cemetery at the Old North Church in Boston,’” citing as his “‘basic argument’” that 
“‘it’s imperative we Indians learn more about Puritan culture.  Puritans had a significant 
impact on us’” (180).  He proposes documenting “‘burial customs, diet, nutrition, and 
social status’” and doing “‘cranial measurements to figure out how intelligent the 
Puritans were, compared to us’” (180).  Cole comments that “‘Harvard should have stuck 
with Oliver LaFarge types.  They made a big mistake taking an actual Navajo’” (180).  
Alex is a bit dangerous because he draws attention not just to past academic attitudes 
toward Native property and bodies, but also toward the tendency of the fictional UC 
Santa Cruz administration in the novel to try to freeze him in time: “‘They’re not going to 
give me tenure,’” Alex worries to Cole.  “‘They don’t want an Indian in their department 
unless he’s in a museum, like Ishi.  It makes them uncomfortable to have a live Indian 
around when they want to go dig up Chumash bones’” (51).  Alex worries that he is on 
the faculty to be a representative of a group and cannot really be part of the university.  
Despite his levity in most situations, he is not entirely secure in his method of dealing 
with the pressures of the university before he becomes a part of Cole’s family circle.  It is 
clear that despite his outgoing personality, he spends most of his time alone in his 
apartment before he meets Cole. He tells Abby, “without a trace of laughter” in his face, 
“‘I’m so lonesome I could cry’” (151). 
 Alex and Cole’s participation in the work of the university is upheld at the end of 
the novel, with the stipulation that it must be balanced out by interaction with a wider 
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community and, for Cole, fiction writing.  At the end of the novel, both Alex and Cole 
leave the university, but only temporarily.  Alex goes home for a nine-day ceremony as 
he heals from being shot in a confrontation with the second murderer.  Cole and Abby 
return to New Mexico to their old home, and both plan to both return to the University of 
New Mexico in the fall rather than to Santa Cruz, he as a professor (since he has just 
taken a leave of absence), she as a student.  There is a suggestion that Alex, who has 
fallen in love with Abby, will come to live with them.  While land and knowledge have 
been separated while the two are in California, which is not the case in Indigenous ways 
of knowing, Cole’s home in New Mexico is interestingly not any sort of traditional 
homeland; rather, it is the place he has chosen to make his home as a mixedblood, a place 
where he can be with his family while he works in the frontier zone of the university 
there. 
Cole plans to return to writing fiction as well.  Luther and Onatima have both 
chided him for not writing recently.  “They got too many stories about us,” Luther says.  
“We need to write books about them now. Get even” (226).  The novel closes with the 
idea that while the university is a productive position from which to write and speak, its 
insularity is corrupting, potentially dangerous.  It is a struggle to remain attentive to both 
academic and spiritual forms of evidence.  Only in the context of a broader community 
that can keep their ways of thinking and speaking healthy and understandable to people 
outside the university can Cole and Alex maintain the effectiveness of their location in 
the frontier zone of the university.  This broader community includes the community 
reached by means of Cole’s fiction writing.  Instead of denying the value of the university 
or forcing it to acknowledge Indigenous ways of knowing, Bone Game sets out a task for 
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Cole and Alex of negotiating between academic and Indigenous notions of evidence, 
moving beyond professional blindnesses, unlocking narrow conceptions of what is 
reasonable and shaking up some of the systems of order that have been imposed on the 
world, in order to try to take seriously all the ways that things can be known.
  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
VOUCHING FOR EVIDENCE: THE NEW LIFE OF OLD WRITING IN LILLIAN 
HELLMAN’S MEMOIRS 
 
In the wake of Mary McCarthy’s famous attack on Lillian Hellman, made on the 
Dick Cavett Show in 1980 (that every word she wrote was a lie, including “and” and 
“the”), and of Hellman’s response—indignation and a libel suit—other Hellman 
detractors proceeded to accuse her of inaccurate research, faulty memory, and outright 
lying in her memoirs. Martha Gellhorn, calling Hellman an “apocryphiar,” suggested for 
instance that rather than having experienced an air raid in Spain in 1937, as she describes 
in her first memoir, An Unfinished Woman, Hellman most likely had heard accounts of 
the raid a week before she arrived in Valencia, and “her imagination then took over, 
placing her a bit off key at the center of the apocryphal action” (294). American 
psychoanalyst Muriel Gardiner, who had worked in the anti-fascist underground in 
Vienna during the 1930s, as had the title character of Hellman’s portrait “Julia,” 
published her autobiography in 1983 and said in the introduction that her friends had 
insisted since the publication of the portrait in Pentimento in 1973 that she must be Julia 
(xv). Gardiner explained that she had consulted the director of the Documentation 
Archives of the Austrian Resistance, and neither he nor the former resistance workers he 
was in contact with had heard of another American woman deeply involved in the 
resistance (xv-xvi).58 In 1984 Samuel McCracken built on Gardiner’s comments and 
                                                           
58
 According to William Wright, Gardiner had written Hellman a polite private letter when she first read 
Pentimento a decade earlier and had asked “if Julia might be a composite of several of her friends in 
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catalogued the contradictions within the “Julia” portrait itself, using train and boat 
schedules from the late 1930s to uncover discrepancies in geography and timelines.   
Hellman was not merely caught up in accusations about lies.  She herself focused 
insistently on truth and lying—in her plays, in her memoirs, in her life. She rose to fame 
in 1934 with the premiere of The Children’s Hour, a play about a lie and a libel suit. She 
died fifty years later in the thick of a legal battle in which she had accused another 
woman of defaming her by calling her a liar. In her “memoir books” (Hellman used that 
term in 1980 to describe her autobiographical and semi-autobiographical writing), she 
displayed a fascination not only with truth and lying, but also with a cluster of related 
ideas that destabilize those initial two terms: memory, evidence, and access to the past. 
The memoirs struggle with but also seem to revel in discordances between Hellman’s 
remembered versions of her life and friendships, on the one hand, and the documentary 
evidence that remains from those events and relationships, on the other. She draws 
frequently on old letters and her own previous writing as sources and yet undermines 
their authority as sources by commenting, for instance, that the notes in her diaries “make 
no pattern” when she reads them now (Hellman, Pentimento 16). Hellman’s memoirs are 
a particularly strong example of the tension in life writing between the authority of 
memory and the authority of evidence—of traces left on paper—documents, diaries, old 
scribbled notes. 
Hellman’s inclusion of both memory-driven retrospective narrative and 
documentary evidence (such as old diaries and letters) in her memoir books enables her 
readers to reconsider the relationship between these two forms, which serve as the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
addition to people she had merely heard about,” but Hellman never replied and Gardiner never pursued the 
matter (Wright 404). 
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primary means of access to the past not only in memoir-writing but also in historical 
research and even in law. My study of Hellman’s use of documents relies largely on her 
drafts of the memoirs, which show the extent to which she revised the material that she 
claims comes from diaries, and how, exactly, she put that older material in conversation 
with her memory of the events from a perspective decades later.  I was also able to 
examine some of the documents she draws from, most notably a diary from her 1944-45 
trip to Russia that figures prominently in An Unfinished Woman.59   
Like any memoirist who references sources, Hellman couches them in her own 
testimony.  She situates them and vouches for them. Wherever truth claims are made—
including history-writing, biography, and literary non-fiction—material evidence and 
testimony form a sometimes uncomfortable partnership in order to substantiate the claims 
made in the narrative. Each form of support for a claim sometimes calls the other form 
into question.  Hellman’s memoirs mirror biography’s convention of documenting events 
by way of sources, but in her writing that strategy becomes instead another way of 
exploring present consciousness: what does the document mean now, or how is a missing 
document remembered now?  Paul John Eakin has argued that biography “offers a 
misleading analogue” for the way autobiography approaches the past.  In autobiography, 
he says, “the past exists only as a function of the autobiographer’s present consciousness” 
(“Reference and the Representative” 37). 
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 Hellman’s manuscripts and the selection of personal papers that she did not destroy are located in the 
Hellman Collection at the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas. The collection was unavailable 
to early Hellman scholars because for a time she restricted its use to allow access only to William 
Abrahams, her official biographer (Adams 142-43, Kessler-Harris 6). (Abrahams died without having 
produced the biography.) Recent Hellman biographers Deborah Martinson and Alice Kessler-Harris were 
able to use her papers and manuscripts but because of the nature of their projects used the documents and 
the memoirs as complementary forms of information about Hellman’s life rather than focusing on the 
correspondences and divergences between them.  
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In many moments of her memoirs, Hellman the narrator approaches the traces left 
on paper of the life of the figure she is developing—Lillian the child, Lillian the 
playwright, Lillian the world traveler, Lillian the non-political woman who gets swept up 
in political affairs—as a historian or a detective might.  Lillian the memoirist amasses 
evidence for the life of her persona, considering the implications of each document, the 
ways it might correct her memory, the means by which all the pieces might fit with what 
she remembers. This chapter will investigate Hellman’s choice to approach the written 
remainders of her own life as would a historian or a detective, amassing evidence for 
events she lived through and bringing that evidence into contact with the narrative sweep 
of her memory, allowing it to supplement, challenge, and be challenged by what she 
recalls.  But to say that Hellman the memoirist resembles a detective or a historian in her 
methodology is not to say she is an aloof, impartial investigator.  There are instead a 
number of competing fidelities in Hellman’s work: fidelity to friends’ recollections and 
yet also to her own, fidelity to artistic expression and the forms that had been available to 
her as a dramatist and yet to generic demands for factuality and verifiability in memoir of 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, but above all fidelity to memory and yet also to her own 
past writing. 
 
Evidence in Autobiography 
Hellman’s first memoir, An Unfinished Woman, appeared in 1969.  It won the 
National Book Award, was read by large audiences, and was received by many as an 
authoritative account of the respective situations in Spain in 1937 and Russia in 1945.  A 
second book followed in 1973.  Called Pentimento, it was subtitled “a book of portraits”; 
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the first had been called simply “a memoir by Lillian Hellman.”  Pentimento focuses not 
on Hellman herself, though she is one of the characters in the book’s seven sections, but 
on various seemingly minor players in her life.  In addition to painting a portrait of each 
of these lives surrounding Hellman’s, it explores the memoirist’s feelings regarding the 
strengths of and gaps in her memory.  “The paint has aged now,” she says in the opening 
section of the book, “and I wanted to see what was there for me once, what is there for 
me now” (3).  Scoundrel Time, published in 1976, deals with Hellman’s hearing before 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the years of hardship that followed 
for her.  It too, however, is more concerned with the nature of memory than with what 
Hellman calls “historical conclusions” (Scoundrel Time 41).  Hellman calls it her “own 
history of the time,” saying she will stick to what she knows, to what happened to her 
(41). Like An Unfinished Woman, and to a lesser degree Pentimento, Scoundrel Time 
appeals to both the memoirist’s recollections and documentation such as diaries and 
letters to authorize the scenes it paints and the stories it tells. A fourth volume, Maybe, 
published in 1980, is subtitled “a story,” and though the narrator seems to be Hellman 
(she refers, for instance, to the three memoirs she has previously written), Maybe’s 
account of Hellman’s life is much looser, much less rooted in world events and other 
historical detail.  The encounter with documentary evidence is replaced in this final book 
by a portrait of the memoirist remembering and turning only to another layer of memories 
to explain the first layer.  Maybe reads almost like a detective story in which the only 
evidence is remembered scenes and clues dislodged from their contexts, and it concludes 
with the memoirist’s even deeper frustration with the endeavor of making sense of the 
past than had the previous three books.   
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In his chapter on Hellman in Telling Lies in Modern American Autobiography, the 
most thorough investigation that exists of Hellman’s engagement with the ideas of truth 
and lying in her memoirs, Timothy Dow Adams obliquely poses the question of whether 
the diary sections that begin in chapter 8 of An Unfinished Woman are unedited or only 
apparently so, and by extension whether the diary sections in her memoirs are actually 
excerpted in the sense that a reader would usually understand the term. Adams’ study of 
Hellman’s memoirs took place during a period when her personal papers were closed to 
the public (Adams 142-43).  A survey of Hellman’s drafts of these chapters reveals that 
they were in fact heavily revised. A diary from a trip to Russia in 1944 and 1945, the 
basis of chapters ten and eleven of An Unfinished Woman, is present among Hellman’s 
papers, allowing a direct comparison with the version published in An Unfinished Woman 
and offering a new perspective on the way Hellman made use of documentary evidence 
in the memoir: she has filled out the diary, changed the order of scenes, and given it a 
rhetorical force in An Unfinished Woman that was lacking in the diary itself.  Not having 
had access to Hellman’s drafts, Adams chooses to assume that her diaries are unedited,60 
as she indeed presents them when she uses brackets and footnotes to indicate additions 
made during the composition of An Unfinished Woman (Hellman, Unfinished Woman 87, 
116, 123).  My access to these materials offered the opportunity for a much greater 
understanding of how Hellman used her earlier writing in her memoirs. 
Critics have argued that in autobiographical writing, memory trumps or simply 
replaces the role that textual sources play in biographies written by others.  Whereas 
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 “These words, from a diary entry written thirty-two years before publication of An Unfinished Woman, 
are included both to show her candor and to amplify the author’s general presentation of herself,” Adams 
says about one diary section in An Unfinished Woman (136). 
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biography usually relies upon letters, telegrams, interview transcripts, texts authored by 
the person in question, and public records, the rhetorical power of autobiography and 
memoir is located not in its use of documentary evidence but in the authority of the I, of 
the voice that states: I have been there, I remember, and I know.  While biographical, 
historical, and legal practice do afford some credence to testimony, the particular 
rhetorical demands of those fields put a premium on documentary and physical evidence 
as measures against which the claims and memories of witnesses are tested.  In the 
traditional understanding of autobiography, in contrast, memory is usually considered the 
source of authority; James Olney has suggested that in that conception, the “voice of 
memory” is understood to “be the guarantor of identity and continuity of being across 
time, the only liaison—but an unbroken and fully capable liaison all the same—between 
past experience and present consciousness” (861).  A need to refer to documentation 
would, according to such an understanding of the genre, undermine the claims of memory 
to represent the self fully. 
In his study of lying in autobiography and memoir, Adams suggests that “even 
when [the autobiographer is] aided by such written documents as diaries, letters, or 
newspaper accounts,” the use of documents in autobiography should not be confused 
with “mnemonic activity—checking a written document for literal accuracy” (169). 
Memory, in this understanding of the genre, is primary.  And yet veracity has 
traditionally been given the same weight.  In “Le pacte autobiographique” (1973), usually 
translated as “The Autobiographical Pact,” Philippe Lejeune distinguishes autobiography 
from fiction on the basis of the “identity of the proper name shared by author, narrator, 
and protagonist,” which depends not on “the extratextual state of authorial intention,” but 
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on “the sign of that intention present in the text [italics original],” in other words what is 
signaled on the title page of the book (Eakin, Foreword ix).61 And not only, in Lejeune’s 
formulation, must the author be identical to the narrator and protagonist, but 
autobiography, “as opposed to all forms of fiction,” must operate under a “referential 
pact,” an oath to “tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth . . . making 
allowances for lapses of memory, errors, involuntary distortions, etc.” (Lejeune 22). 
Because memory is primary, failures of memory or perception are acceptable departures 
from a strict fidelity to extratextual fact. 
Eakin is famous for his comment that in autobiographical writing “the materials 
of the past are shaped by memory to serve the needs of present consciousness” (Fictions 
56).  In a less-often quoted moment earlier in the same sentence, though, he talks about 
audience expectations, surmising that “[w]hen we settle into the theater of autobiography, 
what we are ready to believe—and what most autobiographers encourage us to expect—
is that the play we witness is a historical one, a largely faithful and unmediated 
reconstruction of events that took place long ago” (56).  It is the word “faithful” that I 
find most interesting here.  The word implies a responsibility on the part of the 
autobiographer to interpret and represent his or her past in a particular way—a fidelity to 
the past “as it was,” wherein the “as it was” is established and guaranteed by memory 
rather than historical method.  Eakin’s own argument, of course, common enough in the 
last 30 or 40 years of autobiographical criticism, is that faithfulness to the past as such is 
impossible.  In the realm of historical work, this impossibility has been attributed to the 
inability of sources to have any stable or transparent meaning, to signify in a present 
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 “What defines autobiography for the one who is reading,” Lejeune argues, “is above all a contract of 
identity that is sealed by the proper name” (On Autobiography 19).   
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context what they would have in a past context.  In the realm of autobiography, however, 
not only the idea of access to the past self of the autobiographer but the entire notion of 
an autonomous subject able to know itself or to exist outside of discourse has fallen out 
of critical favor, replaced by the idea that “‘the interiority or self that is said to be prior to 
the autobiographical expression’” is instead, as Sidonie Smith explains, “‘an effect of 
autobiographical storytelling’” (qtd. in Smith 125).   This belief of course resonates not 
only in autobiography studies but with major late twentieth-century currents of thought 
on the subject as an effect of language and power, spearheaded by Foucault in the 1970s.  
Smith and co-author Julia Watson, following Olney and William Spengemann, identify a 
shift in autobiography criticism, around the year 1970, from a preoccupation with the 
“bios,” the life, to an interest in the problematic nature of the “autos”: critics began to 
understand the text as an act of self-creation (123).  Olney, writing in 1993, noted a 
growing doubt about “memory’s capacity to establish a relationship to our past and hence 
a relationship to ourselves grown out of the past” (863).   
Yet the entire power and appeal of autobiography relies on a faith in memory to 
access and narrate an authentic past, whatever that means.  And most readers still clearly 
expect that autobiography and memoir should distinguish themselves from fiction, as the 
outraged response to the autobiographical fictionalizations of the last decade, most 
notably the fabrications of James Frey’s A Million Little Pieces (2003), show.  For those 
who still insist on verifiability and those who are more interested in memory and self-
creation alike, memory’s status in memoir has become only more important. It is the 
writers of autobiography, more than the readers, perhaps, who inhabit the second 
category alongside the critics.  Memoirist Mark Doty comments in a 2008 essay how 
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deeply allegiant his books are to memory, explaining that he instinctually resists 
corroboration. An act such as looking at a map to verify street names, he says, would 
undermine his interest “in how it felt to be that boy [the child Mark Doty], in the world as 
he understood it” (12). “[W]hat happened,” Doty says—meaning the past happenings that 
autobiographers try to narrate—“turns out to be nothing stable, but a scribbled-over field 
of revisions,” since over the course of a life, “we keep moving into different relationships 
with the past” (11-12). It is his fascination with this scribbled-over space called memory, 
more than with the historically verifiable facts of his early life, that animates Doty’s 
memoirs, and he is of course only one of many writers today who conceive of memory 
this way. Hellman’s memoirs were decades ahead of their time in their conviction that 
memory’s appeal is in the way it is shaped by the present.  
Her notorious disregard for the accuracy of dates, names, and other markers that 
signal a fidelity to the real, the true, or the historical demonstrated a strong impulse to 
loosen the relationship between author and protagonist and celebrate the way that 
memory and storytelling produce a self.62  But her conception of memory was perhaps 
even more nuanced than the understandings of these later theorists.  A comparison of 
Hellman’s published memoirs and her personal papers and drafts indicates a split fidelity 
to documentation and to memory, and the power of her work resides precisely in the 
tension of that split.  Her writing teems with references to and quotations from her 
previous writings. The very quantity of quoted material in her work seems to indicate a 
fidelity to her old writing, to the past as she saw it then. At the same time, however, her 
papers in the Hellman Collection include detailed lists of names, dates, and other facts 
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 The idea that identity is grounded in narrative would become common more than two decades later.  See 
Eakin, Living Autobiographically: How We Create Identity in Narrative (2008). 
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she wanted to track down prior to publishing, as well as numerous letters to paid 
researchers, old friends, and legal and business contacts seeking information. 
The notion of faithful representation of the past is essentially an analogy to 
translation or literary adaptation: it imagines a referent, an authentic and accessible 
original, and transmission to an audience that otherwise could not know it. To speak of 
faithfulness to the past as it was in a historical or autobiographical representation is to 
assume that the referent is available for comparison, that we can access and know the 
past, that we can check to see if our account of it is true. We speak of translations as 
faithful, likewise adaptations from page to screen, when we believe in an authenticity of 
the original that can be approached if the translation is executed well. Hellman enters this 
conversation about access, faithfulness, and the authentic original as an artist who has 
adapted and has been adapted.63 Her method is to bring a text or object into view, in her 
memoirs—usually a primary document, sometimes a glimpsed memory—and then 
proceed immediately to translate unfaithfully, to let the original almost disappear beneath 
its re-presentation as her readers look on.  Memory in story form provides the organizing 
logic for the meaning and placement of both her isolated, non-narrative, glimpsed 
memories and the old papers she finds in her files. Even as she studies the documents in 
front of her, what they disclose does not steer her conclusions. Even as she reads them 
into evidence, she undermines their reliability. She presents documentary traces in order 
to demonstrate exactly how embedded they are in the rhetorical structure of her current 
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 Hellman adapted The Children’s Hour for a film called These Three and later adapted most of her other 
plays for the screen. She additionally reworked Emmanuel Robles’ play Montserrat for the American stage. 
She declined to write the screenplay for the 1976 film Julia (based on a portrait from her memoir 
Pentimento), entrusting the film to screenwriter Alvin Sargeant and director Fred Zinneman, though she 
attempted to influence their choices throughout the production of the film (Martinson 10).  
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writing: the artifact disappears beneath its interpretation, and the voice of memory claims 
the right, if not to erase, then to write over the top of what the diarist has previously 
written.  
Hellman positions herself in her memoirs as not only narrator but also investigator 
of her life.  She began the composition of two of her memoir books with a research 
phase, and she directly references that research in the books.  Her other two memoirs are 
metaphorically about investigation and interpretation.  But as is the case with any 
researcher, her method for seeking out evidence, the sources she seeks out, and her ways 
of reading what she finds—and judging whether it is evidence at all, and if so for what—
are conditioned by the stories and forms she is already accustomed to, already loyal to.  
Fidelities necessarily determine how one construes the traces one encounters: Is it 
evidence? What is it evidence of?  For Hellman those loyalties and familiar forms are 
multiple, and they overlap and undermine each other in ways that generate a complicated 
vantage point for what she can see and how she makes sense of what she sees.  Her 
fidelity to her own memories inflects the process by which she gathers and examines 
texts created during the period she is writing about.  Hellman dismisses certain 
observations and conclusions of her early writing on the basis of what has become more 
important in the years between then and now.  A past self, as that past self appears in the 
traces of her earlier years, and a present self, who has moved into a different relationship 
with the past, are in competition in her memoirs.  Eakin writes that the “allegiance to 
truth that is the central, defining characteristic of memoir is less an allegiance to a factual 
record that biographers and historians could check than an allegiance to remembered 
consciousness and its unending succession of identity states, an allegiance to the history 
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of one’s self” (“What We Are Reading” 125).  Hellman’s memoirs are often understood 
as the kind of project Eakin describes: the locations, order, and meanings she gives to 
scenes now, at the moment of writing, seem to be given priority in all four texts.  
Conversely, however, they also engage in a serious way with the temporal otherness of 
the documents.  As Linda Wagner-Martin has argued, Hellman uses autobiography to 
“challenge the notion that recollection is a means to truth” (“Lillian Hellman” 128).  
Hellman’s life writing works through the problem of evidence and traces that contradict 
the story of the self that the memoirist is trying to relate to a reader—it incorporates 
them, rather than turning authority over to solely the memoirist’s voice. 
In Hellman’s autobiographical writing, documents from the past add to the 
authority of the text less because of their own authoritativeness as sources and more 
because they underscore the framing and selecting power of the narrating voice, of the 
voice of memory. It is that voice that orders them and introduces them, that establishes 
their meaning within the memoir. Ultimately, references to material evidence serve only 
to make the memoirist’s current testimony more central to the persuasiveness of the 
narrative. Hellman uses documentation not to supplement incomplete remembrances but 
instead to establish the irrelevance of documentation to the rhetorical appeal of her 
account: she creates moments in the text in which documents contradict her memories 
but, bypassing any reference to truth or accuracy, come to occupy a position inferior to 
the way she remembers events now.  She turns memoir into the dominant way of 
knowing the past, subordinating traditional understandings of autobiography to it. She 
assigns herself the authority not just to testify, but to judge and interpret the past 
according to present concerns. 
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“Fooling with facts” 
   In “On Reading Again,” the introduction she wrote in 1978 for Three, a compiled 
volume of her first three memoirs, Hellman complicates the effort to determine whether 
autobiographical truth, as she understands it, is a function of present understanding (a 
fidelity to memory, or to the “history of one’s self” [Eakin, “What Are We Reading” 
125]) or a fidelity to representing events as they occur, what Eakin calls a “faithful and 
unmediated reconstruction of events” (Fictions 56).  Hellman concludes “On Reading 
Again” with a statement that can be read in two ways: “I tried in these books to tell the 
truth.  I did not fool with facts” (9).  Her statement has a double meaning, however, as 
“fool with” could mean either “take the time to consider” or “alter.”  Her research notes 
reveal that despite her claim, she fooled with facts extensively in both senses, especially 
in the sense of taking the time to track down news articles and other sources meant to 
help identify dates and places.  
Hellman told Peter Adam in a 1978 interview that when she began to 
conceptualize An Unfinished Woman, she started with documents.  She turned to the 
magazine work she had done throughout the years on the Spanish war, the Russian war, 
and the Washington march with Martin Luther King, Jr.  “I got out those pieces to see 
what I thought of them, and thought maybe I could make a collection of them,” she 
explained to Adam.  “And I began to use the pieces, and the diaries—to alter and usually 
to make longer.  And that is how the Unfinished Woman began, and that’s how it ended” 
(“Unfinished Woman” 229).  Entire chapters of that book are headed “from a diary,” the 
diaries being Hellman’s records of her trips to Spain in 1937 and Russia in 1945, and 
they are punctuated at times with insertions and reflections from the standpoint of the 
 191 
 
memoirist’s present.  Similarly, Scoundrel Time’s narrator seems to be a woman who has 
decided to revisit an emotionally-loaded period of her past life after an interval of many 
years, who although she promises to “stick to what I know,” has assembled and studied 
not only her own diaries and notes from those months, but also legal documents, 
memoranda, correspondence, and the transcript of her HCUA hearing (Scoundrel Time 
41).  She relives, reconsiders, and responds to those years of finger-pointing and 
blacklisting by examining the traces they left on paper.  Although Pentimento is a 
collection of reminiscences of more personal moments and does not seem to make the 
same effort as Hellman’s first and third memoirs do to document the events it recounts, 
even its first pages suggest that documentary evidence will be a preoccupation of the 
portraits.  In the opening pages of Pentimento’s first portrait, “Bethe,” Hellman writes 
about a briefcase full of letters and clippings documenting her father’s family history 
which had briefly been in her possession during her teen years.  Even though it has 
disappeared, Hellman uses those vanished documents as a framework to assemble 
memories that are available to her only in fleeting moments between sleeping and 
waking.  “Bethe” begins, in fact, with the text of an old letter.   
Hellman’s initial vision, when she considered publishing a collection of her 
reportage in the late 1960s, was to reproduce those articles as they had originally been 
written:  unedited, faithful to them as they were, the kind of method she explains in the 
preface to Three: “I did not make changes in the books, although I was often tempted, 
because alteration seemed a kind of cheating.  If I don’t like all that I was, or all that I 
wrote, I would equally dislike tampering on the basis that I am now wiser.  I do not think 
I am” (5).  (Here she is referring to her re-publication of the memoir books in the late 
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1970s.)  But instead, at this earlier moment of memoir-writing, Hellman began writing 
commentary, filling out, remembering more, painting over the lines, rather than 
presenting the “originals” of her magazine pieces.  Within the memoir books, the old 
letters, diaries, and notes that Hellman includes have been similarly reworked.  A venture 
into Hellman’s personal papers suggests that virtually none except the most public and 
immortalized of her earlier writing remains in its original form in her memoirs.64   
However, she was extremely concerned in many cases to get her facts right and 
clearly relied at times on actual diaries whose details she trusted.  Pages and pages of 
research notes made during the planning stages for both An Unfinished Woman and 
Scoundrel Time, and to a lesser extent Pentimento, the most personal and least publicly 
historical of the first three memoirs, show that she wrote repeatedly to the researchers she 
had hired with requests to verify dates, places, names, and events. “Sorry to worry 
everyone again,” she wrote during the revisions of An Unfinished Woman in October of 
1968 in what appears to be a letter to her publisher Little, Brown,65 “but if the research is 
correct and my memory isn’t, I will have to do a fair amount of rewriting” (Letter to 
“Arthur” 3). She was even willing to consider, though guardedly, that her diaries might 
be inaccurate.  In a list of research notes from November 1968 that appear to be 
addressed to a secretary but possibly just to herself, Hellman asked, “When was Kiev 
recaptured from the Germans[?] Send this back [to researchers] again.  It is given now as 
November 5, 1944, which would seem to me that I would have to be wrong about 
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 The most notable example of a public document remaining unaltered is Hellman’s letter to the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities, a performance that most people would argue could not be outdone 
or re-done because it is such a static icon of a moment in American history. 
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 The letter, addressed just to “Arthur,” was possibly written to Arthur Thornhill, Jr., the head of Little, 
Brown at the time, with whom Hellman regularly corresponded. 
 193 
 
shooting in the streets and yet that’s what the diary says” (“Research Questions” 4).  Her 
files show that her research practices were unusual and paradoxical. She wanted to fact 
check, unexpectedly, given the famous attacks on her facts and dates. But at the same 
time, she often came back and asserted the authority of her diaries.  She disputed a 
researcher’s claim about when the film The Spanish Earth was reviewed in the New York 
Times by saying (to herself or a secretary), “If this is true, then the piece must be altered, 
or the dates in the diary must be altered, and the dates in the diary are correct.  Pull out 
diaries and make sure diary dates are correct” (“Research Questions” 1). 
At the beginning of the research process, the point seems to have been to request 
more context, to surround herself with more dates, facts, and stories from the time period, 
in order to produce an atmosphere in which she could remember and write.  The year 
between May 19, 1952 (two days before her HCUA hearing) and May of 1953 had “gone 
out of my memory,” she told a researcher in 1975, and she had “lost, if [she] ever had, 
most of the diaries of that year” (Letter to Robert Westbrook).  To write the memoir, she 
needed “the names of a few plays and movies that opened between 1952 and 1953; the 
names of a few books that were reviewed; and any large news events” to jog her memory 
(Letter to Robert Westbrook).   
Hellman put great emphasis on tracking down dates during her research process 
for Scoundrel Time, which, though she calls it her “own history,” is a much more public 
history than An Unfinished Woman or Pentimento (41).  In 1975 she wrote to the 
filmmaker William Wyler and his wife Talli, friends of hers since the 1930s, asking for 
their help pinning down dates for a trip the three of them had taken together in Europe in 
the early 1950s, during which Hellman was struggling to write a play and William Wyler 
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was trying to convince her to work with him on his film Carrie.  She is working from 
“carefully kept diary notes,” Hellman says, as she tries to compose one section of 
Scoundrel Time, but her notes from that time period are not labeled with dates (Letter to 
Mr. and Mrs. William Wyler 2).  “All I need since what I have written you is from a 
diary,” she tells the Wylers, “is the year that happened.  I am pretty certain that it was in 
the autumn, but the year is a mystery to me” (Letter to Mr. and Mrs. William Wyler 2).  
This letter is one of many examples of Hellman’s requests to friends to verify or clear up 
the itineraries or timelines of European trips.  While doing research for her memoir 
books, she often asked friends for their accounts of some of the events she remembered.  
Requests such as this suggest that Hellman knew that her diaries may have been 
inattentive to detail or even written slightly retrospectively, a few weeks after the events 
had occurred.   
In the later stages of writing each memoir, Hellman began to focus in and force 
her diaries to square off against the facts researchers had dug up, in order to determine 
which version would appear in print.  For instance, while preparing to write An 
Unfinished Woman, Hellman asked a researcher for the date the Soviet army had entered 
Warsaw in 1945, but she added that her diary had it recorded as January 14.  After 
several rounds of correspondence, she finally conceded that it may have been January 17, 
as reference sources said, and not January 14 as her diary said (Research Notes for An 
Unfinished Woman).  This exchange is particularly revealing because despite what she 
told the researchers, the January 14 date was not specifically mentioned in Hellman’s 
diary of her 1944-45 Russia trip.  What the diary did say was that on January 7 a Russian 
general told her the army would enter Warsaw in a week.  In the final version of An 
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Unfinished Woman, one of the general’s subordinates tells her that the army will take 
Warsaw on the 16th or 17th.  The struggle over the date is significant because both in the 
diary and in the memoir, her emotional and intellectual intimacy with the general and his 
trust in her are prominent themes.  In her research process on this point, Hellman 
revealed the way that she read and interpreted her diaries according to the possible 
narratives mapped out in her memory. 
Facts and her remembered experience seem to jockey for position. “Is the 
automobile road from Valencia to Madrid mountainous?” she asks a researcher in 1966 
(Research notes for An Unfinished Woman).  In an excerpt from her diary of her 1937 trip 
to Spain that had been published in 1942 in an edited collection called This Is My Best, 
the road had certainly been mountainous: a large part of the action in that early version 
depended on the twists and turns in the mountain road between the two cities. She also 
makes a note, in 1966, about the name of a street she had included in the diary published 
in 1942: “Is there, or was there, during or before the Spanish Civil war, a street called 
Calle De La Cruz in Madrid?”  If there is not, she needs “to be supplied with the name of 
a street which was in a middle to lower class business-residential section in Madrid . . . 
[that] was heavily destroyed during the war” (Research notes for An Unfinished Woman). 
Presumably she is worried that she may have fabricated the street name in 1942, perhaps 
because she had not recorded the name during the trip.  She takes names, dates, and exact 
wordings seriously; they are the underpinnings for the realist mode of these sections of 
her memoirs, even though they are sometimes missing from her own records or 
inconsistent with her actual, historical experience in 1937. She is willing, however, as the 
previously-mentioned research query shows, to change the literal facts of her experience 
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in Spain—to choose any street in a “middle to lower class business-residential section in 
Madrid” as the setting for the episode, to establish a sense of veracity while altering 
details from her own experience. 
In her writing, Hellman questions the authority of primary experience and primary 
records themselves.  In “On Reading Again,” she meditates on the instability of truth over 
time and its implications for memoir-writing: “What didn’t I see during the time of work 
that I now see more clearly? . . . Or what did I see in the past that I could not now 
duplicate?  Perhaps because the emotions that made it possible are over and are not 
recoverable . . . or perhaps because the years blank out even passions” (4).  But Hellman 
disrupted other generic conventions, as well: she also lied in prefaces and interviews.  
She stressed again in the preface to “Julia” in Three (published the year before the Mary 
McCarthy controversy and a few years before the entry of Muriel Gardiner into the public 
eye) how firmly situated Julia was in historical reality: one person has guessed Julia’s 
identity correctly, she says, and the son of the doctor in the portrait who issued the false 
death certificate wrote to Hellman, infuriated that his father had been mentioned.  After 
Hellman’s fictionalizing became public knowledge in the early 1980s, she continued to 
deny vehemently that her detractors were speaking the truth.  Gardiner may have been 
someone else’s Julia, she told a New York Times reporter, but not hers (Wright 404).   
There is a double-edged nature to memory in Hellman’s life writing.  It is 
persistently uncertain, Hellman tells us: “As time and much of life have passed,” she says 
in Maybe, her fourth, final, and most fictional memoir book, “my memory . . . won’t 
supply what I need to know” (63).  In fact, she must sort out, “for the purposes of this 
tale,” “what I am certain of, what maybe I added to what” (63).  Yet elsewhere she 
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defends her memories: “I trust absolutely what I remember about Julia,” she writes in 
“Julia,” the portrait in Pentimento that became so notorious for apparently not being an 
account of a real person’s life, yet seemingly being introduced as one (112).  Richard 
Wilbur, an acquaintance of Hellman, reports that she once became indignant when he 
called her memory “rotten” and asked how she developed “any notion of what [she] 
ought to put down on paper” (qtd. in Rollyson 471).  Rather than defend her memory 
itself, however, she retorted, “What are you talking about?  I’ve kept diaries all my life!  I 
can prove anything I put on paper!”  (qtd. in Rollyson 471).66   
Memory is a troubled term and yet a productive one, and it is the category that 
Hellman seizes as a thematic organizing point for her memoirs.  Her method, spelled out 
most directly in Pentimento and in her introduction to that book in her 1979 collection 
Three, is to return to an untouched memory, to a moment she has not thought about in 
decades, doesn’t consider constitutive of the identity she has since developed—doesn’t 
rehearse, revisit, or retell—and with the help of both remembered glimpses and her 
written records, to try to make sense of the incidents by “free association” (Three 586).67  
“I had not, for example, consciously thought of Bethe for perhaps thirty years,” she says 
of the writing of Pentimento (Three 586).  The records and the glimpses (best recovered 
while she is near sleep, she explains in “Bethe”) clash productively, and it is at the site of 
that clash that Hellman takes up her telling.  Her double fidelity to these two kinds of 
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 Wilbur told this story in an interview with biographer Carl Rollyson; the words cannot be attributed 
directly to Hellman. 
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 The exception, she tells readers in Pentimento and Three, is Julia, her memories of whom she has 
digested and rehashed and tried to write many times, whom she has long understood as essential to her way 
of understanding the world.  With that portrait, Hellman says, she revisited the memories yet again and was 
finally able to write about them (Three 586). 
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fooling with facts produces a fruitful tension that registers in her manuscripts and 
research notes and animates her memoir books. 
 
Revision and Diary 
Hellman’s belief that the truth of a moment can change over time did not affect 
only the retrospective portions of her memoirs.  The drafts, diaries, and research notes 
among her personal papers in the archives reveal that even when Hellman introduces 
segments of text as diary entries, she often chooses not to reproduce them word for word, 
or even in order.  The Russia diary sections in An Unfinished Woman differ in order, in 
emphasis, sometimes in content, and certainly in wording from the original Russia diary 
from 1944-45 that remains among Hellman’s papers.  There is a strong possibility that 
she also “included” entries from diaries she no longer had in her possession or had never 
previously written.  In 1975 Hellman asked a researcher to read all of her published 
writing in order to see whether she had ever written about what Dashiell Hammett said 
after seeing Clifford Odets’ play Awake and Sing. After several letters back and forth and 
several apparently unsuccessful rounds of searches by the researcher, her fact-checker 
commented that it would “help if you could remember roughly what Hammett’s comment 
actually was” (Rosenberg). Yet in Scoundrel Time, Hammett’s comment appears in a 
passage that Hellman says she has copied from a diary written in 1952 (59). Although the 
research correspondence does not prove conclusively that the diary cited never existed, it 
is unlikely that after paying someone to search her published writing, Hellman looked 
through her diaries again and found the appropriate comments ready to be copied exactly. 
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To see memory and diary not as complementary but as clashing, to see diary as a 
form that is not fixed under some sort of understanding of autobiographical factuality, but 
is available to the creative truth-making powers of the dramatist-turned-memoirist, as 
well as to a truth that can be better written in the memoirist’s present than it could have 
been in the diarist’s moment—that much-hailed origin of the “primary source”—was 
bewildering and unacceptable to readers.  When the memoirs’ departures from factuality 
became apparent following Hellman’s 1980 dispute with McCarthy and the subsequent 
fact-checking by her detractors, Hellman was repeatedly attacked for being unfaithful to 
biographical, historical, and documentary truth, in favor of another kind of truth.   
Because of the partial, but problematic, continuity between narrator and narrative 
persona in a memoir, Hellman is able to consider the relationship between notions of 
significance in the creation of the historical record and notions of significance when one 
collects and interprets evidence years later.  In a notebook Hellman used while planning 
An Unfinished Woman, she scrawled across the top of one page, “Bring Spanish pieces up 
to date, as if diary just read and used” (Research Notes for An Unfinished Woman).   
Although this sentence is somewhat cryptic, the memoirs do attempt to bring her diaries 
and notes “up to date,” to put them in conversation with Hellman’s present perspective.  
Addressing Hellman’s use of diaries and notebooks (he is the only critic to have done so), 
Adams points out that Hellman’s reflections on her life undercut the testimony of the 
diaries, but he speculates that Hellman has left them in because “their falseness tells 
another kind of truth” (126). 
As explained previously, Hellman’s notes and drafts show that the diary sections 
of her memoirs were heavily revised from version to version, and a comparison to the 
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diary from her Russia trip allows great insight into how she made use of her actual diaries 
in her memoir writing.  William Wright has noted that parts of the Russia sections in 
Hellman’s first memoir are drawn from a piece published in the magazine Collier’s upon 
Hellman’s return from Europe early in 1945 (330).  In fact, the Collier’s piece—“I Meet 
the Front Line Russians”—and the handwritten diary are woven together in An 
Unfinished Woman, not only in the book’s main narrative of that trip, but also in the diary 
sections dated 1944 and 1945.  
Although the Spanish diary from 1937 itself is not among Hellman’s papers, the 
successive drafts of those sections show similar changes in content and wording.  
Indications of the ways Hellman revised these sections can be found in her previously 
published writings as well as in the Harry Ransom Center files.  Comparison to 
previously published writings that were also labeled as diaries enables a further 
understanding of the degree of change in Hellman’s “diaries” over the years.  Hellman’s 
relatively unknown contribution to the 1942 volume This Is My Best, mentioned 
previously, is clearly an early version of the material that appears in An Unfinished 
Woman’s Spanish diaries.  The title of the piece is “The Little War.”  It is prefaced by the 
notation “These are pieces from a diary written on a long trip to Europe in 1937.  This 
part is about Spain during the Civil War” (989).  Much of the content overlaps with An 
Unfinished Woman’s diary entries, but in several places the same events take shape 
differently or hint at a different meaning, and in most parts the wording is different.  In 
the 1942 publication, for instance (in a section headed “Valencia, October 13, 1937”), 
Hellman describes her recognition that a bombing raid is about to begin: “Ahead of me 
was a cat and I don’t think I paid any attention to what had happened until I saw the cat 
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suddenly sit down in the middle of the street” (989).  In An Unfinished Woman, this is the 
passage: “I didn’t hear anything until I saw the cat sit down in the street, its head raised at 
a queer angle” (73).68  
The most significant change in language that Hellman makes between the Spanish 
diary entries in “The Little War” and those in An Unfinished Woman is to shift parts of 
them to the present tense.  Whereas in “The Little War” Hellman for instance says, “I 
went for a walk this morning and stopped at the flower market and bought a bunch of 
flowers,” (989) in An Unfinished Woman she says, “A few blocks from the Press Office, 
where I tell myself I am certainly going this morning, there is a flower market.  I stop to 
buy flowers . . .” (73).  Large portions of the diary sections in not only An Unfinished 
Woman but also Scoundrel Time are written in present tense.  This strategy differentiates 
them more sharply from the retrospective prose that surrounds them.  In each of these two 
memoirs, the present-tense construction seems to represent an imaginative tenancy of that 
moment as it was.  Hellman brings the pieces “up to date” (her noted advice to herself) in 
the sense that she adds a suspended feeling of being in the moment and not being sure 
what another day of war, or the day of the House Committee hearing, will bring.   
Hellman effectively suggests that her present perspective allows her a clearer 
understanding of her past experiences than she had at the time.  She manipulates her past 
writings to emphasize her lack of understanding in the past.  Perhaps the use of this 
technique most worthy of inquiry is Hellman’s account in An Unfinished Woman of her 
visit to the forced labor camp Maidanek in 1944. Although Maidanek was not technically 
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 Some parts of “The Little War” are nearly identical to passages from Hellman’s 1938 article “Day in 
Spain,” published in the New Republic after she returned from Spain.  “The Little War” also includes 
additional material, however. 
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a death camp, tens of thousands of people died there. William Wright questions in his 
biography of Hellman whether she had actually been to the camp at all, pointing out that 
she did not mention the trip in her initial 1945 write-up of her time in the Soviet Union in 
Collier’s, and that surely such a significant event would have found its way into the 
magazine article (331). But Hellman’s Russian translator Raya Orlova asserted in an 
interview with Hellman biographer Carl Rollyson that Hellman actually did see the camp 
(229). For some reason she elected not to include it in the article.  
In An Unfinished Woman Hellman uses an “overdone” language to attempt to 
capture her horror, Rollyson says, a “kind of language that came to her in retrospect” 
(229).  He argues that any explanation of her visit “would have been entirely out of place 
in her journalistic report on the front line Russians” (229).  Whereas another Collier’s 
correspondent, Jan Karski, who had published an account in the October 14, 1944 special 
issue of Collier’s of his visit to Belzec, wrote an account that sounds odd to modern 
ears—too journalistic, the emotions uncertain, almost searching for appropriate 
language—Hellman’s account in An Unfinished Woman sounds very much like similar 
accounts written after a lapse of so many years.  It is perhaps a representation of what she 
felt she should have felt at the time.   
According to Rollyson, an FBI search of Hellman’s luggage on October 14, 1944, 
while she was in Seattle en route to Fairbanks and then to Russia, turned up the October 7 
issue of Collier’s.  She would have left the United States too late to read the Oct. 14 
issue, despite being a Collier’s reader (and under contract to write for the magazine upon 
the conclusion of her trip).  The next month was taken up in a difficult and lonely journey 
westward across Siberia, but it seems likely that she may have heard of the special issue 
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at some point between her arrival back in the United States in February 1945 and the 
publication of her own article at the end of March, if not before she had visited 
Maidanek.  Yet she avoided writing a similar kind of immediate reaction. 
Hellman claims in An Unfinished Woman that her own Maidanek passage is based 
on a diary “written six months later” (133).  In other words, the event became important 
to her, or she acquired the language to describe it, after a period of time had passed.  She 
paraphrases in An Unfinished Woman to allow even more retrospect: “A diary written six 
months later tells me that . . . as we moved around that endless, wired horror of flat earth, 
we came to the death ovens . . . that, turning now, we faced a building that had a long 
worm crawling up the wall” (An Unfinished Woman 133).  The account is impressionistic 
and notes Hellman’s horror using images that by 1967 were variations on standard 
encounters with the camps: among them the shock of seeing life at the site of so much 
death, and consequently her outright revulsion at the sight of the living worm.  More 
accounts of visits to the camps had come out by the middle of 1945, and if Hellman is 
telling the truth about the diary written six months later, she found a way to speak about it 
months after the event, perhaps in dialogue with the newly-emerging modes of writing 
about the Holocaust.  Discourse about the Holocaust was slow to develop in the United 
States.  Ben Yagoda reports that only a “handful” of first-person accounts of the 
Holocaust were published in New York or London “in the immediate postwar period” 
and that they “did not penetrate the American public’s consciousness” (223).  He quotes 
Elie Wiesel, who says that although he “‘knew the role of the survivor was to testify,’” he 
“‘did not know how’”; he “‘lacked a framework [and] mistrusted the tools, the 
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procedures’” (qtd. in Yagoda 223).  Hellman’s was not the story of a survivor, of course, 
but she, too, claims an inability to tell about what she had witnessed. 
Even if this diary entry from six months after her visit existed, however, it was 
not the first one she wrote.  Despite her comment in An Unfinished Woman that she 
“could not make a second sentence” (133) when she sat down to write in her diary 
immediately after the visit to Maidanek, a comparison to her diary from her 1944-45 trip 
to Russia shows that at some point before January 3, 1945, before she had returned from 
the front, she made a page of notes that sound much like Karski’s article, informational 
but scarcely attempting to represent emotion: “Permanent concentration camp . . . Gassed 
in chamber and brought here . . . 5 ovens—thought they would [sic] bathed.  To gas 
chambers.  Without legs, arms—take two or three men at once . . . Major said he couldn’t 
believe it, either” (Diary from Russia Trip).  The notes are the unprocessed records of a 
first observer.  “One gets mad at people telling the story,” she protests in the diary notes, 
hinting at disbelief, a response later deemed unacceptable in discourse about the 
Holocaust.  Other than this one moment of emotion, however, Hellman’s notes from 1945 
reveal emotional distance, shock, less engagement than some of her other entries in the 
Russian diary.  They are almost strictly factual.  She gives numbers, dates, claims that her 
guides make, all without suggesting that she even believes they are true.  Hellman’s later 
responses, however, make her memories intelligible by putting them in conversation with 
a subsequently-developed tradition of writing about the Holocaust.  Although she 
paraphrases in An Unfinished Woman—and perhaps never wrote the image-laden entry 
she claims to paraphrase—her response to the camp serves as a powerful symbol of the 
 205 
 
new world emerging in 1945 because she frames it as a perspective captured in that year, 
in the aftermath of the war.  
In a number of cases in her memoir books, Hellman seems to have rearranged and 
revised the notes, diaries, and accounts given by her friends, in order to give primacy to 
the voice of memory.  At least in the case of the Russia sections in An Unfinished 
Woman, her drafts suggest that her final step was to revise the diary entries in the interest 
of narrative coherence, re-ordering the events if they did not produce a convincing story, 
or changing the seasons or the characters to add drama.  The order of the events at the 
Russian front, for example, are rearranged so that they build to a climax in a way that the 
diary notes do not.  In An Unfinished Woman they build up to the offer by the Russian 
general to take Hellman to the front.  In the diary, that offer is absent, and the account of 
the trip instead ends with an anti-climatic scene.   
Some minor incidents in the Russia diary become much fuller scenes, or even 
quite different stories, in the diary passages in her memoir.  In An Unfinished Woman 
there is a passage in which Hellman accidentally moves the hand she is using to shield a 
pair of binoculars from the light while watching a German encampment.  Her mistake 
provokes an “answer of grenades and heavy guns” (135).  This dramatic scene seems to 
be an extension of an episode in the diary in which guns, mines, and hand grenades go off 
while Hellman watches Russian practice maneuvers with binoculars (but not in response 
to anything she has done).  In the only slightly retrospective piece of reportage that 
Hellman published in Collier’s magazine in March 1945, soon after her return, the 
incident has just begun to be dramatic: the general gives her the glasses, and she says, “I 
didn’t understand, and still don’t, why, if we were only watching maneuvers, he suddenly 
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pulled me away from the glass slit and said sharply, ‘Keep the glasses down, please! We 
are too near to snipers’” (“I Meet” 71).  Hellman recounted this incident three times in 
published writings.  The third was in Scoundrel Time, in a diary entry supposedly written 
in May 1952 about a dinner with Clifford Odets before he testified before the HCUA.  (In 
the entry, Hellman tells Odets the story as an example of her failures under pressure, so 
she has once again re-implemented it to serve a new purpose.)  She revised the story each 
time, altering it to fit its new purpose. 
Even the famous note from Julia, of which Hellman claims to “remember every 
word,” is carefully crafted and heavily revised across drafts in order to give it the literary 
force it has in the final version (Pentimento 111).  In the first version among Hellman’s 
drafts, Julia’s note says, “When you cross the border, leave the candy box on the seat.  
Open this box and carry the muff in your hands.  There is no thanks for what you can and 
will do from those whose lives are waiting.  No thanks from me either.  My love, Julia” 
(“Julia” TS).  After several sets of revisions, the note published in Pentimento says, “At 
the border, leave the candy box on the seat.  Open this box and wear the hat.  There is no 
thanks for what you will do for them.  No thanks from me either.  But there is the love I 
have for you.  Julia” (111).     
Even when quoting the words of others, Hellman does not present their writing 
strictly as found; her fidelity seems to be, again, to her understanding of what her 
correspondents meant, rather than to the letter of the text.  As she was preparing to write 
Scoundrel Time, Hellman wrote a letter to Joseph Rauh, her counsel before and during 
her HCUA hearing.  In the letter she told Rauh she wanted to represent him in an 
“affectionate and admiring” manner and had “checked every mention of [him] against a 
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diary [she] kept” (Letter to Joseph Rauh).  Nevertheless, in the book she very slightly 
edited a letter she had received from him, deleting commas and introductory phrases in 
order to make it sound more like a memorandum than like the friendly letter it was 
(Letter to Joseph Rauh).  She also replaced the name of one person who figured in the 
letter with the name of another minor figure who had already been mentioned, 
presumably in order to simplify the story for her reader. 
The description in An Unfinished Woman of an evening spent in Madrid with 
Ernest Hemingway, Martha Gellhorn, and a “large” and “overknowing” British journalist 
is one of the most useful scenes for understanding Hellman’s writing process as she read 
and re-worked her “diaries” (Unfinished Woman 87).   (In the case of the Spain sections 
of An Unfinished Woman, these may have been either the “pieces from a diary” that she 
published in 1942 or an original diary that is no longer among her papers.)  Gellhorn, in 
her article “Guerre de Plume,” objected strongly to Hellman’s account of this evening in 
An Unfinished Woman, drawing upon both her own memories and public records of 
bombing incidents.  In an intermediate draft of An Unfinished Woman found in Hellman’s 
files, the typed text of this scene is written retrospectively, from the perspective of an 
older woman looking back (Unfinished Woman TS 19).  However, Hellman’s 
handwritten revisions turn it into a diary entry. At the top of the page, Hellman has 
written “diary 1934” in pencil (Unfinished Woman TS 19). In the typed draft, 
Hemingway tells Hellman that he is glad that she has brought canned goods into Spain 
because “John Dos Passos hadn’t brought in any food but had eaten everybody else’s, 
and he and Dos Passos had had an ugly fight about that” (Unfinished Woman TS 19). “I 
have, through the years, heard many versions of this fight,” Hellman comments at the end 
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of the passage in the typescript, “but I have never heard that it was mended.” In pen, she 
puts brackets around that last sentence and inserts “1968—” between the first bracket and 
“I have, through the years,” presumably in order to make the retrospect of “through the 
years” fit the fact that this passage is supposed to have been written during Hellman’s trip 
to Spain (Unfinished Woman TS 19).  Although the last sentence does not appear in the 
final version of An Unfinished Woman, in bracket form or otherwise, this draft shows the 
development of a technique she uses throughout her diary sections in that book and the 
other memoirs. She frames some of her writing as old, hailing from the historical moment 
she is writing about, though her notes and drafts demonstrate that it is not actual word-
for-word diary. But then her narrating voice breaks in from the present, in brackets and 
preceded by the year of writing, putting the text she has framed as old writing in 
conversation with the text she is framing as new writing. She also inserts occasional 
footnotes that comment on the diaries. These moves bring the reader into the memoirist’s 
experience: she stages the pleasure of recollection upon reading old writing, or the shock 
of seeing how her perspective has changed, and the desire to fill in the gaps with thoughts 
that became significant in retrospect.  
Often the bracketed sections and footnotes from 1968 in the case of An 
Unfinished Woman or 1975 in the case of Scoundrel Time express a troubledness or 
amazement at the innocent response of her past self to a horrible situation, especially 
when Hellman the diarist did not realize the extent of it.  In a diary section labeled “From 
a diary, Moscow, 1944,” Hellman writes, “By now, December 1944, the people look 
tired, cold, shabby and exhausted-sick in this, the easiest, winter of the war” (116).  A 
footnote to the adjective “easiest” explains: “This was the word used in 1944.  In 1966, 
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three Muscovites told me it had been the hardest winter of the war.  I think this conflict of 
memory came about because in 1944 they knew they were on the way to victory and an 
end.  In 1966 they remember only the deprivation and the misery” (116).   
One of An Unfinished Woman’s major projects is re-reading Hellman’s 1944-45 
trip to Russia in light of a trip she makes in 1967, just before writing her first memoir.  
During the trip, she meets many of the people she had spent months with 23 years before, 
compares the past and present culture and scenery of Moscow, finds out who is still 
living and who has died, and verifies some of her understandings of political, military, 
and economic situations during that earlier trip.  After the 1944-45 diary sections in An 
Unfinished Woman, Hellman includes several diary sections from 1967, some of which 
are written from Moscow.  She puts herself in the same space again and holds up the old 
writing to see how it compares to what she is seeing now: “How good it is to come back 
here.  My room in the Astoria Hotel must be directly below the one I had during the war.  
I open the old notebook . . .” (180).   
In Scoundrel Time, the set-up is similar, but the encounter with documents is even 
more deliberate.  Hellman presents herself, the memoirist, as a woman finally prepared to 
look back at a traumatic period in her past.  In order to do it, the memoirist surrounds 
herself with documentary traces.  She writes to fellow participants in the events she is 
trying to recall, seeking clarifications of legal problems she did not understand, or care to 
understand, at the time but now wants to come to terms with and share with an audience 
who may not have a sense of the significance of the period she is describing.  “I am 
looking at a recent letter from Daniel Pollitt [Rauh’s assistant],” she says at one moment 
in the text (110).  “I quote from a memorandum Rauh sent me, this July, 1975.  The 
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memorandum is dated March 26, 1952,” she says at another (87).  (Rauh had recently 
forwarded her the old memorandum, she says, which recounts a meeting he had had with 
the House Committee prior to her May 21 hearing.  Hellman says in Scoundrel Time that 
she had not remembered reading it when she originally received it in 1952.)  Hellman 
pulls from diaries and notes as well, draws from the hearing transcript, and includes the 
entirety of her famous letter to the committee.  Her research notes give the same 
impression, that she surrounded herself with documents.  Rauh’s memorandum is there in 
her Scoundrel Time research files, both the original 1952 copy with a cover letter from 
that year, and the new copy Rauh has forwarded to her in response to her request for 
information.  (That one says, across the top in Hellman’s handwriting, “Used in piece.” 
[Rauh].) 
In Scoundrel Time, Hellman frames her description of her HCUA hearing in May 
1952 as an encounter with the transcript of the hearing.  After years of being unable to 
write about that period of her life, she says in the opening paragraph of Scoundrel Time, 
she decides to face her “strange hangups” and write what she terms her “own history” of 
the time (41).    Although Hellman begins the section about the hearing itself as a 
recollection, she transitions into a quotation from the testimony of Martin Berkeley, who 
had named Hellman and Dashiell Hammett as participants at a Communist Party 
organizing meeting held in his house in 1937.  Then Hellman quotes the transcript of her 
own hearing, but only once, and briefly: “MR. TAVENNER: In other words, you are 
asking the committee not to ask you any questions regarding the participation of other 
persons in the Communist Party activities?” (Scoundrel Time 106).  (Frank Tavenner, 
chief counsel for the committee, is attempting to summarize her May 19 letter to the 
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committee.)  In Scoundrel Time, Hellman paraphrases, rather than quotes, her response to 
Tavenner: “I said I hadn’t said that” (106).  She continues to paraphrase for the remainder 
of the account of the hearing, but her descriptions of the conversation follow the timeline 
of the transcript.  The single direct quotation has signaled that she is working from the 
transcript itself.  Prior to that quotation, her description had been framed as just a 
memory—she roughly describes the opening questions and the emphases the committee 
was putting on certain parts of her life.  This later section of paraphrase instead has 
openings such as “I said,” “Mr. Wood said,” “Rauh said” (Scoundrel Time 106-07).  Her 
switch to paraphrase shifts the focus back to the authority of the memory of Hellman the 
memoirist, whom she depicts as the same sometimes faltering hero from 1952, but older 
and with a more mature understanding of what had happened. 
After describing the tension between Tavenner and Rauh, Hellman’s lawyer, 
when Rauh hands copies of Hellman’s letter to the committee to the press section, 
Hellman writes, “The polite words of each as they read on the page were not polite as 
spoken” (167).  Since she has not quoted Tavenner and Rauh’s interchange, her reader 
has no means of considering her statement, and instead is left to watch this aging, 
authoritative memoirist read and remember.   Hellman takes issue with the text of the 
transcript: “I am convinced that in this section of the testimony, as in several other 
sections—certainly in Hammett’s later testimony before the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee—either the court stenographer missed some of what was said and filled it 
in later, or the documents were, in part, edited” (107).  The words on the page are what is 
left, but they fail to represent the truth of the hearing as Hellman remembers it: she casts 
doubt on their authority. 
 212 
 
When she searches out the traces of events she has lived through, Hellman finds 
that what she chose to record at the time, or what news articles reported, are not the 
moments that later came to have meaning for her. “[M]y notebooks tell what people I 
saw, what the usually glum dinner conversation at Spasso was about, the bad plays that 
the Russians were convinced I wanted to see,” she writes in a retrospective portion of An 
Unfinished Woman, “but nowhere is there a record of how much I came to love, still love 
Raya, the remarkable young girl who was my translator-guide . . . And there are many 
entries about Sergei Eisenstein and our almost daily cup of tea, but I didn’t know, 
couldn’t know, that twenty-one years after his death he is more real than many of the 
people I saw last week” (112). And so she selects, modifies, and invents documents—and 
in at least some instances makes it quite clear that she is doing so—in order to give a 
picture of what the past might have felt like at the time, but with the benefit of 
understanding developed in the meantime. Her references to and excerpts from material 
traces, considered alongside her revision of some of those traces and their clash with 
some of her later research, allow her to undermine the claim of biography, as opposed to 
autobiography, to access the past and make meaning out of it. And perhaps this tendency 
in her memoirs helps to make sense of Hellman’s desire to prevent biographies from 
being written of not only herself but also her intimate friends Dorothy Parker and 
Dashiell Hammett. It is less likely that she was worried that all three of them had real 
things to hide than that she suspected that when a biographer attempted to access and 
narrativize their lives by interpreting the traces they had left behind, her motives and 
choices and those of her friends might seem strange or wrong, in retrospect.  
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Pentimento: Repenting and Repainting 
Pentimento, though among Hellman’s first three memoirs it is the one least 
concerned with the representation of major historical events, nevertheless provides a 
crucial interpretive key for coming to terms with her engagement with documentary 
evidence in all three books. In the first paragraphs of this work that she calls a “Book of 
Portraits,” Hellman meditates on the book’s title, Pentimento. Aged paint, she says, 
sometimes becomes transparent and allows the original lines on a canvas, the tracings of 
the artist’s first vision, to show. “That is called pentimento,” Hellman explains, and it 
allows the viewer to see, many years later, how the painter had repented, changed his 
mind (3). Hellman calls the painter’s change of mind a way of “seeing and then seeing 
again” (3). She goes on to draw a parallel to her ways of seeing the people she will 
consider in her “portraits.” Now that the paint has aged, she says, she wants to see what 
was there for her once and what is there for her now. Most critics associate the term 
“pentimento” with Hellman’s own method: she peers through the translucent paint and 
considers possible versions of the past. 
But the comparison on the first page of Pentimento can be misleading. Hellman 
brings two images together under one term. A painter’s “repenting” has nothing to do 
with aging paint; the repenting and the aging occur hundreds of years apart. The painter 
sees and then sees again within a relatively short window of time, before he ever lays on 
the paint. It is not the transparency or the aging that allows him to see again—that is for 
viewers long after he is dead—but merely an initial and then a succeeding artistic vision. 
The word “pentimento” draws together that initial re-conception of the work by the artist 
and a later understanding by others, enabled by the passing of time, of his changing 
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vision for the work. The awkward analogy to this term from art history allows Hellman—
precisely because of its failure to correspond—to dwell on the confusion between the 
viewing self in the present and the past self whom the present self is trying to 
comprehend.  
Hellman initially positions herself, on the first page of Pentimento, as observer 
rather than as artist with respect to the characters that have peopled her life and the 
accounts she has given of them. She suggests that her purpose is to compare an earlier 
understanding of those people— “what was there for me once”—with her present 
understanding—“what is there for me now” (3). But the “for me” in both phrases calls to 
mind the artist re-envisioning a scene, laying on a new coat of paint and altering the 
original design. Adams’s reading is that “what Hellman has done is a kind of reverse 
pentimento”: she “has simultaneously layered old and new paint, deliberately exposed the 
pentimenti behind her portraits” (140). Hellman the observer, in the present moment, is 
not just seeing her past, but re-envisioning and repainting once again, over the top of the 
original lines. 
The troubling question, however, is how the artist in the present moment comes to 
see the original lines at all. The painter has his original lines to reject or follow, as he re-
envisions. What are the original lines, in Hellman’s version of pentimento? What does 
the memoirist, revisiting the past, depend on to let her know what is a reworking and 
what is not? The past from the perspective of the present always tastes of the present. 
Hellman glosses over the question in the introduction to Pentimento. But despite this 
initial sleight-of-hand, she is certainly aware of, or perhaps obsessed with, the problem of 
access to the past. It is for this reason, I think, that Hellman begins the first of the 
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portraits, a story called “Bethe,” with a document, a letter, from a relative in Germany, 
about her cousin Bethe’s impending arrival in America. The letter appears to be the kind 
of trace that a historian or a biographer would quote and interpret—the kind of object that 
is so important in historical research because it is primary, not layered with 
interpretations made in the interim—almost a window into the past. The first line of this 
first portrait is very much in conversation with the passage that has preceded it, the 
discussion of the term “pentimento.” “The letter said, says now, in Gothic script,” the 
portrait of Bethe begins, and what follows is nearly a page of quoted material (7). 
The letter cries out its own content boldly: “Bethe will be sailing between 
November 3rd and November 6th,” it begins, and other straightforward declarative 
statements follow. There are no ellipses; no sentences break off unfinished. The letter is 
initially framed as a clear, complete, and authentic account of Bethe’s travel plans. 
Immediately, however, this clarity begins to recede. Hellman follows the long quotation 
from the letter with this passage: “The letter is blurred and the pages are torn in the folds, 
but the name Bowman appears several times and it is still possible to make out a sentence 
in which the writer tells of having sold something to make the voyage possible” (8). It is 
hard to believe that she is talking about the same letter on page one and on page two. 
After presenting hundreds of words inside quotation marks, Hellman describes the 
blurredness of the words, the tears in the page, and the fact that she can pick out a name 
here and there on the page and “make out” one sentence. Within the first two pages of 
Pentimento, Hellman has already quoted at length from a document and then asserted that 
the document she is quoting is almost completely illegible. She first suggests that 
remnants from earlier days can make pentimento possible because they establish the 
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original lines, and then she immediately undermines the stability of the idea of 
documentary evidence. Even if Hellman has copied the letter into her writer’s book as a 
child and still has an exact copy of the text, it is unusual phrasing to say that the blurred 
and torn original “says now.”  Hellman refuses to allow this first document to serve as 
stable evidence of what the original lines were. More often than not, in the pages that 
follow, she references documents but declares that they are missing, even while she 
quotes them. 
Hellman has set us up for this move already. The only phrase that precedes the 
letter has a verb whose tense changes: “The letter said, says now” (7). The present tense 
is immediately eclipsed by the past tense, and yet the original shows through. Hellman 
repeatedly doubles tenses when she describes documents in her memoirs. (Adams has 
noted these doublings as well and calls them “mixed tenses” [141]). The time indicated 
by the past-tense verb could be the moment the letter was written, or the moment the 
child Lillian Hellman first read it, and the shift to present-tense seems to indicate that 
there has been no change in the content of the letter in the intervening years. The 
memoirist can look at the document to see the original lines, perhaps accessing her first 
understanding of who Bethe was, and at the same time she can consider the overlaid 
paint, what the document has meant in subsequent re-readings. Re-reading and quoting 
from the letter provides an occasion to come to terms with the pentimento of the 
memoirist’s vision of the past—what was there for her once, and what is there for her 
now. An Unfinished Woman begins more like traditional autobiographical writing: linear 
description of a childhood, the authority of the account based only on the author’s 
testimony to remembered events. But on Pentimento’s first page, there is the meditation 
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on aging paint, and on the second, the long quotation from the letter. The earliest draft of 
“Bethe” that is available in the Hellman Collection is a very different kind of story from 
the published version; it is full of action, police, and mafia intrigue (Hellman, “Bethe” 
TS).  Although the first two pages of the draft are missing, the amount of space the 
missing text fills and the fact that the third page of this draft is very similar to the third 
page of the next suggests that even this early, action-filled draft of “Bethe” began with 
the letter. The letter appears in every subsequent draft, consistently positioned at the 
opening of the portrait.  The placement of this passage, I think, suggests the centrality of 
Hellman’s engagement with documentary evidence and then, immediately, the 
unreliability of that evidence. 
Hellman is most often criticized for inventing memories in “Julia,” but she has 
already declared her independence from historical fact in the first pages of Pentimento. 
The lengthy quotation followed by the description of the letter’s illegibility sets the stage 
for the work that the portrait of “Bethe” will do, because while “Bethe” works through 
ideas about love and sex, as most critics note, it is also about missing evidence, 
forgetting, and whether one can access the past at all without making it merely an 
analogy useful for understanding the present. Later in the portrait, the narrator tells of 
“picturing” lost newspaper clippings and a letter from Bethe “in a German I couldn’t 
read” (16). Such traces are not only unattainable but literally uninterpretable. Hellman’s 
persona, in this moment, comes face to face with images of the originals, but their only 
meaning is in her retrospective glance. The letter in “Bethe” is present, then absent. It 
appears in the text briefly, then gives way to the memoirist’s ruminations about its place 
in her family’s history and her own emotional development. What the letter “says now” 
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immediately eclipses the text itself. The text’s own claim to tell the truth is asserted, then 
subverted. Likewise, despite Hellman’s fact-checking, the question of factuality is elided 
over and over in her memoirs. 
Coming to terms with documents in order to “see again,” as Pentimento’s 
introduction puts it, appears to have been more than just one of the ideas Hellman’s 
memoirs grapple with (3).  William Wright points out that Hellman’s 1938 and 1945 
magazine articles are inconsistent with her supposed diary accounts in An Unfinished 
Woman. He implies, on the basis of that evidence, that it is because some of the events 
never occurred that Hellman has mixed up her accounts. However, Hellman’s comments 
in her interview with Peter Adam suggest that before writing, she had quite recently 
referred to the magazine pieces. In An Unfinished Woman, she is perhaps trying to 
consider, from the perspective of the present, what her initial perceptions—months before 
the magazine articles were written, even—might have been. In Scoundrel Time, the 
likelihood that her May 1952 diary entry about her dinner with Clifford Odets was 
written in the 1970s suggests that she is trying to stage a meeting of her emotions in the 
days before her hearing and her emotions as she looks back on those days. She is working 
through the tension between doing justice to the past self and yet making the past 
comprehensible in the present, and the past self comprehensible to strangers. She is 
performing and developing the author function that we recognize as the contemporary 
memoirist. 
Hellman allows the letters and diaries she quotes to “say” only briefly; her real 
fidelity is not to the “said” but to the “says now,” the translation into a present meaning, 
the adaptation into art. Appealing to documentary traces seems to enable the pentimento 
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that Hellman says she is attempting—but by re-imagining the supposed “originals” 
themselves, she is doing something different, as well: admitting that the paint has not 
really become translucent as it has aged, but claiming the authority to paint both the old 
lines and the new since the original lines are no longer visible. Her research and fact-
checking serve not to establish a referential factuality but instead to establish that the 
evidential authority of her past writings depends entirely on the way in which her present 
writing vouches for or disqualifies their truthfulness. 
The artifacts she cites are part of a rhetorical structure in which memory 
underwrites the persuasiveness of the life story. Hellman’s investigative process as 
memoirist is structured by the requirements and possibilities of the genre. Her uncovered 
evidence has a second life as rhetorical evidence—selected, interpreted, and positioned to 
make a case for what memoir suggests is the more real truth provided by memory.  All 
the layers of overwriting and revision in the diary entries and letters are paradoxically 
meant, in Hellman’s understanding of memoir, to produce the closest encounter possible 
with the original, to make the documents say now (or mean now) what memory says they 
said then. As she hints at the beginning of Pentimento, Hellman the memoirist is never 
really the viewer of the pentimenti or the aging woman examining her life through its 
traces. She instead inhabits the position of the artist, repenting and repainting, generating 
the kind of tension between invention and factuality that seems to define contemporary 
memoir. 
  
 
 
 
 
EPILOGUE 
I return like a detective to the dance floor in New York, or was it someplace else invented 
to look like October?  I turn back to a music the d.j. never played because the room was 
too blue for falling angels.  Nothing by Aretha, nothing by chance.  A woman chased by 
spirits kept asking you to dance, made a gift of her hands.  I add her to the evidence: we 
were there.  She was a witness but I don’t have her name.  Or yours or mine, or was the 
shift in axis an event in the imagination? . . . I want you eternally ever, but this is the 
puzzle.  There is no dance floor on Nineteenth Street.  The woman with spirits left no 
forwarding address.  There is no getaway car, no Brooklyn Bridge.  The evidence floats 
by like rings over sweet water.  Like rings over sweet water. 
 
Joy Harjo, “Crossing Water,” In Mad Love and War, 1990 
 
The rhetorical power of poetry, like that of memoir, tends to be located in 
something other than its use of evidence.  And yet Harjo’s poem, like Hellman’s 
memoirs, gestures toward missing evidence in order to try to prove that what the speaker 
claims has indeed happened.  The speaker, who is investigating a remembered scene “like 
a detective,” says of a woman she recalls, “I add her to the evidence: we were there.  She 
was a witness but I don’t have her name.”  To construe the woman’s remembered 
presence as evidence is an act of pure assertion, of testimony with nothing tangible to 
corroborate it.  It is having been “there” that underwrites the speaker’s authority, a point 
that aligns this poem with the work of memoir.  To name a witness who cannot be called 
is a move that fails to meet legal or even historical standards of evidence, and yet the 
speaker persists in using the language of evidence.  Why is the use of evidence so 
rhetorically powerful?  Why do we embrace it so fully?  Why do we always want to see it 
used?  Why would Hellman bother to quote from diaries and letters if she was going to 
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change them?  She had the option as a memoirist of proceeding on the pure assertions of 
the voice of memory.  Why this fascination with evidence, this attraction to evidence?  
Just in the last week, I watched a series of articles from online sources of various 
stripes pop up on my Facebook newsfeed, posted by friends, colleagues, and 
acquaintances in the wake of recent gun control proposals.  The first, drawing on a 1998 
U.C. Davis Law Review article, purported to give historical evidence that the second 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution was passed in order to support the continuation of 
slave patrols.69  The second, authored by a legal scholar who had previously published on 
the second amendment in other law reviews, tried to show (again with significant 
reference to various types of evidence) that the reason proposed by the first was 
absolutely not on the table at the time of the passage of the Bill of Rights.70  The second 
article was followed by a string of reader comments (yet again citing plenty of evidence 
and authorial qualifications) arguing that neither of the first two articles got the story 
quite right.  Historians and non-historians alike argue about what happened in the past in 
order to support arguments about the courses of action (political, legal, academic, 
personal) we should be pursuing in the present; every time we make these arguments, we 
dip into an incredibly broad archive of potential evidence for our arguments.  The closer 
to the present the periods we study are, the more expansive these archives tend to be, and 
the more possible it seems to find just about any fact we need to serve as evidence for the 
historical account we want to tell—and for the argument contained within the narrative 
                                                           
69
 The first, by Thom Hartmann, “The Second Amendment Was Ratified to Preserve Slavery,” was written 
for an online news source called Truth-out and was based on a 1998 law review article by Carl Bogus 
called “The Hidden History of the Second Amendment.”  See Works Cited for publication information. 
70
 The second, “2nd Amendment Passed to Protect Slavery? No!”, was written by Paul Finkelman for the 
online black issues magazine The Root. 
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we are constructing.  At some point the immensity of the archive of potential evidence 
overwhelms the possibility of even remotely doing it justice in our reading and 
considering it.   
For a number of years Microsoft has been engaged in an experiment called 
MyLifeBits, a project that the Wikipedia article about its experimental subject calls “an 
experiment in life-logging (not the same as life-blogging)” (“Gordon Bell”).  This 
differentiation, I think, is hugely significant: even the day by day, seemingly un-plotted 
blogging of a life requires an ordering consciousness, a great deal of narrative direction 
and selectivity about what constitutes an incident and what incidents to record.  The 
logging of a life, on the other hand, is supposed to rely on systems set up to record a huge 
percentage of what the man whose life is being “logged,” Gordon Bell, experiences.  
(There are devices set up to record what he sees and hears, what he reads, views, and 
writes.)  The record Microsoft is making of Bell’s life is in some sense just a slightly 
more thorough version of what is happening to much of the writing, seeing, hearing, and 
speaking done in the 21st century. A 2010 Amazon.com reviewer of Bell’s 2009 book on 
the MyLifeBits project and its implications (co-authored with Jim Gemmell) remarks that 
the book is already (in 2010) long-since outdated, if it was not already in 2009.  What 
Bell’s apparatus enabled him to record in 2009 (though he appears to be still archiving 
his life) is not significantly greater, the reviewer claims, than what any person who uses a 
good deal of technology has the capability of doing to his or her own life: “Reality has 
already passed by this book. Perhaps if Mr. (Dr.?) Bell worked for Apple he'd have a 
greater appreciation for how many of his lifelogging ideas already are easy and 
automated” (Carpenter).  Vast amounts of what is read and seen by the wealthy and the 
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technologically-inclined, at least, is being recorded—more than anyone, whether in a 
private capacity or as a researcher, will ever be able to sort through.  With such an 
abundance of potential evidence, it becomes difficult to even pretend that these records 
themselves will shape the stories we and future generations will tell about these lives.   
Significantly, Microsoft’s goal is to make all this historical documentation 
searchable.  To search it, Bell or anyone studying his life would need to approach the 
archive with a keyword (or some other similar index to the attributes desired in the object 
being sought).  To go into an investigation with a keyword is to have a strong sense of the 
shape of the story you are going to be telling and the kind of evidence you will need.  
MyLifeBits, or the milder version of it that so many of us are living, with our e-mails and 
photographs and videos archived going back and back, does for the experiences of a life 
what Google does for so much of the potential evidence for the stories we tell and the 
arguments we make about the world and about the past: puts it at our command, if we 
know what we are looking for.  Because of these archives the potential evidence is so 
overwhelmingly there, so overwhelmingly preserved and available, that the only way we 
can approach it is by knowing already what kind of evidence we are seeking, what kind 
of a story we are telling.   
 Hellman’s method in her memoirs extends into the narrativization of lives and 
memories what Faulkner’s, Warren’s, and Owens’s novels illustrate about how prior 
commitments and imagined end narratives alike direct the search for and interpretation of 
evidence by professional investigators.  Considering Hellman’s method, which she 
developed well before the digital age, helps me to make sense of the consequences of the 
MyLifeBits project, as well as the wider ramifications of the idea of a perfectly-
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accessible past in mass culture.  To be able to read a document from the past in the first 
place, Hellman suggests in Pentimento, the memoirist (or the person interpreting his or 
her own life) must come to it knowing what it is supposed to mean—the portrait of 
“Bethe,” the first in the book, is after all built around an unreadable letter.  Memory in 
story form, as I argue in my chapter on Hellman’s memoirs, provides the organizing logic 
for the data the memoirist encounters as she attempts to access her past, whether that data 
is her old papers or her isolated and non-narrative (or at least less-narrative) glimpsed 
memories.  The inclusion of more data points does not necessarily help bring a 
reconstruction of the past closer to what Ranke called “wie es gewesen ist,” how it was, 
how it happened (57).   
The explosion of potential evidence for lives in the digital age suggests that even 
with an almost unlimited archive of potential evidence, using Hellman’s pentimento 
metaphor for understanding access to the past is still a sleight-of-hand.  In the preface to 
Pentimento, Hellman likens her method as a memoirist to an artist’s “repenting” between 
the original pencil lines and the laying on of paint, which allows viewers centuries later to 
see the artist’s original vision alongside the final one, as the paint ages.  “The paint has 
aged now and I wanted to see what was there for me once, what is there for me now,” she 
says (Hellman, Pentimento 3).  But as I have argued about Hellman’s memoirs, the pencil 
lines beneath the painting of the memoirist will always need to be supplied by the artist 
(and that term could be used for anyone representing his or her past) in the present 
moment.  Evidence is almost invariably uncovered, in historical investigations and 
explorations of the personal past alike, where and because it is sought.  Hellman’s voice 
of memory equates to today’s keywords; without the narrative structure provided by 
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present consciousness, there is no access to the past.  Yet the concept of evidence remains 
powerful.  Like Harjo’s speaker, we assert it to show that “we were there.” 
 The texts examined in this dissertation dismantle the genre detective fiction 
apparatus through which evidence appears to lead to reconstruction and thereby to 
justice.  In Faulkner’s detective fiction and major works alike, the anticipation of the 
story that will eventually be told determines what the investigator figures can see and 
how they interpret it.  In Warren’s All the King’s Men, Jack Burden’s multiple loyalties 
shape his encounter with the evidence.  In Owens’s novels, the investigators’ 
commitments to and education in two diverging epistemologies mean that they approach 
the evidence in the murder cases in ways quite unlike genre fiction detectives.  Hellman’s 
memoirs show evidence to be a rhetorical device subordinate to the authority of the voice 
of memory.  Although they are responding, variously, to the work of Agatha Christie and 
Rex Stout, Dashiell Hammett and Tony Hillerman, all of the texts discussed in this 
dissertation nevertheless suggest, presciently, that this world we live in is not a CSI 
world, in which, as a critic I quoted in the Introduction stated, characters “finish each 
other’s sentences, providing a single interpretive avenue available to anyone who has 
done the training” (Campbell).  And it is not. 
On April 17, 2012, while I was at the library, knee-deep in revisions to the 
Faulkner chapter of this dissertation, my 11-month-old son Noah suffocated to death in a 
back room at his babysitter’s house.  I had dropped him off just two hours earlier.  When 
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I got back to work three months later, the first thing I had to say about evidence was the 
following:71 
Noah was alone in the room; he was the only witness to his death.  His 
babysitter claims she moved him to a regular bed because he would not go to 
sleep in a crib, and that she found him an hour later him on top of a pile of 
stuffed animals in a cubby next to the bed, his feet but not his hands wrapped 
up in a blanket, with nothing limiting his ability to move his face away from 
the stuffed animals.  We waited with some mixture of anxiety and hope for the 
medical examiner’s report, which we thought might give a clearer picture of 
what had happened.  But his findings were clearly enmeshed in the musings of 
the detective and perhaps the testimony of the babysitter: positional 
asphyxiation, the medical examiner concluded; he had become trapped 
between the bed and the wall.  Nothing on Noah’s body as presented to the 
medical examiner, I am quite sure, indicated the participation of a bed and a 
wall in his death.  The detective had a theory; the theory became the 
conclusion of the only piece of evidence supposedly external to the testimony.  
We will never know how much of the babysitter’s testimony about when, 
where, and how our son went down for his nap and when, where, and how she 
later found him was true, how much was misremembered in that moment of 
fear and panic, how much was purposely altered to give her legal protection.  
Had he struggled?  Had he cried?  Would she have heard him if she had been 
listening?  We will never know exactly what sort of injustice may have been 
done, what degree of carelessness led to his death.  A theory formulated by the 
authority figure in the case enabled the production of the autopsy findings, the 
only piece of legal evidence there was.  No one will ever be able to 
reconstruct what happened.   
 
And on those grounds, why try to punish anyone?  Furthermore, what could constitute 
justice for the dead?  There was a great responsibility put on us, to try to decide whether 
to encourage the district attorney to pursue a neglect case.  But what could have been the 
outcome, other than other people (the district attorney, judges, juries) bringing their 
expectations and desires to the story and the evidence that clearly did not tell a story on 
its own? 
                                                           
71
 I admit to a Hellman-like maneuver here; the word-for-word version of the first thing I wrote did not 
quite give all the background information I need it to, at this point six months later, but this passage is close 
to what I wrote. 
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In this case, as in many others, there is no way forward other than the one Bone 
Game proposes: empathy and recognition for the dead.  (Noah’s death, of course, was 
almost certainly an accident, a case of nothing more than a stupid decision that cut a life 
short, while Bone Game is positioned in a history of significant violence, much of it quite 
intentional.)  But when the past is past and the dead are dead, despite all the dreams of 
genre detective fiction, there is no justice; there is only the possibility of recognizing the 
dead.  Like Cole McCurtain, Alex Yazzie, and Jack Burden, I have needed to refuse the 
role of the detective and the promises of genre fiction.  There remains the possibility of 
saying Noah’s name, of trying to listen if he speaks to us somehow, and of telling other 
people about him.  We know that as we tell his story to our other children, it will take on 
a shape of its own and might become further and further distanced from who Noah 
actually was.  The several thousand photographs and hundreds of videos we took of him, 
even the diary entries I wrote about him, do not have their evidentiary power on their 
own, outside of the way we use them in our storytelling.  I rarely hang up a picture of 
Noah crying or pouting, for instance, and I probably rarely took one (though I would 
swear that he was almost always smiling).  But I don’t know; like Hellman I have no way 
to see outside of present consciousness, despite all the potential evidence.   I add him to 
the evidence, as Harjo’s speaker says—because that is how evidence happens, as Harjo 
and Hellman demonstrate—because there is an I who speaks something into evidence.   
The Harjo poem I have quoted here is from a book of poems that is deeply 
invested (though it does other work as well) in putting into words and stories the lives of 
a series of people who had them stolen away and too often kept quiet—among them the 
activists Jacqueline Peters and Anna Mae Pictou Aquash.  In the service of this project, 
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Harjo fills out the details of their lives and deaths imaginatively; there would be no other 
effective way for her to tell their stories, for which there is so little official evidence.  Her 
purpose is not to reconstruct, but to recognize.  In a similar way, all my husband and I 
can do in the present is try to be responsible tellers, try to tell Noah’s story for his sake, 
somehow, yet with an idea of letting the story of his life do good work now.  We try not 
to give it meanings that are unfair to other people in the present—we have joked about 
how we have to be careful not to tell our toddlers, someday, that Noah always ate his 
vegetables and went to bed on time.  (He did neither.)  In spite of the thousands of 
photographs and videos I have stored away, I can still really only assert, like the speaker 
in Harjo’s poem, that I add him to the evidence, that we lived with him and loved him, 
that he lived and loved: we were there.  And we were. 
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